






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THE HARTFORD MILLIONS

THE CHARTERED MILLIONS

RHODESIA AND THE CHALLENGE
TO THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

BY

JOHN H. HARRIS

Author of "Dawn in Darkest Africa," "Africa—Slave or Free,"
"Portuguese Slavery—Britain's Dilemma," etc.

THE SWARTHMORE PRESS LTD.

72 OXFORD STREET, LONDON, W. 1

THE CHARTERED
MILLIONS

AND THE
TO THE

JOHN J. HARRIS

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Dedication

AUGUST THE FOURTH, nineteen hundred and fourteen, will throughout history be a memorable day for Great Britain, because on that day the mightiest Empire known to history was assailed from without by the Central Powers. By an extraordinary coincidence and almost unnoticed by the public, the British Commonwealth was on that same day formally assailed from within by the late Sir Starr Jameson, as the President of the British South Africa Company, who, appearing through Lord Finlay before the highest tribunal of the Empire—the Judicial Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council—advanced claims which challenged some of the most sacred principles upon which had been erected the Colonial structure of Britain's Overseas Dominions.

In admiration and gratitude this book is humbly, but without permission, dedicated to the Right Honourable Lord Harcourt, whose discerning eye had early divined the grave issues which were being raised by the late Sir Starr Jameson, and who, with true statecraft and characteristic energy, decided to uphold at all costs those traditional practices which have made for all that is best in the British Empire.

For the moment, the far-reaching issues may appear somewhat obscure, but future historians of Britain's Colonial policy and development will look upon this struggle as being one of the greatest events in our Colonial history, whilst they will assuredly place foremost in the ranks

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of our Colonial statesmen the one who in 1914 scented danger from afar and decided to test the issues in the boldest and most formal manner.

It would seem, from available material, that Lord Harcourt realized that a wrong had been done to several parties, that a grave deviation in Colonial policy was threatened, and that this, if deliberately pursued, could only lead to national embarrassment and Colonial disaster. If this reading of the situation is correct, the British public should be awakened to the danger of allowing the pursuit of any policy which entrenches the wrong and upholds injustice, whether that injustice be to the shareholders of the Chartered Company, to the British taxpayers, to the white settlers, or to the inarticulate and helpless natives of Southern Rhodesia. The action of Lord Harcourt threw into conflict Ethics and Expediency; it is for the British nation to choose which of the two it will uphold.

PREFACE

THE object of this book is not an exposure of the Chartered Company's methods; it is not an attack upon the present Directors of the Company; it is least of all a criticism of the unfortunate shareholders. It is a plain record of facts which it is hoped will be pondered in official circles, by the Company's Directors and shareholders, and by the public, in the hope that justice will be done where injustice is established—that amends will be made where they are possible.

If the facts are disturbing to the national conscience, the fault lies with those who brought about these facts, and thereby sullied the name of Great Britain, prejudiced their shareholders, and wronged the white and coloured people of Rhodesia, and not with the author, who has only attempted a truthful record of such facts. Finally, the facts are not recorded for the enlightenment of those who see nothing good in British Colonial expansion, neither are they published for those who see in the Chartered Company nothing but evil, for the author has seen and appreciates some good work they have accomplished.

These facts are published with the object, first, of showing how grave has been the injustice to 800,000 native peoples of Southern Rhodesia, and how urgent is the need for such reparation

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as may still be possible; secondly, in order that the public of the British Commonwealth may understand the Rhodesian situation, which will probably prove the determining factor in the forthcoming political and economic evolution of South Africa.

The immediate necessity for this publication arises from the various claims which the British South Africa Company has set up against the British Crown, the Rhodesian settlers and the native tribes inhabiting the territories south of the Zambesi.

These claims set up against the subjects of the British Crown, and against nearly one million natives who are not subjects of the British Crown, are of transcendent importance to the British public. They are without precedent in British Colonial history and affect ultimately, not merely British Colonial statecraft in South Africa, not merely administrative policy in every British colony, but the traditions and principles upon which the British Empire has been erected—principles which so magnificently justified themselves during the Great War.

To the Judicial Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council was originally referred the initial question of the commercial ownership of lands nearly as great in extent as those of Great Britain. The advice of this supreme tribunal of Law Lords, which they tendered in 1918 to the Imperial Government, only affects one part of the claim, and but a few of the far-reaching issues which are involved by the Chartered Company's contentions. The British Parliament and public, engrossed as they have been in the Great European War, may be excused from following during that period an intricate Colonial problem, but no time must

be lost in realizing that the advice given by the Judicial Committee and the subsequent steps to be taken by the Imperial Parliament will also vitally affect the stability of British administration in all tropical and subtropical dependencies.

There has been no attempt in this book to enter into a mass of scientific detail upon the technical problems of the mining, agricultural and other industries, but an effort has been made to excite the interest of the ordinary reader in the progress of Rhodesia. In dealing with the political history and problems of Rhodesia every statement has been fortified, so far as possible, with references or quotations; whilst in outlining the claims of the British South Africa Company, and the attitude of the opponents to those claims, the arguments brought forth are those which it is hoped will appeal to the British public as being based upon common sense and sound policy. As the author is but a layman in legal matters, any attempt to base argument upon legal subtleties would savour of impertinence, and therefore no such attempt has been made.

Throughout the book every effort has been made to look at the different historic incidents from the Company's point of view, and to a plain statement of fact. It has not been easy to avoid declamation, and at times it has been difficult to restrain one's pen, but the stinging word and the burning phrase which a hundred times have surged through the brain have remained unwritten.

The history of the Chartered Company's activity has from the beginning circled round those stormy personalities, Cecil Rhodes and Leander Starr Jameson. The measure of criti-

cism expressed on the one hand, and admiration on the other, for their conceptions, will vary according to individual perspective. The writer knew neither of them, has had no connection whatever with the Company, nor any financial interest to serve either in connection with the Company or with Rhodesia, but he has seen their work and compared it with that achieved in other parts of the African continent. He has also given long study to the publications of the British South Africa Company both in England and in Rhodesia, and also to a long series of State documents. This research has provided an absorbing occupation, whilst the problems now raised are of exceptional interest to all students of Colonial affairs.

It would be as foolish to ignore the breezy Imperialism and the bold conceptions of Cecil Rhodes as it would be to ignore the fact that "Dr. Jameson" never hesitated to "rush in where angels feared to tread." But issues are now raised in a region where sentiment has no place, where every act and every argument must pass before the searching scrutiny of public opinion and criticism.

This book is but a modest endeavour to lay before the British public at home and abroad the past, present and future of Southern Rhodesia, the rights and wrongs, real and imaginary, first of the British people themselves, and secondly, of those native races who have been dispossessed of all their just rights in the country which for generations had been their own.

In the preparation of this book I am indebted to many individuals for counsel and help. The speeches, writings and counsel of Rhodesians have been of enormous assistance, and I tender heartfelt thanks to Sir Charles Coghlan, the late

PREFACE


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J. S. Moffat, the Revs. Shearly Cripps and John White, Messrs. H. U. Moffat, H. Longden, R. A. Fletcher, A. D. Brade, A. C. Raymer, and to other administrators, settlers and missionaries. I am especially indebted to my friend Sir Charles Tarring for the patience and care which he has devoted to the manuscript. He has brought to bear upon the pages of this book the critical mind of an Imperial servant of high judicial authority in Colonial and foreign affairs, coupled with a long personal experience in overseas territories under Great Britain and other Powers, including a visit to Rhodesia. This authoritative collaboration has saved the author from many a pitfall, and for this he tenders his humble and grateful thanks.

With the kind permission of the publishers I have been allowed to reproduce substantial extracts from the following books :—

BOOK	PUBLISHERS	AUTHORS
The Ancient Ruins of Rhodesia	Methuen & Co.	R. N. Hall & W. G. Neal.
The Downfall of Lobengula	Simpkin, Marshall & Co.	W. A. Willis & Lt. Collingridge.
With Rhodes in Mashonaland	J. C. Juta & Co.	D. C. de Waal, M.L.A.
Matabeleland	T. Fisher Unwin	Capt. C. L. Norris Newman
Black and White in South-East Africa	Longmans & Co.	Maurice S. Evans.
Memories of Mashonaland	Arnold	Bishop Knight Bruce.
The South African Scene	Smith, Elder & Co.	V. R. Markham.

JOHN H. HARRIS.



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The Report of the Judicial Committee of Special Reference, 1918.
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African World. February 13, 1915.
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PART I


SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND HER PEOPLE

Chronology.

Rhodesia and her People.

The Early Native Inhabitants.

Rhodesia's Riddle.



CHRONOLOGY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

DATES	REFERENCE
A.D.	Arabs known to be settled in Sofala.
903.	
1486.	Cape of Good Hope discovered by Dias.
1496.	Vasco de Gama "doubles" the African Continent and anchors at Sofala.
1560.	Christianity introduced into the Zambesi Valley by Jesuit Fathers.
1570.	Father Silveira murdered by natives.
1600.	Zulu (Amaswazie) invasion of Monomotapa.
1826.	Umsiligasi in Zululand revolts against Chaka, "the Zulu Napoleon."
1829.	Umsiligasi, founder of the Matabele nation, first meets white men.
1829.	Friendship commences between Robert Moffat and Umsiligasi—foundation laid of Matabele friendship with British.
1838.	Umsiligasi and the Matabele reach the Zambesi River.
1853. Feb. 9.	Sir Starr Jameson born.
1853. July 5.	Cecil Rhodes born.
1854.	Moffat (Dr.) joins Umsiligasi in Matabeleland.

DATES	REFERENCE
1868.	Death of Umsiligasi.
1868.	Adam Renders, a white farmer, settles in Zambabwe.
1868-1870.	Lobengula refuses paramountcy and Matabele ruled by Regent and Council.
1870.	Lobengula accepts paramountcy.
1887.	Alex. Boggie and party trek from Pretoria to Matabeleland and form friendship with Lobengula.
1888. Feb. 11.	J. S. Moffat, son of Dr. Moffat, obtains signature to Anglo-Matabele Treaty.
1888. Oct. 30.	The Rudd-Rhodes Concession signed.
1889. Apr. 23.	The Rudd-Rhodes Concession denounced by Matabele.
1889. Oct. 29.	Royal Charter granted to British South Africa Company.
1890. Mar. 19.	"Pioneers" start from Kimberley.
1892. Mar. 8.	Chartered Company attack and kill Mashonas and then take their cattle. Cd. 7171. p. 24-26.
1892.	The Lippert Concession purchased by Chartered Company.
1892.	<i>Financial Times</i> states Chartered Company in Mashonaland doing "all in their power to provoke Lobengula." Cd. 7171. p. 10.
1893. July 9.	Matabele kill Mashonas, capture cattle and burn kraals. Cd. 7555. p. 4.
1893. July 22.	Jameson wires Dr. Rutherford Harris urging to be allowed to settle the question (Matabele) finally. Cd. 7171. p. 60.

CHRONOLOGY

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DATES		REFERENCE
1893. July 27.	Lobengula remonstrates with Chartered Company, charging them with having "come not only to dig the gold, but to rob me of my people and country as well."	Cd. 7171. p. 67.
1893. Aug. 3.	J. W. Colenbrander at Bulawayo urges High Commissioner to "send a word of caution to Dr. Jameson and Dr. Harris."	Cd. 7171. p. 67.
1893. Aug. 7.	Manager of Tati Concession again appeals to High Commissioner for protection in the event of declaration of war against Matabele by Chartered Company, and expresses the opinion "that the object and aim of it all is British aggrandisement."	Cd. 7171. p. 70.
1893. Aug. 13.	Lobengula refuses to receive concession payments from Chartered Company because he says it is "the price of his blood."	Cd. 7196. p. 28.
1893. Aug. 14.	Without the knowledge of the Imperial Government, Sir Starr Jameson signs the "Victoria Agreement," offering lands, gold, "loot," and other advantages to those who will enlist for the invasion of Matabeleland.	
1893. Aug. 16.	High Commissioner, informed that Matabele had "fired on white men," remonstrates with Lobengula for Victoria attack. Thanks him for "the protection he has hitherto always extended to white men."	Cd. 7196. p. 13.

DATES		REFERENCE
1893. Aug. 24.	Lobengula writes to Queen Victoria, sending letters by special envoys.	Cd. 7196. p. 27.
1893. Aug. 29.	High Commissioner informs Lobengula by telegraph that he will be glad to receive the Matabele envoys.	Cd. 7196. p. 32.
1893. Sep. 4.	High Commissioner offers to cover all expenses of envoys' visit to Cape Town and back to Bulawayo.	Cd. 7196. p. 38.
1893. Sep. 11.	Lord Ripon suggests that Dr. Jameson should in future conduct correspondence with Lobengula only through the High Commissioner. Sir Henry Loch replies that he had a month earlier instructed Dr. Jameson to this effect.	Cd. 7196. p. 14.
1893. Sep. 18.	Colonel Goold Adams informs High Commissioner that Dr. Jameson "will not be able to keep the Salisbury and Victoria people much longer inactive; they will either do something to bring on a row or will leave the country."	Cd. 7196. p. 61.
1893. Sep. 25.	Dawson at Bulawayo informs High Commissioner that "Loben" does not want to fight, and that he will not do so unless actually forced to it in self-defence.	Cd. 7196. p. 70.
1893. Oct. 3.	Dr. Jameson acknowledges, and thanks High Commissioner for giving him "discretionary powers to take the necessary measures to clear the border" of Matabele impis.	Cd. 7196. p. 82.

CHRONOLOGY

23

DATES		REFERENCE
1893. Oct. 18.	Lobengula's three envoys reach Goold Adams' camp. Two killed same night through misunderstanding.	Cd. 7196. p. 75.
1893. Oct. 22.	Imperial Government instructs that all negotiations with Lobengula are to be conducted by and under the complete control of the High Commissioner.	Cd. 7196. p. 73.
1893. Oct. 24.	Chartered Company claim right to settle terms with Lobengula. Imperial Government objects, and insists upon control.	Cd. 7290. p. 1.
1893. Nov. 1.	Reported occupation of Bulawayo, capture of Lobengula's cattle by Chartered Company's troops, and Lobengula fleeing 140 miles west of Charter.	Cd. 7290.
1893. Dec. 10.	Dr. Jameson reported to be marking out townships in Matabeleland, and the patrols seizing large numbers of cattle. Marquis of Ripon asks what truth in these reports.	Cd. 7290. p. 25.
1893. Dec. 29.	Sir Henry Loch, in ignorance of Sir Starr Jameson's Secret Agreement, informs Marquis of Ripon that "there is no appropriation of land" in Matabeleland.	Cd. 7290. p. 59.
1894. Jan. 2.	Sir Starr Jameson informs High Commissioner that provisional selection of townships and farms is taking place. High Commissioner acknowledges that this is "entirely satisfactory."	Cd. 7290. p. 59.
1894. Jan. 12.	High Commissioner urges Colonel Goold Adams to try and open negotiations with Loben-	Cd. 7290. p. 76.

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DATES		REFERENCE
	gula and promises him "most honourable and courteous treatment."	
1894. Jan. 12.	Lobengula's envoys robbed of peace offering, beaten and driven away.	
1894. Feb. 26.	Death of Lobengula reported.	Cd. 7292. p. 88.
1895. Dec. 29.	Sir Starr Jameson invades the Transvaal Republic.	Cd. 165. p. 9.
1896. Feb.-June.	Attempt to regain freedom by Matabele and Mashona tribes and massacre of whites.	
1896. Feb.	The Duke of Fife and Lord Farquhar resigned their seats on the Company's Board.	
1896. March.	Earl Grey succeeds Sir Starr Jameson as Administrator.	
1896. June.	Messrs. Cecil Rhodes and Beit resign position on Chartered Company's Board.	
1902.	Death of Cecil Rhodes.	
1904.	Earl Grey becomes Governor-General in Canada.	
1906. July 16.	Death of Mr. Alfred Beit.	
1907. Oct.	Directors of the Chartered Company visit Rhodesia to confer with "the Delegates of the People."	
1907.	Gold output exceeds two millions sterling annually.	
1910. May 31.	Union of South Africa takes effect.	
1911. June 5.	Death of Lord Gifford.	
1913. Jan. 3.	Death of the Duke of Abercorn.	
1914. Aug. 4.	The Rhodesia Land Case brought before the Judicial Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council.	

CHRONOLOGY

25

DATES

REFERENCE

Present :

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Viscount Haldane of Cloan),

THE RT. HON. LORD DUNEDIN,

THE RT. HON. LORD ATKINSON,

THE RT. HON. LORD MOULTON,

THE RT. HON. LORD SUMNER, and

THE RT. HON. THE LORD CHIEF

JUSTICE OF ENGLAND (Lord Reading).

1918. July 29. Report issued by Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declaring the Lippert Concession a *valueless* document as a title to the land, and that legal title was therefore vested in the British Crown.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND HER PEOPLE

RHODESIA to the homeland Britisher is almost a synonym for heated controversy. From its early days the Zambesi valley has excited the deepest passions of our political life; that it will do so again, and this time more violently than ever, is certain, and this fact is recognized by all South Africans. It was the author's privilege to spend some time with one of the greatest statesmen, if not the greatest, in South Africa, who, discussing the affairs of Rhodesia and her future administration, said: "If you in the Home Country succeed in obtaining a complete exposure of the history of Rhodesia, the British public will experience the greatest shock it has known since the bursting of the South Sea Bubble."

To the majority of Rhodesians the land of their adoption is "God's own country," particularly to those who are connected with any of the countless commercial ventures of the Chartered Company. The same sentiment is expressed by the "Free Settlers," that is, by those who are in no way connected with either the Chartered Company or any of its controlled offshoots; to these men also Rhodesia is "God's own country," but even as they express this opinion, such men launch out with a string of qualifications—"If it were not for the drought; if it were not for the fevers; if it were not for

the cost of living; and yes, if it were not for the—Chartered Company."

The Chartered Company, or—to give to this corporation its full title—the British South Africa Company, has admittedly a heavy burden to bear, for which in many respects the Company has only itself to thank, but this is no justification for placing upon the Directors in London Wall the responsibility for every shortcoming, every financial disaster, every drought, every epidemic—in short, all the political, economic and social ills to which the Rhodesian colonist is heir. Every one agrees, however, that if in popular phraseology Rhodesia is "God's own country," it is also true that the Prince of Evil is pretty much in evidence as a rival claimant.

In this book I am concerned primarily—almost solely—with Southern Rhodesia, because this huge tract of territory between the Limpopo and Zambesi rivers presents, in an ever increasing degree, the most absorbing of Colonial and Imperial problems, and this mainly because the future of the Chartered Company, and to a considerable extent Britain's Colonial policy, hinges on the solution of these problems. The decisions and principles which will arise out of the Rhodesian controversy and be hammered out during the next few years by legal and diplomatic action, as has been said, cannot fail to affect intimately British Imperial development in every part of the Empire.

Southern Rhodesia is bounded on the north by the Barotse Protectorate, on the east by Portuguese East Africa, on the south and west by the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and on the south by what was *German* South-West Africa and the Transvaal. The boundary lines are

drawn by the broad and swift flowing Zambesi in the north, the Limpopo and the Shashi in the south, and in the east by the Sabi and its tributaries. The total area of Southern Rhodesia is about 148,000 square miles, or nearly three times the size of England. The total population is about 800,000 natives and nearly 30,000 whites.

The traveller arrives in Rhodesia from the south with a feeling of intense relief. For some twenty-four hours the "express" train has dragged its weary, dusty way at fifteen miles an hour along the edge of the Kalahari desert. The seats of the compartments, the windows of the coaches, every nook and crevice are pervaded with fine white dust flying before the blinding storms of this almost invincible desert. From the clouds of dust nothing escapes—the luncheon car of the train is peppered with it, the carefully prepared food "grates" on the teeth with it, the nostrils are choked and the throat parched with it, whilst the eyes are kept in a state of perpetual irritation, and the very hair of one's head becomes matted and caked. The welcome change first greets the traveller soon after crossing the Shashi river (a river of water or sand as the season dictates), when the never-ending desert is left behind, and farther on the admiring gaze upon the magnificent kopjes of Matabeleland.

In fancy the reviving traveller imagines these great stretches of hills and valleys to have been the playground of the Titans. In inexhaustible profusion the land is everywhere strewn with mighty boulders; here a couple of huge monoliths rear themselves like two mighty goal-posts in some football match of a past age, when the players were giants and the balls solid

granite weighing a score of tons. A mile in the distance is a row of huge square blocks challenging the intelligence for an answer as to how they were shaped and moved to their present positions; yet a mile farther and again one is struck dumb with wonder as the question leaps forward, how came that rock thither? For there, delicately poised on a rock weighing a hundred tons, is a lesser egg-shaped boulder weighing perhaps twenty tons, whose point resting on the nether rock invites the foolish traveller to attempt the apparently simple effort of pushing it over the hillside. At last one wearies of the interminable mental gymnastics which those countless kopjes inspire, and gives up the game of conjecture about the play of the Titans and comes to solid earth again, admiring the scenic beauty of Matabeleland.

Mashonaland to the north-east is in many respects and many parts a striking contrast to Matabeleland. It appears to give greater promise of an agricultural future. The Selukwe province, for example, shows very considerable signs of agricultural development already, whilst farming prospects in the Victoria region are not unattractive. In Mashonaland, however, one also meets with ranges of those picturesque kopjes which so strongly impress the traveller upon entering Matabeleland some hundred miles south.

The great drawback of Southern Rhodesia is the irregularity of the rainfall and the consequent drying up of the riverine system. Any ordinary map of the country has traced across it large rivers and countless tributaries—the Crocodile or Limpopo, the Shashi, the Shangani, the Bubyé, the Insiza, the Senqwe, the Sabi, the Towke—each with its system of tributaries

leads to the belief that the country is well watered. How far from true this is may be gathered from the fact that every few years the major part of the farming community is faced with the prospect of ruin owing to the lack of rain and the complete evaporation of the rivers and lakes.

In the western and central regions of the African continent the most striking feature is the luxuriance of the flora. Everywhere there stretch vast forests of giant trees, everywhere there is creeping vine and matted undergrowth. But Southern Rhodesia knows few of these things, and the bush or forest in local parlance generally means a few gnarled trees of diminutive size interspersed with mimosa bush. Traveling northwards towards the Zambesi valley, one finds the vegetation more imposing, but nowhere to be compared with the luxurious forest growth of Central Africa proper, except on a small scale near the Victoria Falls, where the Rain Forest, which is, after all, little more than a wooded path, resembles somewhat the tracks through the equatorial jungle. The more massive growth at this spot is doubtless due to the almost incessant spray from the Rapids, which keeps the ground moist even in the driest weather. In the bush tracks in the vicinity of the Falls big game is frequently found—the leopard, the chimpanzee and other creatures of the forest sometimes appearing on the frequented road. The Falls of the Zambesi, said to be twice as high as Niagara, are on a panoramic scale extending for nearly a mile, and forming an imposing spectacle. The spray, originally called by the natives mosi-oa-tunya (the thunder-sounding smoke), can be seen for many miles, and the roar of the water is audible

at a great distance. The hippo and the crocodile inhabit the waters above the Falls, and the former are at times dangerous to small river craft on which the natives travel up and down the Zambesi and its tributaries.

THE EARLY NATIVE INHABITANTS

THE history of the native races in Rhodesia, as of all African peoples, is full of romance, and would of itself make a book of absorbing interest. In this work I can only attempt a general outline of the history and customs of the races which have inhabited this part of the African continent, but nevertheless an outline sufficiently ample to render more intelligible some of the later chapters of the book.

Arabian, Persian and later Portuguese writers tell us that the earliest occupants of what is now Southern Rhodesia were of the bushman race, and that the original name for the Southern Rhodesian territory was the Land of the Abutwa. That bushmen were the early inhabitants is evidenced by the fact that there are still in existence in several places the "bushmen paintings"—those crude but in many respects strikingly accurate line sketches of hunting scenes, animals and native types. The pure bushman type has disappeared from Rhodesia, indeed from the whole of South Africa proper, although the late Mr. J. S. Moffat assured the author that a small but pure-blooded tribe of bushmen is still in existence in Namaqualand.

Those who visit Cape Town Museum have an opportunity of seeing types of real bushmen—the little light-skinned hunter is there, the lighter-skinned mother and child, the young and old in striking and lifelike attitudes as if engaged

in their daily occupations ; but in British South Africa the pure-blooded bushman of the Middle Ages is extinct. It was upon this bushman population that the Bantu hordes descended from the great equatorial regions—the black-skinned Zulu and the Xosa tribes, followed by the lighter-skinned and more refined Nilotic tribes. Somewhat later there was a still larger immigration, particularly of the Njanga tribes, and from these sprang the great Makaranga nation, although it is said that to this day there is still a small pure-blooded Xosa tribe living near the southern bank of the Zambesi.

The Makaranga, or "Children of the Sun," dominated the Zambesi and Limpopo valley from the early sixteenth century, and the fame of their rulers was such that it spread to the Courts of Portugal and Persia. Dissension in the Monomotapa kingdom, coupled with a further incursion of tribes from the north, broke up the Empire, which then gradually drifted into decay. From the Makaranga and kindred tribes descended the so-called Mashonas of to-day, who number about 400,000 and occupy the eastern and northern areas of Southern Rhodesia. The Mashona tribes, broken up into units under petty chiefs, and without national organization, had become during the early nineteenth century a dispirited race, and are to-day popularly believed to be less virile and intellectual than the Matabele. Opinions, however, differ considerably upon the future of these two races, because Mashonas, being the more tractable, are apt pupils in the mining and industrial areas, whilst the fighting qualities they exhibited under Matabele leadership in 1897 surprised every one.

The occupation of what is now Matabeleland

by Umsiligasi and his followers took place eighty-two years ago. As the native laws, customs and character of these people known to us as Matabele or Amandabele are essential to any historical sketch of Southern Rhodesia, they are dealt with somewhat fully. Romance and tragedy have jostled each other from the day of Matsobane, the father of Umsiligasi, until the savage but in some respects noble savage Lobengula perished, or more correctly is alleged to have perished, on the farther banks of the river Bubyé.

It is a familiar story how the redoubtable Chaka, the Napoleon of South Africa, was as a young man driven into exile by his father, how by serving Europeans this Zulu youth learned the art of European warfare, and how, upon the death of his father, he returned to his tribe and ruthlessly organized factious elements into the mightiest military despotism in native South African history. Under Chaka, every Zulu youth was a soldier who knew but to conquer or to die. Chaka's Zulu hosts annually raided territories far and wide, subjecting the conquered tribes to great cruelty, and then returning with booty in the shape of wives, slaves and cattle, the wives being given to the Zulu soldiers and the boy slaves incorporated in the Zulu army.

About the year 1825, serving in Chaka's army was a youth of great promise, the son of Matsobane, and a nephew of the then future Zulu king, Dingaan. This youth was named Umsiligasi, or "the Bloody Pathway," and he soon rose rapidly in favour with Chaka, who had a keen eye for promising and fearless generalship. In the course of time Umsiligasi was given supreme command of one of the great

Zulu armies, and instructed to raid territories to the northward. The success which attended this expedition and the booty secured were, however, the cause of a breach with the terrible Chaka.

The dashing young Zulu general had carried everything before him, and had returned to Zululand with a large number of prisoners and great herds of cattle. The Matabele natives to-day possess in the fullest detail the story of this victorious return of Umsiligasi and his quarrel with Chaka. Young Umsiligasi refused to surrender either the cattle or the prisoners to Chaka, but demanded a division of the spoil. To the Zulu the claim to cattle is a challenge to sovereignty, and therefore at this demand Chaka was naturally furious, and at once launched a terrific attack upon the followers of Umsiligasi, who, realizing that Zululand could only be occupied peacefully by one king, retired northward, crossed the Drakensbergs, literally swarmed through the Transvaal, and then, falling upon and driving out the Bechuanas, Umsiligasi and his warring tribes settled themselves in the Marico valley, one of the most picturesque and fertile spots in South Africa.

But Umsiligasi was not allowed to rest very long in his new and beautifully situated home. Ten years later the Boers commenced to settle in this region, and ultimately attacked Umsiligasi, drove him from the banks of the Marico, and captured large herds of his cattle. Umsiligasi then moved farther north and occupied the territories between the Limpopo and the Zambesi, where he founded the Matabele kingdom in or about the year 1838, or some twelve years after the breach with Chaka in Zululand. Umsiligasi then ruled the Matabele nation for nearly thirty

years, and by following in the main the practices of Chaka, and raiding one or other of the surrounding territories once a year, he built up a great—and for a time invincible—warrior nation. Umsiligasi died in the year 1868, and should have been succeeded by Kuruman, a royal heir absent for some reason in Natal. For two years the country was governed by the regent and council, and ultimately a son of Umsiligasi, Lobengula, reluctantly agreed to accept the sovereignty. This was instantly challenged by some of the Matabele regiments, but Lobengula, confident of his backing, met and defeated the hostile forces, and was installed as king towards the end of January 1870. Lobengula continued the policy of his father Umsiligasi for nearly twenty-three years, until he was driven from power under circumstances enumerated in later chapters.

One of the most popular delusions held by Europeans is that these African chieftainships are without any form of constitutional, and still less of democratic, government; nothing could be further from the truth. That their constitution—like that of Britain—is not committed to writing is true, but the broad lines of government are indelibly written on the minds of the national trustees. To this the Matabele nation was no exception, whilst governmental practice showed, to those prepared to look for them, signs of remarkable development. Their form of government was by a Council of Indunas and Royal Councillors, that is, by the headmen of certain districts, and also by those relatives of the king from whom a successor would be chosen. The regent was also on the council, but the most important councillor was, it would seem, neither a relative,

regent, nor induna, but the supreme head of the Abaqua-dunē, a priestly caste whose duty it was to control all court ceremony. The king could do nothing without the sanction of this Matabele archbishop, neither could he travel without him, and it is reported that when Lobengula was retiring before the Chartered Company's troops he finally rode away on a horse accompanied only by Bosungwana, who at the time was the head of the Abaqua-dunē.

The regimental military system, the chase, even the units and commissariat of the raiding impis were all on a democratic basis, whilst the principles of the land system differ but little from those which land reformers are striving to secure in England. Briefly stated, the land system rests upon the basic principle that land, rain and sun form a single combination for the benefit of man, that none shall have a monopoly, that each should have a sufficiency for his need "without money and without price." Therefore the incorporation of a man or tribe as units in the nation carries with it the right to an equal share in these God-sent gifts. It follows that he who would rob a man of land would in the eyes of the native, rob a man of the power to live, and thus become the enemy of mankind to be fought to the death. The European conception of land as a commercial asset is as alien to the native mind as would be a similar claim to a monopoly of the sun or air, and the effort to force this conception upon the Matabele was one of the contributory causes of the war between the bold forces of the Chartered Company and the not less courageous Matabele. In the end the European conception, backed by weapons of precision, prevailed.

The Matabele have been referred to as a

courageous nation. That they were at times guilty of outrageous cruelties there can be no question, but in the field of battle they had few peers in the nineteenth century. Sir John Willoughby, who fought in the 1893 Matabele "war," says: "I must record the pluck of these two regiments, which was simply splendid, and I doubt if any European troops could have withstood for such a long time as they did the terrific and well-directed fire brought to bear on them." At the head of this nation was the historic figure of Lobengula, or "Loben" as he was familiarly, and to some extent affectionately, known, but "Loben" was a savage—at least according to European conception, and more particularly was he a savage in the opinion of the British South Africa Company, whose leading officials could find no denunciation too strong for the splendid—and I do not hesitate to say noble—savage who dared to risk all for the rights of his primitive but highly organized Matabele nation. Whether he was, all things considered, more barbarous than his accusers, these pages will show. The following is a picture of Lobengula supplied to the author by one of the several white men who knew him intimately, and who, like all such men, in the completeness of their knowledge refused to share the denunciation levelled at the Matabele king by Sir Starr (then Dr.) Jameson and his immediate entourage.

"Yes! Old Loben was every inch a king! Most white men liked him, although he could be very cruel at times. Above medium height, and well-proportioned to corpulency, he probably weighed nearly eighteen stone. Arrayed in a magnificent kaross with handsome tails sewn to the border, a blue sash, and with his stately movements, he made a striking figure and looked very regal. His eyes were

large and protruded somewhat, and when he was angry few cared to face the sternness which a glance from those eyes indicated. But Loben never lost his temper; under the most trying circumstances he invariably maintained an outward calm.

"A curious custom was that he always lived in a wagon, never in a house, whilst he seldom outspanned for long. 'Loben,' being very much attached to the white men he trusted, always wished them to accompany him when he moved his Court.

"'Loben' was so attracted to X—— that he agreed to his marrying his daughter, and the marriage was carried out in a binding manner according to Matabele custom. Another white man, however, fell into disgrace through committing what was to 'Loben' the unpardonable sin—he told 'Loben' a deliberate lie! With terrible sternness, but with characteristic regal calm, that man was peremptorily ordered out of Matabeleland, with the words 'never let me see your face again.'"

Apropos of Lobengula's hatred of lying, and insistence upon the truth in all circumstances, a good story is told, for the correctness of which I cannot vouch, of a meeting once with the late Sir Starr Jameson. Lobengula, being a great witch doctor, was one day making one of his mysterious and spell-binding concoctions when it is said Sir Starr Jameson visited Bulawayo and approached the sacred precincts of the enclosure and asked a question upon a certain matter. "Loben" was at first amazed at the temerity of a white man venturing upon such forbidden ground, then, after fixing his gaze for a minute or two upon Sir Starr Jameson, vouchsafed, it is said, a reply in the cryptic remark: "Dr. Jameson, remember—a Matabele king never tells a lie!" This presumably referred to one of those personal agreements which were known to exist between Sir Starr Jameson and Lobengula.

RHODESIA'S RIDDLE

To any student of history Rhodesia has one absorbing, almost irritating puzzle. The histories of those romantic personalities King Solomon, Hiram, King of Tyre, and the dusky Queen of Sheba have for centuries enchanted the minds of old and young alike, whilst their fabulous wealth has been perpetually challenged as to the land of its origin. Was the present-day Rhodesia the source of this colossal wealth?

If Rhodesia was not the fount of gold to those Eastern potentates, whence, then, did they obtain it; and moreover, what explanation is there of these mighty works in Rhodesia whose ruins to-day present to the excavator one of the world's greatest riddles, defying, up to the present day, any authoritative solution. The existing evidence leaves the origin or object of these vast works undetermined.

The traveller through Rhodesia looks on in wonder at kopjes whose boulders are linked together and rendered impregnable to assault by granite walls, in most cases several feet thick. In any single ruin there must be hundreds of thousands, and in some cases millions of granite blocks shaped by some prodigious human agency and then built into walls and structures covering extensive areas of the territory in the Zambesi valley. But these works had not merely a protective value to the ancient gold workers,

for Zimbabwe affords evidence of religious worship—its symbols and construction can have no other significance. The traveller gazes in wonder upon the symmetry of its walls and passages, and marvelled at the amazing efforts of those early builders who, in order to rear the Acropolis, had to carry up the steep kopje of 200 feet, thousands upon thousands of neatly shaped granite bricks; and whilst the traveller reflects upon the immensity of that single task, his thoughts dwell in logical sequence upon the work of hewing and shaping those blocks with primitive implements, and his meditations leave him amazed and perplexed.

It is clear, at least to most people, that these vast structures were not the work of the indigenous African, but of some immigrant race—a race bent not upon colonization, but upon the exploitation of the resources of the valley. There is abundant evidence in support of this theory which leads to the further question, namely, what was the commodity to secure which this race of people were prepared to spend such energy? The answer to this is equally clear, for their implements remain to this day—not single instruments in a given spot, but hundreds of them scattered over the entire territory—the implements of the gold seeker, picks, crucibles, gold wiring presses and metal engravers. Nor is this all, for many of the old workings remain to-day just as they were hurriedly forsaken one tragic day many centuries ago, whilst scattered around in the debris are tiny fragments of pure gold, beads, wire, and countless little nails, all of solid gold. It will never be known, certainly not within some millions of pounds, how much precious metal was won in these distant centuries from

what is now Rhodesia, but the most conservative expert estimate is that of not less than seventy-five million pounds sterling.

Though the question of the antiquity of these ruined cities is one which has long occupied the attention of scientific men, and though a certain amount of excavation has been done, no satisfactory conclusion has been reached as to their origin. A veil of mystery still hangs over those five hundred widely scattered ruins of Zambesia. The Great Zimbabwe near Fort Victoria, Mashonaland, is one of the most interesting because the most perfect, and there seems some evidence that this place was the Metropolis of the Ancients and their centre of religious worship. The ruins cover an area of 800 miles by 700 miles, extending from Sofala on the east to Victoria on the west, from the Zambesi on the north to the Murchison Range, Transvaal, on the south. Within the last forty years, travellers had reported upon the existence of these ruins in the territories known as Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Manicaland; ruins whose construction pointed to the presence in the country, long centuries since, of a civilized industrial race.

To Adam Renders (who farmed in the Zimbabwe district in 1868) belongs the honour of having rediscovered the fortress temple, and the surrounding district was explored by Herr Mauch first in 1871. Sir H. Rider Haggard says:

"In 1891, after the occupation of Mashonaland by the Chartered Company of British South Africa, Mr. Bent, the learned explorer, visited the ruins of Zimbabwe and proved to the satisfaction of most archæologists that they are undoubtedly of Phœnician origin (though there are evidences of a still earlier occupation

of the country by Sabeans or Himyaritic Arabs). There are the massive and familiar Phœnician walls, there the sacred birds, figured however not as the dove of Cypris, but as the vulture, the symbol of her Sidonian representative Astarte, and there in plenty the primitive and unpleasing objects of nature worship which in this shape or that are present wherever the Phœnician reared his shrines. There also stands the great building—half temple, half fortress—containing the sacred cone in its inner court as at Paphos (in Cyprus), Byblos (in Phœnicia), and Emesus (in Syria). It is now ascertained, moreover, that within the walls of this temple men did not only celebrate their cruel and licentious rites, they also carried on their trade of gold smelting. Here have been found crucibles and moulds for the refined metal, and stones upon which it was burnished,"¹ besides decorated and engraved beads, wire, tacks, and other objects of pure gold.

In the Zimbabwe ruins, as in those of Khami and the more scattered ones along the Anglo-Portuguese border, the conclusion is irresistible that the ancient gold-seekers, whoever they were, numbered many thousands, and that in turn they must have been able to force and then control from amongst the native population a multiple of their own numbers in order to carry out these works of which the ruins only remain to-day—no other conclusion as to numbers is possible. It is further evident that these immigrants were an imperious race capable of imposing their will upon the indigenous people of the country, otherwise, how could they have forced them to labour incessantly at this colossal and exacting task? This raises the further

¹ *Monomotapa*, Wilmot (T. Fisher Unwin).

question as to the nationality or nationalities of these ancient immigrants.

It is not merely the character of the ruins, their symmetry and extent which point to the skill of these ancient gold-seekers, for evidence of skill in gold working is found in the remarkable tools and ornaments discovered in the few areas which have been subject to excavation. In the Museum at Bulawayo can be seen to-day a cast of the "golden sun" image, flint axes, ancient quartz-crushing hammer, soapstone tablet, copper bar and a phallus, besides a soapstone image. In the Cape Town Museum there are five soapstone birds which were discovered at Zimbabwe.

In 1891 Messrs. Theodore Bent and H. Swan discovered at Zimbabwe the soapstone birds which authorities declare to be similar to the images of birds sacred to Astarte; they also discovered a considerable quantity of foreign pottery and glass of demonstrably Persian, Arabian and Egyptian origin. Dr. Flinders Petrie discovered south of the Zambesi a figure which he describes as follows:

Ushabaté figure, probably of a courtier of Tahutmes III. Upper part of an Ushabaté figure of pottery impressed in a mould. On the head is an elaborate wig, in each hand a scourge instead of a hoe. On the chest is the cartouche of Tahutmes III (about 1450 B.C.). Three lines of inscription remain below, so much effaced that only the title "Osiris" can be seen; but there is no trace of a cartouche with it. The wig and the scourges in the hands point to this being a figure of the king himself, but his name cannot be traced in the lower inscription. As to the source, the figure is certainly genuinely ancient, and by its smell it has been buried in moist earth (not in an Egyptian tomb), and has not been kept long by an Arab.*

* *The Ancient Ruins of Rhodesia*, R. N. Hall and W. G. Neal, p. 143 (Methuen).

The "finds" in the ruins, so far as they have been excavated, include gold beads weighing over two ounces, gold chain work, quantities of gold tacks, pellets of gold, bangles of gold, cakes of smelted gold, instruments for shaping and making gold ornaments, domestic utensils and military arms used for defensive purposes. Mr. Hall states that the total weight of gold ornaments discovered up to the present date is over 2,000 ounces.

There is not merely evidence, but local tradition, that, whoever these ancients were, they ultimately left the country apparently in a panic. The native to-day, when discussing the manner in which they are treated by the Administration in certain areas, console each other with the interesting reflection: "Our fathers told us that in the past ages white men came here for gold, and that one night they were seized with panic and fled never to return—what happened then will happen again, and then we shall once more own our land."

Three different theories are advanced as to the meaning of this sudden panic. Some incline to the view that it was due to an astronomical or geological movement of considerable magnitude; others, that it was due to an epidemic of disease; but by far the greater number hold that it was due to an uprising of the servile indigenous people. The advocates of insurrection point out with no little force that the ruins of Rhodesia imply the enslavement of many thousands of the inhabitants, that the tasks of hewing and transporting millions of granite blocks was exceedingly arduous, and that, as in the case of the Israelitish tribes in Egypt, it was inevitable that sooner or later the wretched slaves would revolt.

All that can be safely said is that in almost all the old workings are found the primitive tools scattered over the ground; in others, various domestic articles are left in the position in which they would have been used. But possibly the most tangible piece of evidence is that of the position of certain skeletons. Mr. Hall says that over forty skeleton remains which had been buried have been discovered within and close to the ruins, besides some twenty remains of ancients that had not been buried. These latter were lying under the soil outside the entrances, evidently just in the position in which they had been slain, and with them were found their weapons and broken bangles of solid gold, and torn bangles of gold wire, all of Zimbabwe manufacture and design.

The most convincing piece of evidence which would probably answer every question raised has yet to be discovered—the burial place of the ancients. Where are the tens of thousands of skeletons? Some trace there must be of the huge cemetery or cemeteries of Zambesia. The theory of cremation will not be accepted by any student of African or Asiatic customs. Is it possible that the bodies were embalmed and transported by the hundred every month to the coast and then carried by boat to the mother country?

How utterly investigations have failed to discover the burial place of the ancients may be realized from the fact that only sixty skeleton remains have been found, and of these only forty appear to have been properly buried, and there seems from these discoveries strong evidence that whoever the ancients were they exercised great care in the burial of their dead; that twenty bodies remained unburied may have

been due to the panic which at some period overtook the immigrants.

Mr. Bent adopted the view that the ancients were comparatively few in number and mainly military units controlling the labourers, but since Mr. Bent's investigations over five hundred ruins have been discovered, many of them very extensive works as compared with the score of ruins at the time of Mr. Bent's visit to Zambesia. We are therefore confronted with an undertaking vastly greater than Mr. Bent believed it to be. In the light of later knowledge it is inconceivable that the enormous gangs of slaves could be controlled by small garrisons scattered over hundreds of miles of territory.

A moment's reflection will emphasize the amazing activity of the industrial population of that day, for any single work would have occupied gangs of labourers for years, possibly generations. Whilst building was in progress, others would be engaged in gold mining and crushing operations, and these two main streams of activity would in turn imply a large servile agricultural population, producing crops in all probability under the stimulus of force. To these would be added again gangs of carriers to and from both the interior and the coast. How can it be supposed that this prodigious and unceasing activity was maintained by a handful of warriors? Taken even upon the basis of any modern sub-tropical industry where effective control of labourers is essential, and postulating a labouring element of fifty thousand men, the oversight and management would mean about one thousand "supermen."

Mr. R. N. Hall tells us that there can be no shadow of doubt as to which are skeleton remains of the ancients as compared with those of the

indigenous peoples, amongst the very few discovered :

Ancients found in the ruins are buried at full length and always on the right or left side. Ancients were always buried under the original cemented floor, or under the first or second floors above the original floors, each floor being about eighteen inches above the other. The mediæval and modern Kaffir peoples were buried near the surface, and many feet above those of the ancients, between whom there are always cemented floors and several feet of soil. Again, the presence of a considerable amount of solid gold ornaments, with the old Zimbabwe patterns, is an unfailing feature of ancient burial, while with the Mombo-Monomotapa period, remains have ornaments of iron and copper, only slightly, and but in few instances, banded with gold at intervals, while the remains of past and present races of more modern Kaffirs have only copper, iron and brass ornaments, and glass beads of an altogether modern manufacture.¹

The reverence for their dead probably accounts for the difficulty of discovering the resting-place of the ancients ; in their own country they would have no reason to fear desecration, but with a huge servile population seething with unrest and burning for revenge, they had everything to fear and thus would seek out the most inaccessible spots. The discovery of these cemeteries will always prove a financial attraction of no mean order, for, as Mr. Hall points out, an average weight of $1\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of gold has been discovered with the skeleton of each ancient gold-seeker. If the total skeleton remains of a cemetery numbered, as it would do, some thousands of remains, the sterling value of the gold deposit would be substantial.

The world of science is divided into two camps upon the remote antiquity of the ruins ; whilst

¹ *The Ancient Ruins of Rhodesia*, R. N. Hall and W. G. Neal, p. 101 (Methuen).

local opinion is solidly in favour of the more romantic immigration of a pre-Christian era. At the discussion upon the antiquity of the ruins held at the Royal Geographical Society Dr. Randall Maciver rather bluntly dismissed the theories of Bent, Swan and Hall, and gave to some of the evidence a date subsequent to the sixteenth century. The difficulty one experiences in reading Dr. Randall Maciver's paper is its inadequacy, whilst the somewhat arbitrary tone repels rather than attracts one to his views.

The view of those opposed to Dr. Randall Maciver is set forth by Professor A. H. Keane under seven main propositions :

1. Ophir was not the source but the distributor of the gold and the other costly merchandise brought from abroad to the Courts of David and Solomon.

2. Ophir was the emporium on the south coast of Arabia which has been identified with the Moscha or Portus Nobilis of the Greek and Roman geographers.

3. Havilah was the auriferous land whence came the gold of Ophir, and Havilah is here identified with Rhodesia, the mineralized region between the Lower Zambesi and the Limpopo—Mashona, Matabele and Manica lands.

4. The ancient gold workings of this region were first opened, and the associated monuments erected by the South Arabian Himyarites, who were followed, not before the time of Solomon, by the Phœnicians, and these, very much later, by the Moslem Arabs and Christian Portuguese.

5. Tharshish was the outlet for the precious metals and precious stones of Havilah, and stood probably on the site of the present Sofala.

6. The Himyaritic and Phœnician treasure-seekers reached Havilah through Madagascar, where they had settlements and maintained protracted commercial and social intercourse with the Malagasy natives. With them were associated the Jews, by whom the fleets of Hiram and Solomon were partly manned.

7. Queen of Sheba came by land route, not overseas, her kingdom being Yemen, the Arabia Felix of the ancients, the capital of which was Maraiaba Bahramalakum. Her treasures were partly imported (the precious metals and

precious stones) from Havilah and its port of Tarshish to Ophir, and partly (frankincense and myrrh) shipped at Ophir from the neighbouring district of Mount Sephar.¹

Others whose conclusions coincide in the main with those of Professor Keane are Mr. Theodore Bent, the Hon. A. Wilmot, whose work *Monomatapa* embraces also the results of his investigations in the archives of Lisbon and Rome, Dr. Schlichter, the learned archæologist of the late nineties, Sir John Willoughby, and many others. Dr. Schlichter in one of his articles deals with the analogy of the ancient Arabian religion with the worship practised by the ancients at Zimbabwe.

To the simple student of African history the outstanding fact is that there is in no part of Africa any negro or negroid enterprise which can at all compare with these works of Rhodesia. If any African tribe had at any time undertaken granite works of this gigantic nature it is certain that neighbouring tribes would have emulated them, at least to an extent which would have left some trace to-day.


The second and even more convincing factor is that the negro races, who show in many respects great possibilities of development, have never shown evidence of undertaking works involving years of unremitting toil, least of all with the object of winning gold. If, therefore, the indigenous African did not, as certainly he did not, design and build these extensive works and win the enormous quantities of gold from Zambesia, it is obvious that some immigrant race did so, and the tantalising riddle is offered for solution—who built the cities of Rhodesia, and for whom were won these millions of gold?

¹ *Ancient Ruins of Rhodesia*, R. N. Hall and W. G. Neal preface (Methuen).

PART II

THE COMING OF THE BRITISH

The Royal Charter—Its Objects and Limitations.
The Charter and the Concessions in Operation.



THE COMING OF THE BRITISH

It is sometimes claimed that but for the Chartered Company Matabeleland and Mashonaland would have drifted under the flag of a foreign Power. There is very little to warrant such a statement; moreover, historically it is inaccurate, and yet it is sedulously fostered and preached in season and out of season, particularly in South Africa. The bigwigs of the Chartered Company are, of course, perfectly entitled to the opinion that but for their administration Rhodesia would not have been "painted red," but public opinion will naturally ask for the evidence upon which this claim is based.

The first Britishers with whom Umsiligasi, the founder of the Matabele nation, and his people were acquainted had no connection whatever with any member of the Chartered Company. In the minds of Umsiligasi and his Matabele, British government and British character were focused in the splendid personality of Dr. Moffat, the well-known missionary of the London Missionary Society. Mrs. Moffat refers in her letters to the "uncommonly strong attachment of the poor savage Mosilikatse (Umsiligasi) to my husband—an attachment which has lasted for twenty-three years." This "strong attachment" had its foundation in Dr. Moffat's sterling honesty, which did not prevent him, even on his first visit, from expos-

tulating with Umsiligasi for his murderous raids. On the occasion of one visit the Matabele king impressed upon Moffat his anxiety to live in friendship with the King of England, and thus began the first step towards the treaty with Great Britain. The relationship formed between Dr. Moffat and Umsiligasi in 1829 ripened with the passing years, and became traditional amongst the Matabele. Forty years later this friendship found expression in the relations between the sons of both men, Lobengula, the son of Umsiligasi, and J. S. Moffat, the son of Dr. Moffat.

From 1870 onwards several white men journeyed to Matabeleland, and a few stayed there quietly "prospecting" for gold; many of these were in no way nor at any time connected with the Chartered Company group; collectively, however, they stimulated British influence, and it soon became evident that some more definite step should be taken. The British Government, casting round for a suitable representative, naturally regarded Mr. J. S. Moffat as the right person, and acting upon instructions the son of Dr. Moffat, the friend of Umsiligasi, went to Bulawayo and obtained the following treaty of peace and amity from Lobengula.

The Chief Lo Bengula, ruler of the tribe known as the Amandabele, together with the Mashuna and Makakalaka, tributaries of the same, hereby agrees to the following articles and conditions:—

That peace and amity shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects, and the Amandabele people; and the contracting Chief Lo Bengula engages to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any rupture of the same, to cause the strict observance of his treaty, and so to carry out the spirit of the treaty of friendship which was entered into between his late father, the Chief Umsiligasi, with the then Governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the year of our Lord 1836.

It is hereby further agreed by Lo Bengula, Chief in and over the Amandabele country with its dependencies as aforesaid, on behalf of himself and people, that he will refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign State or Power to sell, alienate, or cede, or permit, or countenance any sale, alienation, or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandabele country under his chieftainship, or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

In faith of which I, Lo Bengula, on my part have hereunto set my hand at Gubulawayo, Amandabeleland, this eleventh day of February, and of Her Majesty's reign the 51st.

Thus, and not by the Chartered Company, were Matabeleland and Mashonaland brought within the sphere of British influence and prevented from falling within that of any other "foreign State or Power." It was not until nearly two years later that the British South Africa Company obtained its Charter. Moreover, nearly five years elapsed before the Company commenced commercial operations in Matabeleland. These facts amongst others dispose of the claims that the Chartered Company alone saved these territories from being absorbed by any foreign Power.

This, then, in brief was the territory, these the people and these the political conditions at the time of the inception of the British South Africa Company and the granting of its Royal Charter by Queen Victoria. Before entering upon the history of the Chartered Government, let me enter a caveat against the unrelieved picture of wrongdoing in which is often portrayed the work of the British South Africa Company.

The Chartered Company has a heavy enough burden to bear, but nothing is to be gained by painting black every individual connected with

it and every incident of its development. The Company, like every human institution, has been made up of good and evil constituents. It has been, and still is, splendidly served by some of the most lofty-minded men Great Britain has produced, but in the past at least there have been men to whom no act of spoliation and hardly any crime was too heinous to commit. It is to-day greatly to the credit of many men in its Civil Service that in spite of notorious misdeeds, flagrant and continued acts of injustice, they still serve faithfully from the highest motives the Directors of the Chartered Company, and thereby redeem to a considerable extent the wrongdoing of the past and the injustice of the present. To these men the British Empire owes a debt it can never repay.

To the Chartered Company we owe, at least indirectly, a railway system which covers the territory in several directions, and despite the criticism of engineers as to the solidity of its construction, it links up all the principal centres of Rhodesia with both the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, whilst the standard of comfort provided on the Rhodesian railways places them in a premier position in trans-African continental travel. Rhodesian roadways, the direct responsibility of the Chartered Company, show fewer signs of development, but all things considered, these compare favourably with those of the Protectorates and Colonies farther south.

The "winning" of gold has developed into an appreciable industry, the promotion of which has been largely due to the initiative of the Chartered Company. Some forty-five million pounds worth of gold have been secured, but critics assert that nearly as much has been spent in obtaining this quantity. The Directors

of the Chartered Company claim, quite fairly, that the British South Africa Company has spent large sums of money upon developing the territory. It must, however, be pointed out that they also hold large and valuable assets in return, whilst private initiative has spent in the aggregate not less than the Company itself. Cattle ranching, citrus and tobacco plantations, and other subsidiary enterprises are still in the experimental stage, and though they give some promise of a lucrative future, they do not yet offer results which inspire general confidence.

At the risk of repetition I would emphasize that the most important, although less recognized, service the Chartered Company has rendered has been that of attracting to the field of its operations certain Britishers whose conduct, by the sharpness of its contrast with that of others, has revealed to the native races of South Africa the inherent character of the race, namely a love of fair play, and a keen sense of justice which will ultimately triumph; and further, that this trait in our national character is so strong that once we believe a thing to be right nothing will deter us from acting righteously regardless of consequences.

A good story illustrative of this is told in Mashonaland, though for the truth of the story I cannot vouch; it has probably been exaggerated out of all resemblance to the original incident. A Chartered Company force had attacked and killed a number of Matabele or Mashona natives when a young officer recently arrived from England protested vigorously against the conduct of the operations, and then dramatically bidding farewell to his comrades, told them he was going to apologize to the simple natives. Spurring his horse to a furious

gallop he left the Chartered Company's force, and when last seen was rapidly approaching the native warriors, who, naturally misunderstanding his mission, promptly assegaied him! This story, true or false, has gained currency chiefly because it more or less correctly reflects the light and shade of Southern Rhodesia.

THE ROYAL CHARTER—ITS OBJECTS AND LIMITATIONS

... In consenting to consider this scheme in more detail, Lord Knutsford has been influenced by the consideration, that if such a Company is incorporated by Royal Charter, its constitution, objects and operations will become more directly subject to control by Her Majesty's Government than if it were left to these gentlemen to incorporate themselves under the Joint Stock Companies Acts, as they are entitled to do. In the latter case, Her Majesty's Government would not be able effectually to prevent the Company from taking its own line of policy *which might possibly result in complications with native chiefs and others, necessitating military expenditure, and perhaps even military operations.*¹

At the time the Royal Charter was granted the Company does not appear to have possessed any concession in Southern Rhodesia other than the Rudd-Rhodes Mineral Concession (the famous Lippert Concession was obtained much later). The Company had several concessions, but these are the only two which had received then or since the approval of the Imperial authorities, whilst in 1892 Lord Ripon intimated to the Company that certain material information appeared to have been withheld from the Colonial Office. Not merely was this information undisclosed to the Imperial authorities at a time when alone it was material, but it was soon to

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, 1889-92, p. 3. (Italics mine.—J. H. H.)

be shown, both by the Company's admission and by its inability to act upon it in Matabeleland, that the Rudd-Rhodes "Concession" was in certain material respects a defective instrument. It is a remarkable fact that it was not until nearly three years after the granting of the Charter that the Colonial Office obtained officially the information which had apparently been withheld from the Imperial authorities at the time the Charter was granted. This is set forth by Lord Ripon in the following despatch:

Lord Ripon gathers that his predecessor had indeed become aware by unofficial information of the engagements of the Chartered Company towards the United Concessions Company, but it may be observed that your letter under acknowledgment appears to be the first direct intimation of the arrangement which has come upon the records of this office. No indication of such an arrangement appeared in the correspondence which led to the grant of the Charter, and from the reply to a question given by Baron Henry de Worms in the House of Commons on the 27th January, 1891, it is clear that Her Majesty's late Government was unaware of it when they advised the grant of the Charter. Whether knowledge of the arrangement would have influenced their action is a question which they alone could answer; but Lord Ripon thinks it important to place on record a statement of the state of their information at the time when alone their knowledge or want of knowledge of the arrangement was material.

The original terms by which the Company secured the Rudd-Rhodes Concession were set forth in the Company's Report dated December 18, 1891:

In anticipation of the acquisition of the Royal Charter by the founders of the British South Africa Company, it was agreed by the owners of the Rudd Concession that the Company should have full power to manage, deal with, work and turn to account by sale, lease or otherwise, the

concession granted by Lobengula on the basis of the Company finding the requisite capital, and of all net receipts resulting from the operations of the Company in Africa being equally divided.

On April 30, 1889—that is, six months after the signing of the Rudd-Rhodes Mineral Concession—the petition praying for the grant of a Charter was presented to Queen Victoria's Government, the signatories to this petition being the Duke of Abercorn, the Duke of Fife, Lord Gifford, Lord Grey, Messrs. Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Beit and George Cawston. In presenting this petition it was argued that the granting of it would (1) promote trade and commerce, and (2) improve the moral and material well-being of the native tribes.

Six months later—October 29, 1889—the Royal Charter¹ was granted, the following being the principal objects :

- (a) The working of concessions, "so far as they are valid" ;
- (b) To secure other concessions subject to the approval of the Secretary of State ;
- (c) To preserve peace and order ;
- (d) To abolish the slave trade and domestic slavery ;
- (e) To prevent the sale of intoxicants to natives ;
- (f) In the administration of justice to consider carefully native laws and customs, especially with regard to rights of property ;
- (g) To seek and act upon the advice of the Imperial authorities.

History will probably regard these as the

¹ See Appendix.

most important conditions of the Charter, especially those clauses which bound the Company to observe the rights of native property and to act upon the advice of the British Crown.

On February 3, 1891, the "Deed of Settlement" was signed, and at subsequent dates a supplemental charter and supplemental deeds of settlement were also signed. These are of considerable technical value, but of little interest to the general reader, with possibly the single exception of Clause 4 of the supplemental Charter of 1899, wherein it is laid down:

Nothing in the principal Charter shall authorize the Company to establish or maintain any force of military police.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the Charter is that, although it conferred very large privileges, it has been established that it *did not give any administrative powers* within the territories covered by the Charter, but only providing these could be obtained from the native rulers themselves. The establishment of these facts has already had important consequences.

In point of time the corner-stone of the Chartered Company's political and commercial edifice in Rhodesia was, then, the instrument known as the Rudd-Rhodes Concession,¹ which was secured from Lobengula on October 30, 1888, nearly a year after the signing of the Treaty of "Peace and Amity" between Lobengula and the British Government, and upon this concession was based the petition for a Royal Charter. Prior to the signing of the Matabele-British Treaty and immediately after-

¹ Appendix A.

wards, white men representing various interests had visited Lobengula in the hope of obtaining a concession, and although promises had been made the Matabele king was adamant, and hesitated to place his cross upon any scrap of paper lest by doing so he should alienate the tribal rights of his people, particularly Matabele rights, over the land. The only exceptions were certain occupation rights granted to individual white men and missionaries, and a concession granted to Mr. Baines in 1876. It is worthy of note that the latter exception safeguarded in the clearest language the sovereign rights of Lobengula.

In making this grant I, Lobengula, do not alienate from my kingdom this or any other portion of it; but reserve intact the sovereignty of my dominion, and Mr. Baines engaged on behalf of said Company not to make any claim contrary or injurious to my right as sovereign of the country, but to recognize my authority as king, and to apply to me for such protection as he might require, and I engaged to grant such protection to Mr. Baines as should enable him to enjoy all lawful and proper use of the privileges granted him by me; and I also certify that when in November of the same year, 1876, Mr. Baines asked me what tribute or payment he should make me in return for said privileges, I declined to name any sum, but left it to the judgment of Mr. Baines to make me annually, on behalf of the said Company, such present as might seem proper to him and acceptable to me. Among the Matabele the verbal promise of the king has always been regarded as a sufficient guarantee, and many white men now enjoy privileges in virtue of grants made by my father, Umzelegazi, which I regard as binding on me.¹

The British South Africa Company at a later date secured this concession from the Baines group, but there seems to be no evidence that

¹ *Zambesi*, p. 264.

it was at any time presented to H.M. Government for approval, and without that approval it could not be used as title in any claim against the Crown. An interesting question is whether, in view of the obvious limitations of the Baines Concession, the Company will ever care to advance any claim at all in connection with this instrument, for an acknowledgment of the inheritance of its limitations might prove very embarrassing! It is certainly passing strange that so little is said in the Company's literature about this particular concession.

It seems clear that, at some date prior to the Matabele-British Treaty of 1887, Mr. Cecil Rhodes and Mr. Beit amongst others attempted to secure a concession, but failed to do so until Messrs. Rudd, Maguire and Thompson obtained Lobengula's cross and elephant seal to the Rudd-Rhodes Concession. The dramatic way in which this was obtained is picturesquely told by Messrs. Willis and Collingridge in *The Downfall of Lobengula*¹—told, that is, from the Chartered Company's point of view.

Mr. Rhodes induced Mr. C. D. Rudd (with whom he had been closely associated in the Diamond Fields since 1870) and Mr. R. Maguire, M.P., to undertake a mission to Lobengula; these gentlemen being accompanied by Mr. F. R. Thompson. They obtained from the king—somewhat to the general surprise—a concession ceding the mineral rights to the whole of his territories. This was formally signed on November 30th, 1889. Hurrying back with this priceless document, bearing Lobengula's mark and the famous elephant seal, Mr. Rudd was lost in the veld. After burying the concession and leaving written instructions as to its whereabouts, he lay down, as he thought, to die, overcome by hunger, thirst, and fatigue. He was, however, discovered by some of Khama's Bamangwatos, and by them nursed back into health.

¹ *The Downfall of Lobengula*, Willis and Collingridge (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.).

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But this is only part of the story. Other incidents no less dramatic, but of an entirely different nature were occurring at Bulawayo. If tragedy nearly overtook Charles Dunell Rudd upon the South African veldt, tragedy blood-red and terrible occurred amongst the Matabele the moment the alleged purport of the concession became known amongst the tribes. How far Lobengula understood the concession and how far it was understood by the Matabele Council is a matter which at this date cannot be determined, but subsequent events disclosed the widest divergence of views upon its interpretation even amongst the white men themselves.

The Rudd-Rhodes Concession purported to grant mineral rights throughout Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and for a time it was declared that it included land rights also; and it was this contention which led to the first tragedy in Matabeleland. Mr. Rochfort Maguire hurrying to Europe had barely crossed the Shashi with his precious document when rumours gained currency among the Matabele that Lobengula had ceded some of his land to the Rhodes group. These rumours were largely fostered and spread by certain whites in Bulawayo until the Matabele tribes were so thoroughly alarmed that their attitude became somewhat threatening even towards Lobengula himself. It was clear that something had to be done, some advice sought, some help obtained, and the only impartial advisers were the missionaries. But here again was a difficulty, for the oldest and most experienced missionary, the Rev. C. D. Helm, had advised and witnessed the signing of the Rudd-Rhodes Concession!

Lobengula, faced with this dilemma and the

growing alarm of the Matabele councillors and people, held daily meetings, which became increasingly stormy and violent. It was then proposed that the missionaries of Inyati, a more distant mission station than Hope Fountain, should be summoned to give their interpretation of the disturbing document. Four horses under two riders were despatched in all haste peremptorily summoning the two missionaries, Messrs. Elliot and Bowen Rees, to Bulawayo. The messengers arrived, but alas! found that the missionaries were fresh from the performance of funeral ceremonies which under Matabele custom would preclude their approaching the king. Messrs. Elliot and Bowen Rees, realizing the urgency of the matter, started for Bulawayo, and a message was sent on in advance informing the Matabele Council that the missionaries had that day buried a child. The Matabele, like all African tribes, were and still are extremely superstitious, especially in all matters concerning death, and thus came about the fixed custom that no man who had been in proximity to a deceased person could come into the presence of the Matabele king until the lapse of one "moon" (month), for it was feared that death brought into such close contact with their king might have fatal results. One can imagine, therefore, the dilemma in which the Matabele Council was placed, but the alarm over the Rudd-Rhodes Concession can also be gauged by the decision of the Indunas and Council: "What to us is death or the presence of death when our land is in danger? Let the missionaries come on"—and on the missionaries came.

It was a great Council meeting before which those travel-stained missionaries appeared.

THE BETRAYAL OF THE MATABELE 67

Lobengula presided, on his right was Lochi, the Chief Councillor, on his left the ever faithful Bosungwana, head of the Abaqua-Dunë, and around Lobengula sat or stood a group of heirs presumptive and potential: Hlangabeza, Jojwana, Lukuni, Lopila, and some eight other close relatives of the Matabele ruler, the central figure being that of Umshlaba the Regent. All the principal Indunas were there, including Sekombo and Gambo, alive until quite recently, Somabulana, Umjasu and Malevu, the powerful Induna of Zwananzi. There is some doubt whether Gwabalanda, one of the Indunas of Matabeleland, was present or not; probably he was, but in any case it is doubtful whether so large or fateful a gathering had ever before assembled.

There were no "preliminaries," and Lobengula went straight to the heart of the matter. Addressing the missionaries, he handed them what purported to be a copy of the Rudd-Rhodes Concession and said: "Read that piece of paper and tell me faithfully whether I have given away any of the land of the Matabele." An expectant hush fell upon the assembly, and in a few minutes one of the missionaries looked up and said: "Yes, king, you have. How can white men dig for gold without land?"

It is said by one who was present that an awful silence fell upon the whole assembly, for these words sounded like the death knell of the Matabele nation. For a moment or two none spoke or moved, then quietly and calmly Lobengula put these three questions:

"If gold is found anywhere in the country can the white men occupy the land and dig for it?"

"Yes, king."

"If gold is in my garden can they come and dig it?"

"Yes, king."

"If gold is in my royal kraal can they enter and dig?"

"Yes, king."

Again "Loben" was silent for some minutes, and then with terrible and eloquent solemnity he turned to his Chief Councillor Lochi and said: "Lochi, you have done this; you have blinded my eyes, you have closed my ears, you have betrayed the Matabele nation." With incomparable dignity Lochi accepted the fatal condemnation. Without a word of protest he, in European parlance, accepted "ministerial responsibility," rose, left the Council, and walked to the royal kraal, there to await submissively the inevitable penalty. As Lochi left the Council meeting he met Alexander Boggie, a trusted friend of Lobengula, still living in Bulawayo, who gave him a native salutation; the disgraced councillor replied: "Good-bye, Boggie, I am a dead man." A little farther on he met the Rev. Charles Helm, who had countersigned the Rudd-Rhodes Concession, and, alarmed at rumours which had reached him, was hurrying into Bulawayo: "Good-bye, Helm, I am a dead man." Lochi then made his way to Lobengula's kraal and sat down close to the king's wagon awaiting his execution—no sentry required, no restraint, neither a guide nor a comforter. The Matabele nation had spoken through its king, the great betrayal demanded a suitable sacrifice. In a few days the end came, not only of Lochi but all his family, everything he possessed; according to one white man even the very poultry were utterly destroyed; for the Matabele

would have nothing to remind them of their "great betrayal."

It was not known until some years after that not a foot of land had been alienated under the Rudd-Rhodes Concession! This was one of the first unpleasant surprises for the promoters. Charles Helm, loyal friend to the Matabele, had astutely up to this point saved them from signing away their country. This is clearly set forth in correspondence between the British Foreign and Colonial Offices, as the following passage demonstrates :

Lord Salisbury is doubtless aware that the British South Africa Company has found *itself hitherto somewhat embarrassed by the fact, on which those opposed to it were not disinclined to dwell, that the "Rudd Concession" obtained from Lobengula in 1888 did not in terms purport to grant more than mining rights in his territories, and that therefore it had but an imperfect right, if any right at all, to grant such titles to immovable property as were necessary for the development of a civilized community*¹ and of operations other than mining in its field of operations south of the Zambesi.²

Meantime the Matabele Council took further steps, both important and, as they believed, adequate. First, every white man concerned in any way with the granting of the Rudd-Rhodes Concession was placed under police or sentry supervision, and in deciding upon this Lobengula said : "Remember no harm is to come to them, but they will remain under arrest until that document comes back."

The next step, and this took place immediately, was the drafting and sending to Queen Victoria the following despatch denouncing the concession :

Some time ago a party of men came into my country, the principal one appearing to be a man named Rudd.

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

² Cd. 7171, p. 7.

They asked me for a place to dig for gold, and said they would give me certain things for the right to do so. I told them to bring what they would give, and I would show them what I would give. A document was written and presented to me for signature. I asked what it contained, and was told that in it were my words and the words of those men. I put my hand to it. About three months afterwards I heard from other sources that I had given by that document the right to all the minerals in my country. I called a meeting of my indunas and also of the white men, and demanded a copy of the document. It was proved to me that I had signed away the mineral rights of my whole country to Rudd and his friends. I have since had a meeting of my indunas, and they will not recognize the paper, as it contains neither my words nor the words of those who got it. After the meeting I demanded that the original document be returned to me. It has not come yet, although it is two months since, and they promised to bring it back soon. The men of the party who were in my country at the time were told to remain until the document was brought back. One of them, Maguire, has now left without my knowledge and against my orders. I write to you that you may know the truth about this thing and may not be deceived.¹

Cecil Rhodes referred to this complication with his engaging audacity when speaking to the Chartered Company shareholders in 1892 :

The work, however, had only then begun, because, although we had a charter, we had not got the country, which was occupied by savages ; and although the chief of the country had given us a concession, he was not at all pleased that we should derive any benefit therefrom—that was, that we should occupy the country.²

There is a blank as to the happenings in Matabeleland during the next few months following this denunciation of the concession. We do know that after the Lochi massacre “ Mata-

¹ Cd. 5918, p. 201.

² British South Africa Company's Report, November 29, 1892.

bele Thompson "hurried to Mafeking ostensibly "to get the document back." We do know, upon the authority of the authors of *The Downfall of Lobengula*, that Sir Starr Jameson, then Dr. Jameson, journeyed to Bulawayo upon "delicate negotiations" connected with the Rudd-Rhodes Concession, whilst the same authors tell us that he made certain promises to Lobengula. Another incontestable fact is that, although the Rudd-Rhodes Concession purported to cover both Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the Chartered Company dared not enter Matabeleland, and in point of fact were not allowed to do so until after the close of the Matabele war of 1893—namely, five years after the signing of the Rudd-Rhodes Concession.

The intrinsic value of the Rudd-Rhodes Concession has always been a matter of discussion, not less so the curious manner and terms upon which the document passed from group to group before it became the property of the "Charter" group. The first exchange of which there is any public knowledge appears to have taken place in 1890, when

an agreement was entered into, under which, in consideration of £1,000,000 fully paid shares of the British South Africa Company being issued, as to 925,000 to the United Concessions Company, Limited, and as to the remaining 75,000 to the Exploring Company, Limited, the British South Africa Company was to acquire the Rudd and the other concessions belonging to the United Concessions Company, Limited, and the special rights belonging to the Exploring Company, Limited, in the principal field of operations of the Chartered Company in Africa, as defined in the Royal Charter; and the Companies interested agreed not to compete or interfere with the operations of the Chartered Company anywhere within the field of its operations.¹

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, 1892-94.

It had become apparent that the Rudd-Rhodes Concession was not without a serious flaw, as Lord Knutsford's letter to the Foreign Office, already quoted,¹ demonstrates. This defect, however, was believed to have been remedied by the purchase of the notorious Lippert Concession,² upon which the legal struggle has turned. Edward Amandus Lippert was a German banker settled in the Transvaal, who, by the aid of an Englishman named Renny Tailyour, caused the newly-born Chartered Company no little embarrassment by obtaining from Lobengula the right for one hundred years to grant land titles in the name of the Matabele king. There is little doubt that Lippert, in order to secure this agency, represented himself as being antagonistic to the Company. Sir Henry Loch and the Company's officials were at first "disposed to oppose this concession on various grounds; amongst others, on the ground that its validity or authenticity was doubtful; but after several communications and interviews of the Company's officials with Mr. Lippert, it was decided that on the whole it would be better to come to terms with him and take over the concession from him."³ It is important to bear in mind that according to the Company's own interpretation the rights so obtained by Lippert only referred to "unoccupied lands."⁴

In the meantime, as we have seen, the Company had been granted the Royal Charter of October 29, 1889, a year after the signing of the Rudd-Rhodes Concession, but prior to the Company securing the Lippert Concession.

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 7.

³ Cd. 7171, p. 7.

² Appendix B.

⁴ Cd. 7171, p. 8.

THE CHARTER AND THE CONCESSIONS IN OPERATION

WHAT, then, was the Company's position at the close of 1891? It had the Royal Charter, which gave far less power than was and is generally supposed. It had the Rudd-Rhodes Mineral Concession, which was popularly believed to confer effective land rights, but did nothing of the kind, and which had, moreover, been denounced by the Matabele king and council.¹ immediately they were informed of its alleged contents. It had purchased the Lippert agency Concession, about which there was a measure of local ignorance even so late as 1907 which can only be described as amazing.

These two concessions, the Rudd and the Lippert—for what they were worth—and the Royal Charter applied, it was said, both to Matabeleland and Mashonaland, but it was to the development of the former that all eyes were turned in hungry anticipation. The pioneer trek designed to carry out the privileges granted by the Rudd Mineral Concession and the Royal Charter started north from Kimberley on March 19, 1890, with the present town of Salisbury for its objective. Its "royal" route to Salisbury lay through Palapye, Tati, Bulawayo and Hartley Hill—a well-worn route with water and supplies at each day's march. As Lobengula

¹ Cd. 5918, p. 201.

said: "There is only one road to Mashonaland, and that goes through my country and past Bulawayo."¹ But the "pioneers" trekked to the Palapye district, and then they surprisingly turned east, and east again to Tuli—and yet east again before turning due north! What was the reason for this well-nigh incredible change of direction? There was no question of its being an easier route, for the difficulties of the march were increased thereby a thousandfold. One fact alone will demonstrate this—for over two hundred miles, or half the entire trek from the Macloutsie river to Salisbury, the men had literally to cut a road through the bush, and then negotiate "disselboom mountain," a hill, the steepness of which sometimes involved the breaking of five out of every six disselbooms—the centre pole on the wagons. The journey was accomplished with amazing fortitude and courage by the pioneers, that none will deny, but why was this terrible route necessary when the Directors of the Company held in their pockets a document, which it was claimed had been secured in a perfectly regular manner, purporting to give them the fullest rights of occupation, travel and commercial development upon and over the "royal" road in and through all the territories between the Limpopo and the Zambesi? The local reason provides the answer, viz. that by the route chosen they avoided crossing an inch of the Matabele land. Those who suppose this route was taken by choice have only to consider the following passage from Mr. Cecil Rhodes' speech to be immediately disillusioned:

We formed a force which marched through that territory, and I agree with the chairman that the highest tribute is


¹ *Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa*, F. C. Selous.

to be paid to those young men who marched for 1,000 miles, 400 of which were through a dense forest, and who had to cut their way day by day through it until they finally reached "the promised land."¹

But it may be remarked that even at this time the "promised land" of gold was still across the border in Matabeleland! Nor was this merely an initial surprise to onlookers. The still more important fact remains equally inexplicable that upon arrival in Mashonaland no attempt was made for nearly four years to carry out any peaceful industry in Matabeleland. Moreover, for some reason Sir Starr Jameson vetoed any proposal put before him for developing Matabeleland, whilst the most imperative instructions were issued against any unofficial visit to Matabeleland for any purpose whatever or under any circumstances.

Whatever criticisms are made with regard to Sir Starr Jameson, it is abundantly clear that his position in Mashonaland at this time was becoming increasingly complicated and difficult. He was misunderstood by the settlers, and every effort made to retrace one false step or to repair one error led to the creation of a dozen others. No study of blue books or the Company's publications give the explanation of the mystery which enshrouds the reason why no effort was made until 1893 to put into force the privileges which the Rudd-Rhodes Concession and the Royal Charter purported to confer in Matabeleland. A careful analysis of books, newspaper criticisms and reports, if properly collated, may put one on the track, but no more—a visit to Southern Rhodesia for a few months will accomplish the rest.

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, November 29, 1892.




PART III

"THE DAWN OF CIVILIZATION"

Britain's Honour and the "Perfidious" Matabele.

"Smashing the Matabele."

The Jameson Raid—The Imposition of Slavery—The
Native Revolt.



BRITAIN'S HONOUR AND THE "PERFIDIOUS" MATABELE

(a) *Britain's word of honour as passed to the Matabele king and council on August 16, 1893, by Sir Henry Loch on behalf of Queen Victoria:*

"You (Moffat) can tell the king from me I have no intention of invading his country or of dragging him into war.

(b) *The British South Africa Company's Declaration, 1892:*¹

It is never to be forgotten that the policy of the Company, unlike that of expeditions in other parts of Africa, has been to occupy peacefully under treaties with native chiefs and not by force.

THE fatal year for the Matabele was 1893. But why fatal? Why were the Matabele in this year "smashed" as a nation; why, in spite of the above formal declarations, were they despoiled and robbed of farms, lands, kraals, cattle, and indeed of everything which made up the life of the nation? The five years' Enquiry (1914-1918) before the Judicial Committee, the highest tribunal of the Empire, coupled with the investigations of Lord Cave's Commission, has sifted fact from rumour, stripped hypocrisy of its cloak and cunning, torn the mask from the hideous lineaments of a shameful wrong, and with this final and complete disclosure there emerges into the daylight of 1920 the Matabele and Mashona peoples appealing mutely and helplessly to the British public, not for sympathy or pity, but—justice.

¹ Report 1889-92, p. 28.

The principal figures in the fatal drama of 1893 were Sir Henry Loch, the British High Commissioner, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, Sir Starr Jameson, and Lobengula with his Matabele Council. It has hitherto been held that the wicked Matabele, under a still more wicked and savage king, committed such heinous crimes and created such widespread terror and slaughter that the Chartered Company with an executive personnel normally incapable of telling an untruth or of harming a mouse was in sheer defence compelled to oppose the Matabele hordes.

What are the facts as now established? Sir Henry Loch, by right of precedence, comes to the foreground of the picture; and the evidence establishes beyond question that he was kept in profound ignorance and completely misled upon all the capital issues. But even so, he was convinced of the determination of Lobengula to maintain peaceful relations with the white men.

Next to Sir Henry Loch come Lobengula and his Matabele Council. The first striking fact which emerges is their intense, almost pathetic, trust in and reverence for the "Great White Queen" and her representative, and at the same time the very intimate knowledge they possessed of Sir Starr Jameson's intentions as distinct from professions; next, their determination to allow no breach in their relationships with the white men; and finally, their well-founded belief that if Jameson and his followers entered their country, they would be robbed of everything which they possessed tribally or individually.

The third element in the picture was the Chartered Company as represented by Sir Starr Jameson. There were the Company's public declarations of peace and goodwill towards all

native peoples, the declared policy of refraining from the infamous conduct of those publicans and sinners in other parts of Africa who wickedly made military expeditions in their own interests. This declaration of peaceful methods left nothing whatever to be desired; yet, when the whole abomination stood revealed in a publication to be quoted, it was made known that there existed a signed contract for the "military occupation" of the country for £90,000! From half a dozen authoritative sources it is now learned that whilst peace was being preached in London, every preparation was being made, not for defence, but for the invasion of Matabeleland.

But the fact upon which everything turned is now known to have been the infamous *secret* agreement to invade and rob the Matabele, signed by Sir Starr Jameson at Fort Victoria on August 14, 1893. The agreement to carry out this invasion was actually made whilst Queen Victoria's Government was giving to Lobengula and the Matabele the most explicit and solemn assurances that there was no such intention. The most emphatic of these assurances was given, as stated at the head of this chapter, on August 16th, two days *after* Sir Starr Jameson had signed the agreement for such invasion, and signed it in terms which are happily without precedent in British Colonial history. The following is the text of this notorious secret document, which figured prominently in the Enquiry of 1914-18 before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and before Lord Cave's Commission of 1919-20:

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(Copy certified.)

VICTORIA,
14 August, 1893.

Capt. Allan Wilson, Victoria.

Sir,

The following are the conditions of service for the members of the Victoria Force for Matabeleland :

1. That each Member shall have protection on all claims in Mashonaland until six months after the date of cessation of hostilities.

2. That each Member will be entitled to mark out a farm of three thousand morgen (6,000 acres) in any part of Matabeleland. No occupation is required, but a quitrent will be charged on each farm of ten shillings per annum.

3. That no marking out of farms and claims will be allowed or held valid until such time as the Administrator and the Commanders of the different columns consider the country sufficiently peaceful, and a week's clear notification will be given to that effect.

4. That Members be allowed four clear months wherein to mark out and register their farms, and that no such marking out or registration will be valid after that time with the exception of the rights belonging to Members of the Force killed, invalided, or dying on service.

5. The Government retain the right at any time to purchase farms from the Members at the rate of £3 (three pounds) per morgen and compensation for all improvements. This does not include the purchase of claims already pegged out on farms.

6. That any Member of the Victoria Force is entitled to 15 claims on reef and 5 alluvial claims. The Protections works to be : thirty feet shaft within six months, or sixty feet shaft within twelve months on reef claims. Alluvial claims are to be subject to existing laws in Mashonaland.

7. The "loot" shall be divided one-half to the B.S.A. Company and the remainder to officers and men in equal shares.

8. Each man to be mounted and equipped, and rationed when practicable.

9. For the protection of Members of the Pioneer Force, no marking out of claims will be allowed on the part of fresh arrivals until four months have elapsed from the time specified in Clause 4.

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10. From that date on which the Force crosses the border, the rights of any Member of the Force dying, invalided or killed on service shall be protected and secured to his estate.

I have the honour to be, etc.,
L. S. JAMESON,
for the B.S.A. Company.

FURTHER CONDITIONS.

11. That in the event of payable gold being discovered upon any farm, no mining or milling for a profit or flotation can take place until the farmers' rights are satisfied according to Clause 5, viz., of the rate of three pounds per morgen.

(Signed) L. S. JAMESON,
for the B.S.A. Company.

No survey required by Company. The title deeds issued without survey. Every one can have survey at his option, but it is a matter between occupier and the surveyor.

L.S.J. Re Clause 4. After expiration of four months stipulated, Members can peg out for a further twelve months on any vacant land not reserved by the B.S.A. Company.

L.S.J. Certainly Company will provide all facilities for registration.

The outstanding features of this document are as follows:

(a) It clearly provided for the invasion of Matabeleland, and nowhere limits the operations of the force to a "protection" of Mashonaland.

(b) That 6,000 acres of land were to be at the troopers' selection, and that under Clause 5 the minimum estimated value of such an inducement would be £9,000 to each trooper. That, considering there were 672 troopers, this secret agreement confiscated and alienated in advance some 4,000,000 acres of the land of the Matabele.

(c) The promised "equal share" of the "loot," which included thousands of head of cattle, could hardly have been worth less than another £1,000 for each trooper.

(*d*) The alluvial and reef claims could be pegged out by the invading troopers in preference to all comers for four months, and without any recognition whatever of pre-existing titles.

(*e*) The total value of this incentive to join in the invasion was thus of the potential value in round figures of £10,000 to each invader, and was in fact so estimated by a witness, and not disputed by the Company, when giving evidence before Lord Cave's Commission in Rhodesia.

At this moment no argument is advanced upon the ethics of this inducement; of that the reader must judge; but it will at once be apparent that a complete expropriation of the Matabele was a foregone conclusion, and that this document rendered hopeless the efforts of the Imperial authorities and Lobengula to prevent the invasion of Matabeleland.

There is but one reflection which may perhaps be permitted upon this agreement. It surely could not have been known, at least one hopes not, to the London Directors and the shareholders of the Chartered Company; indeed, it is probable that its publication at the instance of Mr. Leslie Scott in the Appendices of Documents for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the first knowledge most of them had of the existence of such an amazing document. But this secret agreement does not stand alone; Sir Starr Jameson was not the only person who, whilst his Directors were giving public and official assurances of peaceful intentions, were preparing behind the scenes to act like other "publicans and sinners," whose wicked example they were so loudly and publicly (as it were) thanking God they did not intend to follow.

The unofficial story issued by those who

took a leading part in "smashing" the Matabele is extraordinarily instructive—it is not now and has not been for years procurable in Great Britain. This story is published in a book entitled *The Downfall of Lobengula*, written with the admitted assistance of the principal local officials of the Company. In this book the following disclosure is made :

Later on, on 13th July of the same year, a petition was presented praying for a Charter. This resulted in the granting of the latter on 29th October, 1889, on which date also this bold enterprise was incorporated as a *joint-stock*¹ concern with a capital of a million sterling.

So far all had gone smoothly. But now the formidable task of effective occupation—to use the Foreign Office term—had to be faced. It was universally believed at the time that the Matabele could not be trusted to fulfil their bargain, and recognized authorities expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to enter into possession of Mashonaland without a force of at least 5,000 men. This opinion, however, was not shared by Mr. Frank Johnson, who afterwards became a Major in the British South Africa Company's military service. He knew the country well, and had acquired a reputation for exceptional daring and resource. His view was, that a force of 500 men would be ample for the purpose ; and on being invited to do so, tendered to carry out the military occupation for £90,000. This extremely novel offer was accepted, and Major Johnson immediately set about the formation of the historic Mashonaland Pioneers, a *corps d'élite* of Englishmen and colonists, all *expert shots*¹ and horsemen, of all trades and professions, and numbering 192 men.

This gem is set forth under the headline, "The Dawn of Civilization" !

It is perhaps as well that the British public should have this comprehensive interpretation of what the "Dawn of Civilization" meant to the Royally "Chartered Pioneers," namely,

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

the formation of a "joint-stock concern," "capital of a million," "military occupation for £90,000," "mistrust of the Matabele," "*corps d'élite* of . . . expert shots," all engaged, it must be remembered, to act not as other men in Africa, but to introduce this "Dawn of Civilization" "peacefully under treaties with chiefs and not by force"!

It has already been seen that the British Crown, in granting the Royal Charter, did so because it was anticipated that by so doing military operations against the natives would be prevented. It has equally been shown that the Directors in London were not slack in assuring the public and Government that they were not as other men in their dealings with the African race.

But if it seems clear to anybody that the London atmosphere was entirely peaceful, it is equally clear that the atmospheric conditions in South Africa were highly charged with explosive matter. In the light of present day knowledge it cannot be held that Mr. Rhodes and Sir Starr Jameson had no intention of invading Matabeleland and crushing the Matabele; it is equally certain that elements in their daily entourage and employ were determined that by hook or by crook the Matabele should be crushed, and their lands and property taken from them and divided amongst the invading whites. This must also have been apparent to Sir Starr Jameson from the very beginning; and therefore willingly or unwillingly he was being led rapidly on to those very military operations which the Imperial Government hoped and believed the granting of the Royal Charter had avoided. The earliest evidence of this, and it is overwhelming, may be

found in Mr. De Waal's book, *With Rhodes in Mashonaland*.

In October 1890, only a year after the granting of the Royal Charter, Mr. Rhodes left Kimberley in company with Sir Henry Loch and Mr. De Waal. At Mafeking the High Commissioner went on to Bechuanaland, whilst Mr. Rhodes and his (admiring) companions, Mr. De Waal and a Mr. Venter, travelled north through that Marico Valley, which half a century earlier had been occupied by the Matabele under Umsiligasi. The party stayed one night at a Boer farm, and Mr. De Waal, who had fallen under the spell of Mr. Rhodes' fascinating personality, records the conversation of the party with the farmer and his wife.

"It is a pity, old friend," observed Mr. Venter, "that age has already such a hold on you, else you might assist Mr. Rhodes in the event of war breaking out."

"Old?" repeated the grey-haired man, with an air of pride; "if Rhodes wants to fight that tyrant (Lobengula), who has been playing the bully for so long a time, then I and all of us shall go and help him, and I think I will fell more of those cruel naked animals than any of you will."

"Yes," added the old lady, who had been listening with keen interest to the conversation; "what my husband says I can confirm. He seldom misses a shot, and he still rides his horse like a young man."

"But," said Mr. Venter, "do you think it is *right* of Mr. Rhodes to deprive the Matabele of their land?"

"Certainly," she replied with emphasis, "and none but he *can*. That unfeeling, treacherous Lobengula, who has slain his brothers and captains out of mere covetousness of their wealth, should be brought to his wits! But all have been afraid of him; now, however, Rhodes has come, and he is not afraid, and a man who is not afraid we must assist. But then, we want him to grant our people farms, and will he do that?"

"Oh, yes," answered Mr. Venter, "of that I am convinced."

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"Then I am sure," the old lady replied, "that both my husband and my children would be glad to join in the war."

At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. De Waal takes up the story thus :

We left them and returned later in the evening. The old couple had already gone to bed, but a son of theirs and a son-in-law (Mr. Fourie) were still up enjoying a pipe. These latter, also, could not speak enough about the excellence of Mashonaland, and affirmed every word that had been told us by their father and mother. They, too, appeared very desirous to *trek* to Mashonaland. They wished from the bottom of their hearts that war should arise between the heartless Matabele chief and the "chief" of the Chartered Company.

But even more damaging to the "peaceful" protestations of the Chartered Company is Mr. De Waal's account of a conversation with the Boer farmer, Mr. Greeff, who lived near the Limpopo, for Mr. De Waal quotes Mr. Rhodes himself, and as this book was never repudiated by Mr. Rhodes, the legitimate assumption is that Mr. De Waal, who acted as chronicler of the party, correctly reported the incidents of the journey.

"Yes, Mr. Greeff," answered Mr. Rhodes, "I shall certainly some day be pressed to do as you want me to do, but you must remember that I have only the right to dig gold in that land ; so long, therefore, as the Matabele do not molest my people, I cannot declare war against them and deprive them of their country, but as soon as they interfere with our rights I shall end their game ; I shall then ask your aid, and be very glad to get it, and when all is over I shall grant farms to those who assisted me."¹

¹ The translation of these memoirs from the original Dutch is now available from Messrs. Juta & Co., Cape Town. They were written by Mr. De Waal, who accom-

These illuminating conversations took place in the presence, and with the participation, of Cecil Rhodes, at a time when the ink was hardly dry upon the Royal Charter and before even the Lippert Commission had been obtained by the Chartered Company; moreover, it was three years before Sir Starr Jameson's invasion of Matabeleland. Can any sane person believe, in the light of this, that the intentions of the local element of the Chartered Company with Rhodes at their head were "entirely peaceful"?

The Downfall of Lobengula apparently discloses the military atmosphere in the headquarters of the Chartered Company; the translation of the De Waal memoirs, written still farther from Downing Street, show the intentions of those in close touch with Mr. Rhodes, and, to some extent, of the "Colossus" himself. But in Mashonaland the intention to embark upon a filibustering expedition was still more unmistakable, and no effort seems to have been spared to create a suitable "incident." Moreover, the Matabele were soon to learn that "operations" involving the death of Mashonas commenced immediately after the arrival of the "pioneer column," and they quickly realized that what the timid Mashonas were called upon to suffer so promptly, would ultimately be the lot of the Matabele.

The original settlers forming the pioneer

panied Mr. Rhodes as companion, friend, and chronicler; they cover conversations in 1890; they exhibit the intention to make war, and to give away lands and property of the Matabele to those who would take part in the military operations. The whole memoirs are full of similar filibustering expressions and, like *The Downfall of Lobengula*, the first page presents a full-sized portrait of Mr. Cecil Rhodes.

column had barely reached Mashonaland when Lord Knutsford drew the attention of the High Commissioner to the report in the *Financial News* of January 9, 1892, in which it was stated :

... It is a significant fact that at all the forts from Tuli to Salisbury the Chartered Company's flag has been taken down and the Union Jack hoisted in its place. Adding this to the fact that the pioneers have done all in their power to provoke Lobengula, even going so far as to escort Khama's men out of the country, there is no doubt that a fight must ultimately and very shortly ensue.¹

The date upon which Sir Starr Jameson decided to invade Matabeleland is probably known only to himself and a few—very few—friends. That he intended to do so cannot now be questioned ; nor in the light of present day facts can it be denied that whilst the Imperial authorities were still endeavouring to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, Sir Starr Jameson was definitely committed to an invasion of Matabeleland.

Sir Starr Jameson had, it has been disclosed, signed the secret agreement for invasion on August 14, 1893 ; but another reference to *The Downfall of Lobengula* discloses, upon the authority of Major Forbes, the further fact of capital importance that the plans for the invasion were actually prepared nearly a month earlier, for "on the morning of the 19th of July, as I (Major Forbes) have said, the programme of the expedition was drawn up." That is twenty-eight days before the High Commissioner, in ignorance of these commitments, was giving formal assurances, on behalf of Queen Victoria, that there was no intention of invasion. Not only had the High Commissioner given this assurance,

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 10.

but he also telegraphed to Lobengula a fortnight later :

Let there be peace between you and the white men. I understand also you were thinking of sending two of your Indunas to speak to me. I shall be glad to receive them if they come from you with words of friendship and of peace.¹

His Excellency had also telegraphed to Lobengula thanking him "for the protection he (Lobengula) has hitherto always extended to white men," but that "peace or war must rest with you."

The foregoing offer by the High Commissioner to receive the envoys, and the statement that "peace or war" rested with Lobengula and the Matabele, demonstrate the most pitiable ignorance in the offices of the Imperial authorities of local conditions and movements; but this was perhaps not altogether surprising in view of the immense distances which separated the High Commissioner's officials from the actual scene of the Chartered Company's operations, and of the profound trust which Downing Street always placed in the Directors of the Company.

On the spot no doubt was entertained by any one as to the certainty of an invasion, least of all by the Matabele, for so early as July 27, 1893, King Lobengula had with characteristic courage telegraphed to Dr. Rutherford Harris in Cape Town :

I thought you came to dig gold, but it seems that you have come not only to dig the gold, but to rob me of my people and country as well.²

Apart from the settlers connected with the Company, there were very few independent

¹ Cd. 7196, p. 32.

² Cd. 7171, p. 67.

observers on the spot. Such as they were they also had no doubt upon two points: First, that Lobengula was endeavouring to avoid hostilities, and secondly, that there were powerful elements in the Company's entourage doing their utmost to cause a rupture and force Sir Starr Jameson's hand. Mr. Kirby, the manager of the Tati Concession, wired through the Assistant Commissioner a message of which the following is an extract :

. . . If war is declared on the pretext which is the present subject of negotiation with Lobengula, I presume that the object and aim of it all is British aggrandisement. . . .¹

Mr. Kirby writing to his Company on August 18th said :

From all I hear our Government intend to force Loben to fight. Most of the whites I have seen from Bulawayo say that the king does not want to fight.²

Mr. Dawson, than whom there was, and is, probably no greater authority upon the Matabele, writing to Mr. J. S. Moffat on September 9th, said :

I am firmly of the opinion that Loben does not want to fight and that he will not do so unless actually forced to it in self-defence. . . . The High Commissioner has certainly sent some very conciliatory messages, and holding the opinion which I do of Loben's intentions, I cannot see where the probability of hostilities occurring becomes apparent, unless, of course, the third factor, i.e. the Company, is so powerful as to have its own way in case they wish to see the thing out.³

Another resident at Bulawayo, an intimate of Lobengula and an intermediary of the British High Commissioner, Mr. Colenbrander, tele-

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 70. ² Cd. 7196, p. 26. ³ Cd. 7196, p. 70

graphed on August 3rd to Sir Henry Loch that he would " be exceedingly glad if you would kindly send a word of caution to Dr. Jameson and Dr. Harris on the subject " ¹ (the relations between Lobengula and the Company).

It is therefore clear in the first place that the Matabele people, even more than their king, were convinced that hostilities were intended upon the slightest pretext, and it is equally clear that independent and experienced white men in Bulawayo, like Colenbrander, Dawson and Kirby, had no delusion upon the subject ; it is, moreover, quite apparent that the settlers under the Chartered Company and certainly some of their officials were equally intent upon hostilities, no matter how earnestly the Imperial authorities on the one hand and Lobengula on the other endeavoured to prevent a rupture. The Imperial authorities alone failed to realize that the invasion of Matabeleland was determined upon in spite of the peace efforts of Lobengula and the High Commissioner.

The attitude of the settlers in Mashonaland is set forth by the Imperial Secretary in Cape Town in a letter written to the Chartered Company on August 17, 1893, in which he said :

The chief, Lobengula, who is apparently anxious for peace, seems to be doing his best to restrain his people, and to protect the lives of the Europeans who are resident at Bulawayo. On the other hand, there is in Mashonaland a European population which is not unnaturally anxious that an early termination should be put to the present unsettled feeling which prevails, and which result they consider can only be attained by the immediate and entire subjugation of the Matabele.²

How correctly the Imperial Secretary had interpreted " public opinion " in Mashonaland

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 67.

² Cd. 7196, p. 16.

is shown by Mr. Newton's report upon the "Victoria incident," described later on in this book. In this report is included a copy of the *Mashonaland Times* of July 20, 1893, the "News Items" of which contains the following:

Sunday.—Rev. Sylvester, as military chaplain, holds service after parade for inspection of arms. The rev. gentleman stood on ammunition cases, and said that the sons of Ham¹ would all be cleared out. He considered the Chartered Company had not quite forgotten its duty, it had left us four walls to get behind. Cricket match in afternoon.²

The curious medley of the gospel preached from a pile of ammunition cases, the Christian denunciation of the "sons of Ham," the Sabbath cricket match and the military ardour of Monday are a good indication of the state of public opinion.

Sir Starr Jameson at Victoria could not at this time, at least, be regarded as a restraining influence, for only a month earlier he had telegraphed to Dr. Rutherford Harris at Cape Town urging the importance of finally settling the Matabele question, which could be done "by (*sic*) in Mashonaland alone."³

The situation thus portrayed shows that there was both created, and apparently desired, a momentum towards a native war, a situation created by one out of the three parties, and in point of fact the determining party. The only element now required was a match for the powder magazine.

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

² C. 7555, p. 41.

³ Cd. 7171, p. 60.

"SMASHING THE MATABELE"

(Cost, £120,000)

THE HOSTILITIES OF 1893

IN the previous chapter we have seen that local opinion was ripe for the process of "smashing the Matabele," that handsome inducements had been offered by the Administrator of the Chartered Company to every white man willing to take part in the invasion, and that these inducements comprised a gift of lands, gold and cattle, and other "loot" of a potential value of not less than £10,000 to each invader. The total number of Europeans who, according to Major Forbes, volunteered for the invasion was 672, giving a total cash value to these invaders of £6,720,000; a select few received a good deal more than the value of £10,000 each. But according to the Rhodesian Attorney-General's evidence given before Lord Cave's Commission on September 22, 1919, the number of "grants," as they are euphemistically called, was over 800, or a total value of over £8,000,000.

The gold in Matabeleland had little value in the eyes of the native tribes, and they could not understand the anxiety of the white man to possess it, but their tribal land and cattle represented to them, as they tell one to this day, more than their very life. The *casus belli* so eagerly anticipated was founded on three appar-

ently trivial matters, a piece of telegraph wire, some cattle and the "border," whilst if the real and ultimate excuse is sought, tragically ridiculous as it may seem, it is represented solely by that piece of telegraph wire, which was probably stolen by some wandering native herdsman or half-caste—if it was stolen at all!

Early in May 1893, it was stated that someone had cut and carried off five hundred yards of the Company's telegraph wire, and this was ultimately alleged to have been done by a petty chief, upon whom the Company's agents promptly levied a fine of cattle. There is evidence that the number of cattle, though not stated, must have been considerable. Gomalla, the accused chief upon whom the fine was levied, appears to have been herding some of Lobengula's cattle, and with characteristic African ingenuity promptly paid the fine with these! The Company claimed that the cattle in question were returned, but this was denied by Lobengula.

To appreciate the significance of this act we must see how it appeared to the Matabele. Mr. Colenbrander at Bulawayo, who, writing to Mr. Moffat on May 10, 1893, says that as punishment for the alleged wire-cutting the

. . . Company seized all their cattle, which turn out to be the king's. Loben is awfully wild about this. The people wanted permission to recapture them, which fortunately was refused them, or otherwise what would have been the result? I have written to Drs. Harris and Jameson to be more careful in their seizures, as these matters may not always be taken by the king so coolly.¹

It is doubtful whether at this period Sir Starr Jameson knew enough of the Matabele customs to understand what this seizure of cattle implied.

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 44.

The most charitable view is that he was ignorant of the fact that this was in itself an overt act of war, although there were several men at Victoria who ought to have known it perfectly well. Cattle were the symbol of the chief's authority, or in European parlance, the evidence of sovereignty. This was one of the principal reasons why Chaka was so furious with Umsiligasi in 1826; for it will be remembered that the latter had proposed a division of the cattle captured in Umsiligasi's expedition into the Transvaal, which of course implied a division of sovereignty. The Matabele people were not unnaturally thoroughly roused by Sir Starr Jameson's claim and seizure of cattle, but as Colenbrander said, Lobengula himself acted with great restraint under such a provocation, and any retaliatory act of war was avoided.

The next stage in the development followed a few weeks later, when, according to Sir Henry Loch, Lobengula "sent an impi to punish the Mashonas" ¹ for cattle thefts, and for damaging the telegraph wires." The High Commissioner quotes the fact that Lobengula was careful to notify Sir Starr Jameson and Captain Lendy of this action as an evidence of his friendliness.

The version given by Captain Norris Newman (Reuter's Special Commissioner) aptly sums up the local situation at this time :

At last matters were brought to a head by some of the marauders cutting down the telegraph poles, for which they were promptly brought to book and ordered to pay a fine, which was done by the petty chiefs, Setama and Goomala, apparently out of the cattle held by them in charge for the king. Communications passed between the Administrator and Lo Bengula, and later on with the

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 47.

High Commissioner, in which the king denied that it was his people who had done the damage, and objected to the fine being levied. He then sent an impi, in July 1893, under the induna Umgandine, ostensibly to punish the people who had cut the telegraph wires; but these men, whether they mistook or exceeded their orders, tackled some friendly Mashunas, killed some, and chased others right into Fort Victoria, where the poor unfortunates tried to take refuge.¹

The sending of this impi led to the first collision between the Matabele and the Chartered Company's "force." As a preface to the description of this incident the following message is quoted from Lobengula containing his view of the telegraph wire-cattle-boundary question. This message was sent to Mr. J. S. Moffat, the British Assistant Commissioner at Palapye:

I have received your wire, you accuse me wrongfully. I only sent my impi to recover some of my stolen cattle and to punish the Amaswini that your people complained to me about as constantly cutting your telegraph wires, but it would seem now to me that the white people stole my cattle, for white people know very well that the Amaswini had stolen some of my cattle, for I had written to tell Dr. Jameson; so what have you got to say now? You said before that you would not punish my Amahole, but now that *I send to punish them for you for harm done to your telegraph wires you resent it*—my impi on its way back. What goods have my impi stolen and destroyed and how many cattle have they captured? You only say my impi has done all this as an excuse for firing on them. I am not aware that a boundary exists between Dr. Jameson and myself; *who gave him the boundary lines?*² Let him come forward and show me the man that pointed out to him these boundaries; I know nothing whatever about them, and you, Mr. Moffat, you know very well that the white people have done this thing on

¹ Matabeleland, Capt. C. L. Norris Newman (T. Fisher Unwin).

² Italics mine.—J. H. H.

purpose. This is not right, my people only came to punish the Amahole for stealing my cattle and cutting your wires; do you think I would deliberately go and seize cattle from you? No, that would not be right.¹

There is no need to set forth all the details of this humiliating story called the "Victoria incident," but a brief record is essential to a correct appreciation of the present day claims of the Chartered Company, more particularly because like so many audacious "facts" connected with Rhodesia they have been reiterated with such persistency that they are now popularly accepted without examination even by men intimately associated with the Company. Those who wish to read the full story of the "Victoria incident" cannot do better than read Sir F. J. Newton's report.²

Sir F. Newton, then Mr. Newton, was appointed by the Imperial authorities to investigate the circumstances of this miserable affair, and on the whole his report is an extremely fair one, although he shows considerable regard for the Company's position in the matter. Sir F. Newton, then an Imperial servant, now holds a high position in the Chartered Company's Civil Service, and has behind him, with the exception of his conduct during the Jameson Raid, a very distinguished and arduous record in the service of the Crown.

The Matabele impi arrived in the Victoria district on July 9, 1893, to punish the Mashonas for stealing cattle and cutting Sir Starr Jameson's telegraph wire, and for about a week bullied the Mashonas, burning some of their kraals, seizing their cattle and killing a number of men and women, also capturing women and

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 67.

² Cd. 7555.

girls. The number of this impi was vaguely reported to have been from 350 to 8,000! It now seems clear that there were not more than 500 to 800. Sir Starr Jameson returned to Victoria from a journey on the 17th of July, and is variously stated to have ordered the "impi" "towards" or "across" the "border," wherever that might be, within an "hour" or "two" or "three." The impi indunas sent a message asking where was the boundary, and upon being told "they knew it very well," commenced moving westward towards Matabeleland. After lunch Sir Starr Jameson sent Captain Lendy and some thirty-eight troopers to follow the impi, and if he found them "not moving off to drive them, as you heard me tell Manyow I would, and if they resist and attack you, shoot them."¹

The troopers overtook the Matabele impi moving leisurely towards Matabeleland and shot some of them, admittedly without any provocation, for there was, as Mr. Newton (now Sir F. Newton) says, "nothing to show that any organized or individual resistance was offered."² The character of this incident may be gathered from the fact that the shooting of the Matabele occupied about ten minutes, and that not a single one of the Company's troopers was in any way injured, whilst the Company itself in its report says "about thirty"³ Matabele were killed. This, then, was the real commencement of hostilities, the excuse for the invasion of Matabeleland; the inspiration was the settlers' "war ultimatum" to Sir Starr Jameson, which in turn presumably forced the Company's administrator to sign the infamous agreement

¹ Cd. 7555, p. 6.

² Cd. 7555, p. 7.

³ British South Africa Company's Report, 1892-94.

of August 14, 1893, addressed to Captain Allan Wilson, although it is now established Sir Starr Jameson had much earlier made known to his associates his intention of invading Matabeleland.

As an example of the manner in which Matabele "ferocity" was exaggerated out of all proportions, it is interesting to compare Mr. Selous' record of this Victoria incident with the established facts. Mr. Selous makes the extraordinary statement with regard to this Matabele raid that:

It is true that no white man was murdered by the Matabele during the prosecution of this historical raid; but, short of this, everything was done to stir up the bitterest feelings of exasperation in the hearts of the colonists. More than 400 Mashona men, women and children were killed in the neighbourhood of the township of Victoria.¹

Subsequent information shows that this statement of Mr. Selous was cruelly inaccurate. Sir Starr Jameson in his telegram to the High Commissioner, dated July 18, 1893, did not, it is true, make such an astonishing misstatement as that of Mr. Selous, but he did make another misstatement of capital importance. The following is the material passage in this telegram:

The indunas arrived after my last telegram; after some conversations, during which they would not consent to return beyond the border, I told them I would give them an hour to retire, and if they did not would send my men to drive them out as I had informed the king. At the stated time Captain Lendy, with thirty-eight mounted men, rode out, found about three hundred still on commonage; *these fired on Lendy's party.*² Lendy then fired, and

¹ *The Downfall of Lobengula* (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.).

² Italics mine.—J. H. H.

pursued for about nine miles; a few men were killed, including two head men. Lendy has now returned; no casualties.¹

What are the elements of truth in these allegations of Sir Starr Jameson? Take first the question of the "border" to which the Imperial Government appears to have attached so much importance. Where was that "border" and when was it agreed upon? Neither the Charter, the Rudd Concession, nor the Lippert Concession contain the slightest mention of any border. Lobengula repudiated any such border, his indunas denied all knowledge of it. The Imperial Government had never, so far as can be ascertained, sanctioned any "border." If the Imperial authorities with all their sources of information knew nothing about any border, and if Lobengula repeatedly declared that he knew nothing about it, we cannot be surprised that the indunas in charge of the impi sent to recover the cattle and "punish" the Mashonas for cattle stealing and the alleged cutting of the Company's telegraph wire were equally ignorant of any such border.

The second offence alleged against the Matabele was that of shooting Mashonas and carrying off their cattle. Let it at once be admitted that the raiding and shooting of the Mashonas by the Matabele as judged by European standards was thoroughly unjustifiable and brutal, but Mr. Selous' statement that *four hundred Mashonas* were killed has been demonstrated to have been an exaggeration so gross as to be well-nigh criminal. In Mr. Newton's report none of the evidence supports such an allegation; several witnesses spoke of seeing *two* dead Mashonas, others saw *three*, another saw

¹ Cd. 7555.

several, whilst another witness "knew of *seven*." Sir Starr Jameson himself only said "altogether about twenty were killed in Victoria."

From the Matabele point of view the shooting of Mashonas was a legitimate punishment for theft, and whatever difference of degree there might have been in comparative incidents, there is no doubt that the Matabele argued that if the Company shot Mashonas and took their cattle, there was no reason why the Matabele should not follow the same practice.

To the Matabele, Captain Lendy's punitive expedition a year before against the Mashonas would appear in the same light as their own punitive expedition against the Mashonas at Victoria. What are the established facts of the Captain Lendy incident? A white man alleged robbery against a chief named Ngomo. Sir Starr Jameson sent Captain Lendy to arrest Ngomo and bring him to trial. Ngomo refused to be arrested, and therefore Sir Starr Jameson sent Captain Lendy back again with more men, a seven-pounder and a maxim, with the result that they killed the Mashona chief and twenty-one of his people, whilst as usual not one of Lendy's party was even scratched. Captain Lendy in his report says:

I counted twenty-one killed, among them being the chief, Gomo himself. I captured forty-seven head of cattle and several goats. Deeming the punishment sufficient I did not burn the huts, and I left what little grain there was.¹

A "punishment" far heavier than that inflicted upon the Mashonas by the Matabele during the much denounced "Victoria incident."

The High Commissioner's comment upon this

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 25.

expedition of Captain Lendy was "that the punishment inflicted in this case, involving the loss of some twenty-three lives, appears utterly disproportionate to the original offence."¹

Lord Knutsford's comment is even more vigorous :

The full report by Captain Lendy, subsequently received and forwarded, would, in Lord Knutsford's opinion, have justified much stronger terms of remonstrance than were used by the High Commissioner. There is nothing in the information now before his Lordship which affords any justification of Captain Lendy's proceedings, and after making full allowance for the difficulties attending the establishment of a European administration in a country such as Mashonaland, Lord Knutsford cannot avoid the conclusion that Captain Lendy acted in this matter with recklessness and undue harshness.²

At a later date the Imperial Secretary at Cape Town, replying to an explanation by the Company, stated that Sir Henry Loch had somewhat modified his first opinion of this incident, but :

His Excellency still entertains doubt as to whether the fire of Captain Lendy's force was not maintained much longer than was absolutely necessary, for, from the description of the engagement supplied to his Excellency, there seems good reason to suppose that Captain Lendy must have been early aware that the resistance offered by the natives was feeble in the extreme.³

If evidence exists that Lord Ripon modified his view of this incident it has escaped my notice. In point of fact, a Mr. Rolker from Mashonaland, accompanied by Mr. Rochfort Maguire, called at the Colonial Office on June 3, 1892, but failed to supply information sufficient

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 23. ² Cd. 7171, p. 26. ³ Cd. 7171, p. 34.

to "lead the Secretary of State to modify the views already expressed."¹ Thus the comparison between the Chartered Company's attack on the Mashonas, and the attack of the Matabele upon the Mashonas, provides several interesting features.

The third and most material feature of the Victoria incident arises from Sir Starr Jameson's allegation that when Captain Lendy followed the Matabeli impi towards that elusive "*border*,"² the Matabele fired on the white men. They did nothing of the kind.

At the stated time (said Sir Starr Jameson) Captain Lendy, with thirty-eight mounted men, rode out, found about three hundred still on commonage; *these fired on Lendy's party*.² Lendy then fired, and pursued for about nine miles; a few men were killed, including two head men. Lendy has now returned; no casualties.—(Sir Starr Jameson to the High Commissioner, July 18, 1893.)³

Two days later, on July 20th, Sir Henry Loch remonstrated vigorously with Lobengula upon this incident, and said, *inter alia* :

Dr. Jameson made friendly endeavours to restrain your people and induce them to retire, but when the conduct of your indunas and people became dangerous not only to the property *but to the lives of the white men, and they dared to fire on white men*,⁴ then the limits of patience were passed.⁵

Now this allegation of firing upon the whites was at a later date proved, and officially proved, to be wholly unfounded, for the impi, in conformity with Lobengula's strict orders, did not touch the hair of the head of a single white

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 27.

² Italics mine.—J. H. H.

³ Cd. 7171, pp. 53-54.

⁴ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

⁵ Cd. 7171, p. 57.

man, not even apparently when the Company's troopers without the slightest provocation started shooting them. This is authoritatively brought out in Sir F. Newton's report, and his conclusion on this point is emphatic :

Dr. Jameson was misinformed when he reported officially that the Matabele fired first on the whites . . . the sergeant of the advance guard fired the first shot . . . the Matabele practically offered no resistance.¹

But this wicked misstatement officially made and started on its way spread to the Imperial Government, and it was reproduced in the Press of two continents with all the gross exaggerations about the ferocity of the Matabele, whilst even responsible men recognized that the deliberate firing upon white subjects of the British Crown meant, as the High Commissioner had said, that the "limits of patience" had been passed—nobody seems to have thought of the possibility that there was never a vestige of truth in the allegation. How soon Sir Starr Jameson discovered it was a misstatement, how soon it became known whether this misstatement of such capital importance was or was not deliberate, nobody knows—one thing only seems clear, neither the Chartered Company, Sir Starr Jameson, nor any of its officials took any steps to publicly recall and correct the misstatement of such vital importance. The world was allowed to ring with "Matabele atrocities," whilst barely anything was heard of the much more atrocious attack by Captain Lendy on the Mashonas.

This Victoria incident, so gravely distorted to the Imperial authorities, gave that for which

¹ Cd. 7555, p. 12.

many were hungrily waiting—a pretext to invade and seize Matabeleland. A public meeting was held, and resolutions passed and sent to the High Commissioner urging action. Sir Starr Jameson telegraphed, as we know, to Dr. Rutherford Harris with the object of obtaining permission to "settle the (Matabele) question finally." At the same time Sir Starr Jameson was presented with a kind of ultimatum by the "settlers," who declared they were determined upon either the "breaking up of the Matabele power," or they would "leave the country."¹ We have also seen that the Matabeleland invasion letter of August 14th addressed to Captain Allan Wilson followed closely upon this declaration.

The attitude of the High Commissioner was set forth in a telegram dated July 24th, in which he assured the settlers of his sympathy, and although he "talked war" he stated finally:

As to the rumours of men leaving Mashonaland in consequence of what has happened, I cannot believe that there are any such fair-weather trekkers who, at the first breath of difficulty or danger, would think of leaving the country. Should, however, there be any such, then in my opinion the country would not suffer by their departure.²

It can only be surmised what the High Commissioner would have said had he at this time learned how grossly he had been misinformed upon capital issues, more particularly had he been aware of the fact that the plans for invasion had been prepared, according to Major Forbes, five days before! On July 25th, Lord Ripon, in London, called the attention of the Chartered

¹ *The Downfall of Lobengula*, p. 62 (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.).

² Cd. 7171, p. 61.

Company to a report in *The Times* that "Dr. Jameson had informed a committee of residents (at Fort Victoria) that everything was ready to push affairs to an issue," and the Colonial Minister asked whether the Company could throw "any light upon the meaning of this alleged declaration."¹ The light which could have been thrown upon this would indeed have shown Lord Ripon how completely everything was ready. Major Forbes describes that readiness in his report, where he tells how the whole scheme of the invasion was at this date settled, even to Sir Starr Jameson telling Major Forbes that Matabeleland should be invaded from three points, and that all the troopers were to converge on the capital, Bulawayo. The complete details of the invasion of Matabeleland had been decided upon, as may be gathered from the following sentence in Major Forbes' account:

In accepting the responsibility of invading Matabeleland with 750 men, I was doing what many thought a very rash thing. . . .²

Yet Lord Ripon, Britain's Colonial Minister, was all this time kept entirely ignorant of these arrangements! During August and September troopers were drilling and stores being collected, of which the Matabele knew perfectly well the meaning. At the same time rumours were floating about which added to the general atmosphere of alarm; friendly kraals were stated to have been burnt, but these, like so many other allegations against the Matabele, were unfounded. In some cases the kraals had never existed, in others no harm had been done to them.

¹ Cd. 7171, p. 48.

² *The Downfall of Lobengula* (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.).

On August 16th the High Commissioner telegraphed to Mr. Moffat asking him to tell Lobengula "I believe it is his desire to live on friendly terms with the white people, and that it is my desire peace should be maintained," but if the impi raid were repeated fighting would follow; and at the same time assuring him, as we have seen, "I have no intention of invading his country or of dragging him into war; that although the white man is fully prepared to fight if he forces them to do so, peace or war will rest entirely with him."¹

How could peace or war rest with the old chief when, as we know, one month earlier Sir Starr Jameson had made all plans for the invasion, and had already *signed the secret agreement which formally committed him to an invasion of Matabeleland!* In fairness to the Imperial authorities, there is no evidence that they knew of the existence of the Victoria agreement of August 14, 1893, or that they realized how grossly they were being deceived in other respects. It is also significant that on August 17th, three days after the Victoria agreement was signed, the Imperial Secretary had to protest to the Company against the "sensational account of events in Matabeleland" which were appearing in the newspapers, and concluded:

. . . To enable Lobengula to have a fair chance of arriving at a peaceable settlement of existing difficulties, his Excellency desires to see excitement allayed and confidence restored, but his efforts in that direction will be to a great extent neutralized by the publication of *sensational Press telegrams*,² such as those which have recently appeared. His Excellency desires me, therefore, to invite your co-operation by your giving instructions to the officers of

¹ Cd. 7196, p. 13.

² Italics mine.—J. H. H.

the British South Africa Company to exercise prudence and moderation in their communications with the representatives of the Press.¹

Neither Lobengula nor the Matabele had any Press agents to defend them and their country against such sensational news items! They had no authoritative voice to tell the world that Selous' four hundred slain were not more than twenty, none to deny that damaging allegation that they had fired on Queen Victoria's white subjects, nobody to disclose to the world the infamous secret pact for the invasion of their land and the division of their cattle amongst the invaders.

Lobengula, fully alive to the preparations which the Victoria secret agreement involved, as a last hope addressed a letter to Queen Victoria, in whom he had boundless faith, and despatched this with envoys to the High Commissioner. Sir Henry Loch, as ignorant of the existence of Sir Starr Jameson's formal preparations for invasion as was Lord Ripon, agreed to receive the envoys and hoped for peace. The following is Lobengula's letter to Queen Victoria, sent through Sir Henry Loch:

I have the honour respectfully to write and state that I am still keeping your advice laid before me some time ago, i.e. that if any trouble happens in my country between me and the white men I must let you know.

I despatched an army for my cattle stolen by the Mashonas, which took the direction of Mashonaland. My impi was told to leave their arms behind coming into the camp, which they did. The white men, after holding a meeting with them, shot dead thirty of my people without any cause.

Some time before my cattle were stolen by the Mashona

¹ Cd. 7196, p. 16.

THE APPEAL OF A "SAVAGE" III

and driven into Mashonaland. I sent my army to fetch them back, with a messenger before them to warn the white people that the impi following had not to interfere with Europeans whatsoever, but simply to bring back my stolen cattle.

When the impi reached Mashonaland they found my cattle mixed with the Europeans', where they were killed. In the meeting they had, they told my people that the white men had bought the country and the people who live in it.

Your Majesty, what I want to know from you is if people can be bought at any price. I have no more cattle left.

Before sending my impi after the stolen cattle, I wrote and informed Captain Lendy that I am coming to fetch my cattle back from the Mashona, and that I am not coming to make war with Europeans settled in Mashonaland.

When the meeting was held my impi was told to leave their arms coming into camp. Their disarming them was a clever trick to attack them armless. Further, they stated that I do not allow them (Europeans) to enter my kraal with arms; neither do I.

Your Majesty, allow me to ask by disarming whom did I mislead first and then kill?

Also they state I made a line between them at Shashi and Inyati rivers, of which I am ignorant.

With whom did I agree to make this line which my people are not allowed to cross into Mashonaland?

Also, Captain Lendy, when he was at my kraal, informed me that the Mashonas were also troubling him by stealing cattle, taking them to their forts, and cutting the telegraphic wire. All the time pretending to be my friends; hence the death of my thirty men.

Your Majesty, what I want to know from you is, i.e. Why do your people kill me? Do you kill me for following my stolen cattle which are seen in the possession of the Mashonas living in Mashonaland? I have called all white men living at or near Bulawayo to hear my words, showing clearly that I am not hiding anything from them when writing to your Majesty.¹

In the meantime, Colonel Goold Adams, with his Mounted Police from Bechuanaland, had

¹ Cd. 7196, p. 76.

moved to a camp into which three of Lobengula's envoys came upon a "safe conduct" pledge. For some reason the unfortunate envoys, it is said, became alarmed, and in attempting to escape had a fracas with the sentries, during which two of the envoys were shot dead. At a later date the other induna saw the High Commissioner, and upon his return was first taken ill and then disappeared. The fate of these "peace envoys" naturally had a most unfortunate effect upon the Matabele.

The Chartered Company gives the following reason for the commencement of the Matabele war and the invasion of Matabeleland :

What slight hope remained of a peaceful settlement was dissipated when, on October 2nd, a patrol of the Company's police was fired on close to Victoria. On being informed of this, the High Commissioner authorized Dr. Jameson to take all steps he considered necessary to provide for the safety of the lives and property of the settlers under his administration.¹

(At this point the author ventures to adopt the unusual course of inserting an interpolation. If at any time this question of the alleged attack on this "patrol" should be the subject of an enquiry at which sworn evidence can be taken, it will then be necessary to state what took place on December 18, 1919, in the vicinity of Westminster between Brigadier-General — and the author; and also to whom a written account of the incident was instantly submitted.)

Several questions at once arise out of this statement issued by the Chartered Company; first, was it true that the police were fired on? Already we have seen that on the other occasion on which Sir Starr Jameson made such an

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, 1892-4, p. 18.

allegation it was ultimately proved to be quite untrue. Next, was it absolutely certain that, if such firing took place, they were Matabele who fired? These and many other questions arise which are of no little moment in the light of the attitude of the settlers in Mashonaland. It is incorrect to suggest that prior to October 2nd there was hope of "a peaceful settlement;" there never was any hope after the secret agreement to invade Matabeleland was entered into on August 14th. War was desired, anticipated and determined upon, and thus became inevitable. How far Sir Starr Jameson was the victim of circumstances, how far he was responsible for the creation of the circumstances which led him to invade Matabeleland, the public must judge from the evidence.

The actual invasion of Matabeleland began early in October 1893, by which time, as we have seen, Colonel Goold Adams with a police force had been moved up to the southern border of Matabeleland. The early hostilities are of little political interest, because the result was a foregone conclusion. Lobengula had long known that he could not hope to withstand European troops in possession of weapons of precision, machine guns and artillery. The Company's troopers fought with courage, especially in the deplorable Shangani incident (which ought never to have occurred), when Captain Allan Wilson and his comrades were ambushed and killed to a man. Apart from this incident, due largely to the rapid rise of the river, there were very few casualties.

The total strength of the invading force was 672 Europeans and 515 natives; the whole casualties were 158 European and native inclusive, whilst excluding the disaster to Captain

Wilson's force, less than six white men were killed in the fighting!

The Matabele fought with bravery admittedly equal to that of the whites. For example, in the principal fight, that of Mbembesi, we are told that one regiment of seven hundred men had five hundred killed, that is five hundred natives killed, whilst less than six white men had been killed, and still the killing went on! This struggle, so unequal from the first, had completely broken up the main Matabele force, and there only remained the task of "chastising" the roving bands of indigenous Matabele.

There is, however, one outstanding political feature of these operations which an eminent divine in South Africa told the author he considered as the most disgraceful proceeding in the invasion. It has been asserted, and it is believed to this day by responsible Ministers of the Crown, that Lobengula made no definite offer of peace; this much at least is certain—the Imperial authorities were not allowed to know of any such offer when it would have been of service to know of it. It cannot now be denied that Lobengula did send peace envoys. But disaster in some form or other nearly always overtook Lobengula's envoys, with the exception of the two who visited England prior to the granting of the Charter in the year 1889, and the last peace envoys from the hunted Lobengula were no exception; and how far, if at all, the antagonism between the Imperial authorities and the Company contributed to that particularly "unfortunate incident" will probably never be known. This antagonism between the Imperial authorities and the Company upon the question of peace terms began early in October 1893. On October 11th, Sir Henry

Loch agreed¹ with Lord Ripon that all negotiations with Lobengula as to the future should be conducted by the High Commissioner, and on October 21st, Lord Ripon advised Sir Henry Loch to send a message to Lobengula telling him that :

... you are ready to receive any persons sent by him with full powers to treat, or any communications from him made with the view of restoring peaceful relations on such conditions as will give security against future raids or disturbances. That you cannot, however, stop the forces now advancing until you are satisfied that he sincerely intends to restore friendly relations on a satisfactory basis."²

It might be asked, what right had the white men to be "advancing" at all? A question very difficult to answer!

This contention of the Crown was met by the Chartered Company forwarding to Lord Ripon the following telegram from Mr. Rhodes, and stating that the Directors fully endorsed the views set forth in the telegram :

Board of Directors (should) see Marquess of Ripon, ask meaning of Sir Henry Loch's telegram to C. J. Rhodes, stating Marquess of Ripon has placed all negotiations Matabeleland under complete control Sir Henry Loch. British South Africa Company have asked British Government nothing, and surely they have right, in terms of Charter, if victorious, to settle the question with Lobengula, subject only to approval of Marquess of Ripon.³

Lord Ripon replied maintaining the attitude he had adopted, and which had been based upon Article 7 of the Charter, but assured the Company that due weight would be given to any representation made by Mr. Rhodes with regard

¹ Cd. 7196, p. 57.

² Cd. 7196, p. 73.

³ Cd. 7290, p. 1.

to peace terms. That peace terms could have been arranged by the Imperial Government or Lobengula was clearly impossible if the Victoria agreement was to be honoured. It would have been beyond the power of Lobengula to agree to any terms which permitted the carving up of his country and the distribution of the "loot" so explicitly pledged in that document; and on the other hand, does any one suppose for one moment that the Imperial authorities could have been party to the terms of such a filibustering agreement—the mere thought is utterly repugnant to every self-respecting British subject.

This was, of course, the reason why Sir Starr Jameson was anxious that peace terms with Lobengula should only pass through his hands. But the Imperial authorities were ignorant of Sir Starr Jameson's agreement with his fellow invaders. Bishop Knight Bruce tells us that he also was willing to go out from Bulawayo, whither he had come for this very commendable purpose, and open up peace negotiations with Lobengula, but was dissuaded by Sir Starr Jameson.

Whether any of the peaceful messages from the Imperial authorities ever reached Lobengula is doubtful; what is not in doubt is that *Lobengula did send peace envoys and that the envoys reached the Company's troopers who were pursuing him, but the Matabele message of peace carried by the envoys was not allowed to reach the Imperial Government.*

The following are the facts of Lobengula's peace offer so far as can be gathered locally, and principally from one who was present; they are well known in Rhodesia, and cannot be disputed in their main outline.

Lobengula, resolute in his fixed determination not to attack the white men personally, retired

with a few faithful adherents across a tributary of the Zambesi river; he had been compelled to abandon his wagon, but owing to an attack of gout was obliged to take to the bath chair presented to him by Lord Randolph Churchill. Once across the river, Lobengula hoped his relentless pursuers would cease their attacks, but finding he was mistaken he called his principal relatives and indunas around him and, it is said, addressed them as follows:

Matabele, the white men will never cease following us whilst we have gold in our possession, for gold is what the white men prize above all things. Collect now all my gold and you A—— and you B—— (two indunas) carry it to the white men; tell them they have beaten my regiments, killed my people, burnt my kraals, captured my cattle, and that I want peace.

The gold was carried in bags by the two indunas who came into the camp, where the gold was forcibly taken from them, and they themselves were then brutally driven away. It is sometimes said locally that these envoys were killed, but there is good reason to believe that they were not; probably this arises from a confusion with the incident in 1893, when two of Lobengula's envoys were killed at Tati. This deplorable story was brought to light through an injudicious "flow of gold" on the return of the troopers to Bulawayo. At a later date, when the scandal became so notorious, two men were tried by Sir Starr Jameson and sent to prison for a short period. It may be said that with such evidence of the displeasure of Sir Starr Jameson, the matter was satisfactorily terminated; if this argument is advanced, further light would probably be thrown upon it by asking whether these men were still in

prison in December and January 1895-96, if not, where were they, and why?

Thus the message of peace so anxiously awaited and with such hopeful expectancy by the Imperial Government was actually sent by Lobengula, but never allowed to reach its destination, whilst the messengers were subjected to treatment which savage tribes would scorn. In *The Downfall of Lobengula*,¹ which is, on the face of it, the apologia of the Company's men, this incident is dismissed in the following sentence :

When Lobengula became convinced that Major Forbes' patrol was following him up in earnest, he at once sent messengers to negotiate terms of peace, with a large sum of money : the surest test that the Kaffir can give of his desire to submit. This, as stated by Mjan, was accompanied by a message that he was prepared to come in and talk matters over with Dr. Jameson at Bulawayo, merely asking to be assured of his own personal safety.²

It has been said that Lobengula died soon after from small-pox—he did nothing of the kind. It is frequently asserted that Lobengula is still alive, and of this there is some very slender evidence, but there is good reason to think that he died a natural death at a very different date, at a very different place, and under very different circumstances from those put forward by the Chartered Company.

With the so-called "smashing of the Matabele" and the alleged death of Lobengula, Sir Starr Jameson appears to have given permission for the pegging out of claims, according

¹ Simpkin, Marshall & Co.

² *The Downfall of Lobengula*, p. 213 (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.).

to the terms of the Victoria agreement. Indeed, so anxious were the invaders to select the best portion of the country, that even before Major Forbes began his unhappy retreat from Shangani, impatient individuals had begun dividing the spoils. On December 10th Lord Ripon, in some justifiable alarm, telegraphed as follows to Sir Henry Loch :

According to newspaper telegrams, Dr. Jameson is marking out townships in Matabeleland, one of which includes the Bulawayo kraal ; patrols, in some of which Bechuana-land Border Police are probably included, are continuing to seize large numbers of cattle from the Matabele ; the followers of Lobengula are dying of small-pox and starvation ; and the Matabele are being prevented from sowing until they surrender their arms.

If these reports are in substance correct, it would appear that the final settlement of the question is being seriously prejudiced, contrary to the promise of the Chartered Company in this country, and contrary to the public declarations and intentions of Government.

Her Majesty's Government cannot acquiesce in proceedings such as those above mentioned, and in the continued seizure of cattle from people who have ceased to offer effective or organized resistance. Such proceedings greatly strengthen the opposition in this country to the Company, and render it more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement. You should, as soon as possible, communicate with Rhodes, representing to him the state of the case, and inviting him to give Jameson instructions to moderate his proceedings, and to take steps to stop the looting of cattle, or to arrange for restoring it in future to its owners.¹

Sir Starr Jameson was of course only carrying out his secret agreement, and although Lord Ripon said the Imperial Government "cannot acquiesce" in such proceedings, the plain fact is they did acquiesce. But this telegram further demonstrates the fact that Lord Ripon knew nothing of that secret Victoria

¹ Cd. 7290, p. 24.

agreement by which Sir Starr Jameson had committed himself to spoliation, and thereby "seriously prejudiced" both the Directors of the Chartered Company and the Imperial authorities.

The rights of the Matabele, the prerogatives of the Imperial Government, and unquestionably the reputation of the British people amongst the natives of South Africa had been signed away for the time being by Sir Starr Jameson on August 14, 1893.

This chapter comprises one of the most tragic periods in the history of Rhodesia. This and the previous chapter opened with the fervid protestations of the Directors of the Chartered Company that they were not as other men are, for they declared it must "never be forgotten that the policy of the Company, *unlike that of expeditions in other parts of Africa,*¹ has been to occupy peacefully under treaties with native chiefs, and not by force"!

What does this evidence portray?

The evidence shows a determination to force a quarrel with the Matabele upon some or any pretext, whilst the local settlers had been incited to invasion by liberal promises of land, "loot" and gold.

At the time this policy of aggression was being fostered locally, the Imperial authorities were led through gross misrepresentations upon capital issues to consider seriously the possibility of hostilities. The evidence now available also discloses honourable conduct at this time on the part of a savage, but in many respects noble, chief; conduct which found an appreciative echo in the attitude of the Imperial authorities, who were anxious above all things

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

to avoid the hostilities. But the Imperial authorities were ignorant of local circumstances, and either lethargic or weak in their dealings with the Chartered Company's agents in South Africa. Is it possible for any impartial witnesses to read this record of the events leading up to the "smashing of the Matabele," as it is called, without indignation? But mere indignation will serve no useful purpose—there is but one course for all honourable men to take, and that is to make amends to the Matabele as quickly as possible and as generously as practicable for the wrongs done to them. But it must not be overlooked that the Matabele represent but one section wronged in one way or other by the Chartered Company.

THE JAMESON RAID—THE IMPOSITION OF SLAVERY—THE NATIVE REVOLT

There is not the slightest evidence that the late High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all information on the subject from him. The Committee must, however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in not communicating to the High Commissioner the information which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty in a like manner.—(Report of the Transvaal Raid Select Committee.)

THE year 1894 was largely occupied with "rounding up" the Matabele or their cattle, or both, and 1895 again saw Sir Starr Jameson preparing his schemes for conquest. The Transvaal Raid involved the practice of a further measure of deception upon the Imperial Government, coupled with the infliction of a system of slavery upon both the Mashonas and the Matabele, which was bound to lead to further wars.

It will be asked what connection had the Mashona and Matabele risings of 1895 and 1896 with Sir Starr Jameson's notorious raid into the Transvaal territories? It will also be asked, and quite fairly, why these unpleasant incidents are at this date again brought before the public?

From the historic point of view, their renewed consideration is valuable because with the lapse

of time new facts have come to light which have an academic—although important—bearing upon the Transvaal Raid. But there are other and stronger reasons, in that the native risings involved a very large expenditure, which has now been claimed from the Crown. It is essential, therefore, that the taxpayers of Great Britain should realize where the responsibility for that expenditure rests. If it can be shown that such expenditure was unnecessary, and was due in any appreciable measure to Sir Starr Jameson's incursion into the Transvaal, then the burden of financial responsibility surely rests upon those who organized that raid, and not upon the taxpayers of Great and Greater Britain.

Let us recall first the main facts established by the Select Committee of the House of Commons, and set forth in their Report :¹

The "Jameson Raid" took place on December 29, 1895, the Directors of the British South Africa Company in London being kept in complete ignorance of Sir Starr Jameson's intention, but Messrs. Cecil Rhodes, A. Beit and Dr. Rutherford Harris were all privy to the enterprise, whilst Mr. Rhodes, although Prime Minister of the Cape, had for months secretly financed the movement. So far back as June 1895, Mr. Rhodes, according to Mr. Beit's evidence, had conceived the idea of an "armed invasion," and from that date Messrs. Beit and Rhodes commenced the plot for "organizing the discontent which existed at Johannesburg, providing money and arms for the purpose of an insurrection there, and placing a force under Dr. Jameson on the frontier of the Transvaal to assist and support it."² Mr. Beit also admitted

¹ Cd. 165.

² Cd. 165, p. 6.

giving "unlimited credit" to Mr. L. Phillips "to the extent of some £200,000." Mr. Rhodes also paid large sums of money to Dr. Wolff, who was employed in organizing stores and stations for Dr. Jameson's forces, and also for arms sent from England by Dr. Rutherford Harris (the Secretary of the Chartered Company at Cape Town), which were alleged to be the property of the Chartered Company, but were diverted from their avowed destination, Rhodesia, and used for the insurrection in Johannesburg. The value of these stores, some time after the raid, was, it has been said, repaid by Mr. Rhodes. "The arms supplied to the insurgents of Johannesburg were secretly smuggled into the Transvaal through the instrumentality of the De Beers Company."¹ It will be remembered that the relationships between the De Beers Company and the Chartered Company have always been of an intimate nature.

Now the troops for this raid were enlisted primarily in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, whilst most of them had taken part in Sir Starr Jameson's incursion into Matabeleland in 1893, and had already profited under the "Victoria agreement." These troopers, when ready, were stationed at Pitsani and Mafeking, a proceeding which rendered necessary some step to hoodwink the Imperial authorities.

The High Commissioner, Lord Rosmead, having learned of this concentration, demanded the reason, and was given a shameless lie, for Mr. Rhodes deliberately informed his Excellency they were there merely for the sake of economy and to protect the railway. Thus the police force in Southern Rhodesia had been denuded in order that the leading spirits of the Chartered

¹ Cd. 165, p. 7.

Company might be enabled to invade the territory of a friendly State. This action was disastrously prejudicial to the government of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, for which the Company was responsible, a fact emphasized by the Select Committee on the Jameson Raid.

The Board were, under their Charter, invested with very large authority over an extensive territory, and the duty devolved upon them to maintain a due supervision over its administration, not only in respect of the commercial interests of the South Africa Company, but also in regard to the Imperial relations of the dominion under their control.¹

At the time the Select Committee upon the Jameson Raid penned the above reflection, they do not appear to have been in possession of the deplorable developments in Rhodesia—namely, the institution of modern slavery.

It is now interesting to follow what was taking place in Southern Rhodesia. During the year 1895 a force of native police had been brought into existence and trained for service; one reason given for this was significantly the same as that given by Mr. Rhodes for the concentration of the white police at Pitsani—economy. The white police cost for upkeep £205 a head, "whereas the native police cost about £30 a head." The original duties of the native police appear to have included the procuring of labour, branding cattle and tracing hidden cattle. The total strength of this native police force seems to have been about 200 men.

We are assured upon the authority of the Chief Native Commissioner, Mr. Taylor, that at this time, namely, when the native police force was being organized, "the attitude of

¹ Cd. 165, p. 12.

the natives generally is very satisfactory . . . and they are most submissive to the laws of the country"¹—that is in 1894.

But these "submissive" natives were soon to learn something of what the Black Man's Burden meant in the shape of slavery. Sir Richard Martin, who was ultimately appointed to enquire into the cause of the 1895 rising, made a prominent feature of forced labour, and reported to the High Commissioner :

1. That compulsory labour did undoubtedly exist in Matabeleland if not in Mashonaland.

2. That labour was procured by the various Native Commissioners for the various requirements of the Government (Company), mining companies and private persons.

This compulsory labour was, by authoritative interpretation, slavery. Both the official spokesmen of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices have declared that when forced labour is exacted for private purposes, then it is slavery, whilst nobody to-day will question the authority of the late Lord Cromer to pronounce upon the subject, which he did in the following words, when referring to labour conditions in another part of Africa :

Here, therefore, is the explanation of British views which M—— seeks. The answer to his question, what we mean by slavery, is that we reluctantly admit the necessity of compulsory labour in certain cases, and that we do not stigmatize as slavery such labour when, under all possible safeguards against the occurrence of abuses, it is employed for recognized and indispensable purposes of public utility. On the other hand, we regard the system when employed for private profit as wholly unjustifiable and as synonymous with slavery.

It is universally recognized amongst adminis-

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, 1894-95.

trators that the employment of native police and troops is a most dangerous practice unless those troops are firmly held in check by adequate white supervision, every departure from this rule having led invariably to disaster. The organization of the Jameson Raid involved a serious weakening of the Company's white controlling force, for the Chartered Company itself admits that Sir Starr Jameson's raiding force was "largely composed of members of its police."¹

A moment's consideration will show how dangerous was the situation. The native people were robbed of their land, they were robbed of their cattle; they were then subjected to a labour system "synonymous with slavery" imposed upon them by the worst elements of their tribes, who had been armed by the very officials and their followers who, but a year before, had robbed them of land and cattle. The white police, at least the symbol of armed might, were stealthily withdrawn, and the High Commissioner, the representative of the Imperial Government, was hoodwinked and kept in ignorance by a "conspiracy" of those who should have been his trusted advisers—that, frankly, was the situation about the end of 1895. Can it be a matter for surprise that the inevitable happened? The Matabele tribes, still smarting under the manner in which their country had been raided, and many of them believing, and not without reason, that, given an opportunity, their courageous if savage king Lobengula would come forth from his hiding-place and help them to throw off this bondage, were ripe to revolt against their oppressors. This situation was aggravated by the cruel and oppressive acts of the native police, now so thoroughly out of

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, 1896-97.

hand that they robbed and looted the unfortunate tribes, and generally subjected them to the most brutal treatment.

The moment for a rising was thus most opportune, for the Jameson Raid had failed at the end of 1895, the leaders of that raid were in prison, and were amongst the most vigorous and influential elements in the Chartered Company's administrative machinery; and the withdrawal of these elements, coupled with the savage atrocities of the native police, threw the whole country into a ferment of disorder, and a violent "rebellion" broke out.

The Company cannot be expected to admit completely that the 1896-97 risings arose directly or indirectly from the exigencies of the Jameson Raid into the Transvaal, but the following passages from their own Report come very close to such a general admission:

... The discontent thus engendered was undoubtedly increased by the dissatisfaction caused by the absence of any head; *by their unsatisfied desire for a king*; and by the irritation caused through the *overbearing action of the native police*, the old men especially resenting the indignity of being controlled by their "own dogs."¹

... It would, says Earl Grey, thus appear that the withdrawal of the white police from the country did not supply the cause for the rebellion, but merely pointed the opportunity.²

This official admission of Earl Grey, then Administrator of the Company, will be sufficient to demonstrate the close connection between an inadequately controlled police and the absence of that controlling white element on a raiding operation against a friendly State. This force

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

² British South Africa Company's Report, March 18, 1898, pp. 5 and 6.

of police, whose object, as stated under the Royal Charter, was to maintain peace and order in Southern Rhodesia, was knowingly and deliberately withdrawn, and used to create disorder and bring about a condition of war with a friendly State, namely, the Transvaal; thus indirectly bringing about another condition of war in the Rhodesian territories which it was its first duty to protect. This situation so deliberately created was brought about by conspiring with Imperial servants of the British Crown to keep the High Commissioner of South Africa, Lord Rosmead, in complete ignorance of the whole movement connected with the raid and its disastrous consequences. The word "conspiracy," with all its grave implications, is surely no whit too strong for these proceedings, and every one must agree that it was the only word which could have been used by the Select Committee.

The Matabele rising spread a few months later to the Mashonas, and without the restraining hand of Lobengula on behalf of the whites, the natives committed a large number of outrages and murders upon both white men and white women. With the aid of the local settlers, the Imperial troops, and, it is readily admitted, with the good sense of Mr. Rhodes, the "rebellion," as it was called, was ultimately put down and peace restored.

The revolt of the Mashona and Matabele in 1896 and 1897 have but little political significance, and only remotely affect the present issues; there are, however, two or three points of some importance. It is admitted that only a portion of each native tribe revolted, whilst many sections of tribes assisted the whites, and thus any consequent disabilities inflicted upon

the natives obviously ought to affect only parts of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. It is not without interest that the "protection" of the "unhappy" Mashonas, which the Company so loudly proclaimed when organizing the invasion of Matabeleland, was of such a nature that upon the first opportunity these same Mashonas rose against their self-appointed protectors, and called in the "ferocious" and "perfidious" Matabele to help them!

The loss of life amongst the white settlers and troops was deplorable; in fact, far heavier than that involved in the 1893 invasion of Matabeleland. The total casualties exceeded 270, and of these nearly 120 persons were reported either murdered or missing. The losses in the Company's police force were 32 deaths from various causes and 8 wounded, whilst the casualties of the Imperial troops were 12 deaths and 22 wounded.

The losses amongst the natives were frightful; probably the avenging of the murders of the whites has nowhere in British history assumed such terrible proportions. Men in Rhodesia give an involuntary shudder as they recount the manner in which the Mashonas who fled to the caves for protection were treated. Those who wish blood-curdling stories can easily find them in the local reports of both natives and white men. It can serve no useful purpose at this time of day to publish an array of evidence upon this feature, particularly as no political value attaches to such an account. From the year 1898 interest in Rhodesia became political as between whites, natives and the Chartered Company.

PART IV


THE CHALLENGE TO THE COMMONWEALTH

70,000,000 Acres of Land.

£22,000,000 ?

Imperial Practice.

Britain's "Acid Test."



THE COMMERCIAL CLAIM TO 70,000,000 ACRES OF LAND

THE land of Rhodesia has been divided by the Chartered Company into a threefold category :

- I. That alienated to white men.
- II. That unalienated to white men but occupied by natives.
- III. The Native Reserves, which is also called "unalienated" land.

The land alienated to white men on August 4, 1914, measured approximately 21,000,000 acres, whilst about 70,000,000 occupied by natives within and without the Reserves was designated "unalienated" land. It was to this 70,000,000 acres of Southern Rhodesian land that the Chartered Company laid claim as a commercial asset of the shareholders! To the student of Colonial politics this claim advanced by the Chartered Company, and in due time submitted to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, was one of the most astonishing which any individual or corporation has presumed to set up throughout the history of the British Empire. The claim was that the ownership of the entire unalienated lands of Rhodesia ("unalienated" being taken to mean land occupied by natives) was vested in the Company not as an administrative but as a commercial asset. This claim reduced to a popular interpretation may be stated as follows: these vast

areas measuring over 70,000,000 acres, covering a territory nearly twice the size of England, were declared to be the private or beneficial property of certain individuals in London, Berlin and Paris, many of whom have never set foot upon the Continent of Africa.

This claim was advanced to the exclusion of the British Crown, whose forces were called to the aid of the Chartered Company on at least two occasions, to the exclusion of the settlers, who had expended vastly more time and money in developing the country than the Chartered Company, and to the exclusion of the pre-existing and well-defined native laws and customs, which by its Charter the Company was, and is, bound to observe.

The settlers in Southern Rhodesia, numbering about 25,000, had for years viewed the land claims of the Chartered Company with increasing concern, but it was only after the death of Cecil Rhodes, and when the Company commenced to assert publicly the claims to "commercial ownership," that they really grasped the danger to which the country was exposed. There is no doubt that the unbounded confidence with which the people regarded the "Colossus of South Africa" tended to allay any uneasiness with regard to the land question, the more so because Rhodes himself appears to have looked upon the ownership of the land as an administrative, and not as a commercial asset. With the death of Rhodes, the Chartered Company lost the confidence of the settlers, and suspicion grew apace.

The settlers had long demanded information upon the Company's position in regard to land. Whence, they asked, is your title—is it through Royal Charter—is it concession—is it conquest

—is it occupation? The attitude of the Chartered Company towards its fellow colonists in Rhodesia was illustrated by the following extracts from questions and answers between the deputation of principal colonists and the Directors and Attorney of the Company at the Bulawayo Conference of 1907:

Sir Charles Coghlan. — If it (the land title) has been ratified by the Imperial Government, not another word is to be said against it. We have never yet been able, in spite of the fact that we have asked for it, to get at what the title to the country is.

Mr. Hawkesley (Attorney). — I am not here to be challenged upon my title. I am quite prepared when the time comes to defend it. I am not going at this stage to say anything more in the support of it. You know as a lawyer if you ask me to produce my title deed it is my right to sit upon it.

Mr. Forbes. — If you can show us your confirmation from the Imperial Government it will settle the whole thing.

Sir Starr Jameson. — It is perfectly right that the Imperial Government should interfere, but they have never disputed our right and title to the land. There is the celebrated case in which the Chartered Company acted in a way which the Imperial Government did not approve of, and so they sent a Resident Commissioner to look after things. I don't know whether you have a friend coming down from the Zambesi or at the Colonial Office.

Sir Charles Coghlan protested against this remark. He said that all they wanted was what was right and fair, and so far as the Chartered Company were concerned, they were welcome to what they were entitled. He would be the first one to champion them if their case were maintained.

Sir Starr Jameson. — You are perfectly entitled to go and look for proof.

Sir Charles Coghlan maintained that he did not think it right that it should be suggested that in doing that they had an ulterior motive.¹

¹ Report of the Conference at Bulawayo, October 1907, pp. 20-21.

To put the matter very mildly, the above would seem to represent a somewhat undiplomatic attitude to adopt towards responsible men and colonists, particularly of the Sir Charles Coghlan type, and incidentally such an attitude is poles asunder from that fraternal bearing which invariably characterized Cecil Rhodes, and was the secret of the loyalty and confidence which he always inspired.

The position assumed at the Bulawayo Conference by Sir Starr Jameson and Mr. Bouchier Hawkesley, the Company's solicitor, had at least one unexpected effect. It made the settlers more determined than ever to dispel local ignorance upon the rights of the Company in Rhodesia, and although information was refused, the terms of the concessions were obtained, closely examined, and then subjected to vigorous criticism.

The 1907 Conference really did more than anything within recent years to wake up Rhodesia. For years the Company had browbeaten the settlers, by insisting in season and out of season that they were utterly incapable of governing themselves, that all wisdom, all "might, majesty, dominion and power" was in the monopoly of the big-wigs of London Wall. So insistently was this cry sounded by influential voices, that the Rhodesian had almost come to believe it himself. The Bulawayo Conference finally broke the spell, for it showed the Rhodesian that the cupboards in London Wall contained not a few skeletons, and that the opening of those cupboard doors might lead to very inconvenient questions, and possibly startling discoveries.

This awakening, leading as it did to the asking of pertinent questions, automatically led on to

a challenge of the entire position which the Chartered Company had taken up. The settlers, with their ever increasing knowledge, began to realize that the Company's hold upon the assets of Rhodesia was in many respects precarious, and should be thoroughly examined before any decisions were made with reference to the surrender of the Royal Charter in favour of a new form of government.

The Rhodesian colonists believed they had three propositions to meet: (1) That the land rights came to the Company through the Crown; (2) that the benefits derived by Royal Charter were fortified by concessions; (3) that the rights by concession and through the Royal Charter were again fortified by conquest. To the local Rhodesian, the right by conquest had been regarded as an academic legal question which the Imperial authorities must decide, although they stoutly denied the right of the Company's shareholders to financial benefit arising out of a "conquest" in which elements other than the Company played a part. It may seem strange to the keen British student of affairs that so late as 1907 Rhodesians should have so little knowledge of facts vital to their country. There was, for example, hardly a man who knew that the Company had only two concessions of any value, or that the Royal Charter gave no administrative powers, whilst even so prominent a settler and so keen and well-informed a lawyer as Sir Charles Coghlan said at the Conference in 1907:

... We have never had an opportunity of inspecting the title, and what they (the settlers) now asked was to be put in such a position. If the title was good, then there was nothing more to be said. The matter was most important to them, and the question, therefore, should be decided

without loss of time. The Chartered Company, we contend, is the possessor of the land purely from an administrative point of view, and when they ceased their administrative functions the land passed to the next administration.

The 1907 Conference gave, as has been said, an enormous impetus to local political action, and the next stage was reached when the Legislative Council of Rhodesia, on April 17, 1914, passed and submitted to His Majesty's Government the following resolutions, which formally and very definitely challenged the Chartered Company's claim to the commercial ownership of the land :

(1) That the ownership of the unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia is not vested in, and has never been acquired by, the British South Africa Company as their commercial or private property, and that such powers of taking possession of, dealing with or disposing of land in Southern Rhodesia as have been or are possessed by the British South Africa Company have been created by virtue of authority conferred by Her Majesty the Queen in Council and her successors upon the Company, as the governing body charged for the time being by Her Majesty in Council and her successors with the general administration of affairs within the said territory, and responsible for the maintenance of law, order, and good government therein.

(2) That if by the exercise of the said powers and the taking possession of, dealing with and disposing of the said land, or by any other means, the British South Africa Company have acquired an ownership of the said land, such ownership is so vested in them as an administrative and public asset only, and the Company in their capacity other than a government and an administration have no dominium or estate in or title to the said lands or to any moneys or revenues derived therefrom.

(3) That on the said Company ceasing to be the government of the said territory, and ceasing to exercise the administration of affairs therein, all such lands as may be unalienated at such time shall be and remain the property of the government of the said territory which shall take the place of the said Company, and the possession and

administration of such land shall pass to such government as public domain.¹

By an Order in Council dated July 16, 1914, these resolutions were referred to a Board of Special Reference of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The preliminary consideration commenced on August 4, 1914, and the enquiry proceeded in one form or another until April 16, 1918, when the formal hearing opened, and lasted until May 2, 1918. The members of their Lordships' board were Earl Loreburn, Lords Dunedin, Atkinson, Sumner and Scott Dickson. The counsel engaged were :

For the British South Africa Company—

The Lord Advocate (The Rt. Hon. J. A. Clyde, K.C.), Sir H. Erle Richards, K.C., Mr. C. H. Tredgold, K.C. (South Africa), and Sir Hamar Greenwood, instructed by Messrs. Coward & Hawksley, Sons & Chance.

For the Crown—

The Attorney-General (The Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Smith, Bart., K.C., M.P.), The Solicitor General (The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C., M.P.), Mr. J. H. Cuncliffe, K.C., and Mr. G. A. H. Branson, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor (Law Courts Branch).

For the Legislative Council (White Settlers)—

Mr. P. O. Lawrence, K.C., The Hon. Frank Russell, K.C., Mr. J. W. M. Holmes and Mr. H. H. Phear, instructed by Messrs. Charles Russell & Co.

For the Natives—

Mr. Leslie Scott, K.C., M.P., and Mr. Stuart Bevan, K.C., instructed by Messrs. Morgan, Price & Co.

Their Lordships' Report (not technically a judgment) was delivered on July 29, 1918, by Lord Sumner.

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, July 29, 1918, pp. 14-15.

The contention of the Chartered Company was a very simple one—namely, that the whole of the land not already alienated to white settlers, that is the 70,000,000 acres, was their absolute property; that they had “consistently maintained and asserted that the unalienated land of Southern Rhodesia was its (the Company’s) property, and that it had the right to deal with it as it thought fit.” This claim to commercial ownership, not merely against “all comers” but against all native occupiers, was supported by pleas as bold and comprehensive.

(a) That the Royal Charter was the foundation, because it was a commercial concern which contemplated using shareholders’ money for developing lands obtained by concession.

(b) The “land rights” were acquired by concession from Lobengula.

(c) By occupation and development. (The Lord Advocate was exceedingly careful to avoid the actual word “conquest” as a contributory title, but he came very near to it in the following passage: “I do not object to anybody calling it conquest if he wishes.”)

The foregoing was “broadly the Company’s case.” It can be made still narrower under the three words—Charter, Concession, “Conquest.”

The Crown, in order of precedence, was the first opponent to this claim.

The Attorney-General, Sir F. E. Smith, now Lord Birkenhead, during the opening of his speech, dealt forcibly with the “conquest” argument in the following passage:

It never, of course, has been seriously argued in a Court of Law that conquest or the result of a conquest made by a subject inured to the benefit of any one but the sovereign power of the State to which the subject belonged. High judicial authorities have declared this conclusion, but it will be sufficient that I should remind

your Lordships of the resolutions of the House of Commons, never questioned since that day, in the year 1773, dealing with the affairs of the East Indian Company. The resolution is in these terms: "That all acquisitions made under the influence of a military force or by treaty with foreign princes do of right belong to the State." That has been the accepted doctrine of our constitutional law ever since that period, and I think could be shown if it were necessary that it had been an accepted principle of our law long before that resolution was passed by the House of Commons.¹

The argument of concession was only raised seriously upon the Lippert Concession, which the proceedings had early elevated to that of being the factor upon which everything turned.

The Attorney-General having made certain "preliminary observations" with regard to the Lippert Concession, then advanced the following capital propositions:

First, the Lippert Concession cannot be construed as the Lord Advocate has construed it without a most gross abuse of language and without grave violation of the standard by which I contend an instrument of this kind must be construed. In the second place, having regard to what happened in 1893, whatever force belonged to the Lippert Concession before was utterly dissipated and destroyed at the deliberate intention of the Crown.²

The Attorney-General concluded his speech upon the Lippert Concession in the following words:

... my submission is, first of all, that the Lippert Concession never did give the powers, for the reasons I have indicated, that are contended for by the Lord Advocate. In the second place, whether we examine the rights of the parties at the time of the war and the period immediately following the war, or in the long years that elapsed until

¹ Special Reference, Southern Rhodesia, in the Privy Council, eighth day, p. 399.

² Ibid., ninth day, p. 413.

the Company first stated their claim to the land, their conduct is throughout consistent with the theory that the Lippert Concession had disappeared, and is throughout wholly inconsistent with the view that the Lippert Concession still survives. I say in the period when the claim was first made that if one attentively examines the nest from which it sprung, the documents and the discussions by which it was accompanied, and the language in which it is put forward, it is plain that it was at that time, after all these years, that the idea first presented itself to the minds of the advisers of the Company that this claim might be brought forward with some prospects of success. Thirdly, that it was revived suddenly, never having been thought of throughout the whole of the intervening years.¹

The arguments of the white settlers are most succinctly stated in the Report of the Judicial Committee itself :

The case of the elected members is in great measure identical with that of the Crown. In so far as they traverse the Company's case and dispute its rights, their contentions differ from those of the Crown in immaterial respects. In one point they are at issue with the Crown. They contend that the unalienated lands are the property of the Crown, and not of the Company, but that even the Crown's power of dealing with them is now limited. With far-sighted care for the interests of unborn generations, they urge that these lands are really an endowment for the future of Southern Rhodesia, and that, if and when the Company's administration comes to an end, the possession and disposition of the lands will not revert to the Crown, but that the Company's successors in the administration will *ipso facto* be entitled to the lands then remaining unalienated as administrative assets for the country's benefit.²

Mr. Leslie Scott's case for the natives may be briefly summed up as follows :

(1) The natives possessed tribal ownership rights to the land.

¹ Special Reference, Southern Rhodesia, in the Privy Council, ninth day, pp. 450-51.

² Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, July 29, 1918, pp. 15-16.

(2) They had not lost these ownership rights by any act of concession. The Lippert Concession could not be construed as a valid concession, because neither Lobengula nor any other individual had the power to alienate the ownership of tribal lands.

(3) That no legislative act either in Rhodesia or in Great Britain had been passed by which the natives had been divested of their ownership rights at any time.

The foregoing represent very briefly the main arguments of the respective parties during the Enquiry. The Report, issued on July 29, 1918, is a lengthy document of some 15,000 words. The "Report" recognizes that the Lippert Concession was the main issue, and the really caustic remarks of their Lordships make useful reading for future concession hunters.

Their Lordships say of this document :

The Lippert Concession was not one of these public acts by which one independent sovereign, however humble, enters into political relations with the agents of another. Instruments of that character have been common enough in the history of the British Empire. They derive their juridical character from their recognition and adoption by the Crown, and in interpreting them it must be borne in mind that they are State documents. The Lippert Concession is not of this character.¹

Lobengula, it was said, had granted to Herr Lippert the right to allot the land to others and to take money in return ; to dispose of the surface for one hundred years without being called to account ; to do all that an owner could do and make out of it all that an owner could make. Thus he granted to him all the right of dealing with land of which he had any knowledge, and his ignorance of the nature of an estate in fee ought not to derogate from the amplitude of a grant, which was as wide as he knew how to make it. He reserved, at any rate, nothing but money considerations for himself, and when the Lippert and the Rudd Concessions fell into the same hands, the king had,

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, July 29, 1918, p. 19.

in substance, sold his country out and out to the Company. Their Lordships cannot accept this argument. As well it might be said that a savage who sold ten bullocks, being the highest number up to which he knew how to count, had thereby sold his whole herd, numbering, in fact, many hundreds. . . . Their Lordships think that the real question is, What does the Lippert Concession say?¹

Thus read, it is plain that the concession did not give the concessionaire the right to use the land or to take the usufruct. It did not make any land his, nor did it enable him to make it his own. What land he appropriated to others was to be appropriated in Lobengula's name. There were no words of conveyance—no estate or interest in land was vested in Herr Lippert. The concession was at most a personal contract. . . .

The consequences of the construction which the Company puts on the document would indeed be extreme. It would follow that Herr Lippert was, or could become at pleasure, owner of the entire kingdom—for nothing is reserved in favour of the inhabitants, from the kraals of the king's wives to his father's grave, or the scene of assembly of his indunas and his pitso. Thenceforward the entire tribe were sojourners on sufferance where they had ranged in arms, dependent on the good nature of this stranger from Johannesburg even for gardens in which to grow their mealies, and pastures on which to graze their cattle. The Lippert Concession may have some value as helping to explain how and why the Crown came to confer the administration of Southern Rhodesia upon the Company, but as a title deed to the unalienated lands it is valueless.²

The Report was equally emphatic upon the Company's plea of the Charter and occupation as giving a commercial title.

The questions in this reference refer to property and not to mere occupation. This must never be lost sight of. The Charter simply gave capacity to own and to grant land, but in itself it granted none. It used, indeed, the expression "the Company's territories," but this referred to the area within which those capacities might be exercised, and did

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, July 29, 1918, pp. 19-20.

² Ibid. p. 20.

not amount to an anticipatory grant by the Crown of land which in 1889 was not the Crown's to bestow. The fact of occupation, and especially the circumstances under which it was taken and enjoyed, are significant and helpful in estimating what the rights of the Crown were, and how far, if at all, the Crown conferred rights over the land on the Company, but in itself and by itself occupation is not title.¹

During the proceedings before the Judicial Committee nothing was more interesting than the remarkable way in which the Lord Advocate, Mr. Clyde, threw out all the glamour of *conquest* and drew out from it every scrap of possible credit for the Company without ever once using the fatal word—he knew too well the danger of doing so. The Report, however, dealt with this plea as vigorously as did the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown.

. . . If there was a conquest by the Company's arms then, by well settled constitutional practice, that conquest was on behalf of the Crown. It rested with Her Majesty's advisers to say what should be done with it.²

Where then does legal title rest? The relationship of Great Britain with Rhodesia still appears to repose mainly upon the Anglo-Matabele Treaty of 1888, for as the Judicial Committee say :

The Crown does not claim to have annexed Matabeleland and Mashonaland. No proclamation of annexation has ever been issued.³

It is true that the Matabele sovereignty is defunct, although some of Lobengula's wives

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, July 29, 1918, p. 21.

² Ibid. p. 8.

³ Ibid. p. 22.

and descendants still live in Southern Rhodesia. It would thus seem that in the absence of a Matabele paramountcy the British Crown is in the position of trustee, the following being the governing passages upon legal title to the land :

Their Lordships think it sufficient to say that except in so far, if at all, as the rights of the Crown are subject to those of the natives and the Company, nothing has been shown to have happened or to have been done that would prevent the Crown, if and when the Company's tenure of the administration of Southern Rhodesia determines, from disposing of the lands then remaining unalienated by any lawful means, and in favour of any persons or purposes, as it may duly be advised.¹

In conclusion, their Lordships affirmed the first paragraph of the resolution, namely :

That the ownership of the unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia is not vested in, and has never been acquired by, the British South Africa Company as their commercial or private property, and that such powers of taking possession of, dealing with or disposing of land in Southern Rhodesia as have been or are possessed by the British South Africa Company have been created by virtue of authority conferred by Her Majesty the Queen in Council and her successors upon the Company, as the governing body charged for the time being by Her Majesty in Council and her successors with the general administration of affairs within the said territory and responsible for the maintenance of law, order and good government therein.²

The third paragraph was denied, namely :

That on the said Company ceasing to be the government of the said territory, and ceasing to exercise the administration of affairs therein, all such lands as may be unalien-

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, p. 16.

² Ibid. p. 14.

ated at such time shall be and remain the property of the government of the said territory which shall take the place of the said Company, and the possession and administration of such land shall pass to such government as public domain.¹

The second paragraph of the resolution, it will be remembered, reads as follows :

That if by the exercise of the said powers and the taking possession of, dealing with and disposing of the said land or by any other means, the British South Africa Company have acquired an ownership of the said land, such ownership is so invested in them as an administrative and public asset only, and the Company in their capacity other than a government and administration have no dominion or estate in or title to the said lands or to any moneys or revenues derived therefrom.²

Upon this paragraph their Lordships said :

... So long as the British South Africa Company continues to administer Southern Rhodesia under the Crown, it is entitled to dispose of the unalienated lands in due course of administration, and to apply the moneys or revenues derived therefrom in duly reimbursing all proper outlays on administrative account in the current or in past years, and, if its administration of Southern Rhodesia should be determined by the Crown, then the right to look to the Crown to secure to it (either out of the proceeds of further sales of the lands by whomsoever made, or if the Crown should grant away these lands or proceeds to others, from public funds) the due reimbursement of any outstanding balance of aggregated advances made by it for necessary and proper expenditure upon the administration of Southern Rhodesia. This, however, and the other rights hereinbefore mentioned, do not vest in it dominium or estate in or title to the said unalienated lands.³

The effect of this Report upon the parties seems to be, *first*, that legal title to the land reposed

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, p. 15.

² *Ibid.* pp. 14-15.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 28-29.

in the Crown as paramount in succession to Lobengula; *secondly*, that the Company completely lost its claim to commercial ownership upon which for over twenty years it had proceeded. The white settlers received but scant return for their efforts, whilst the advantage to the natives was potentially incalculable in that by the decision they found themselves under the British Crown as trustee in succession to Lobengula. There was thus presented to the Crown, for the first time since the granting of the Royal Charter, the fullest opportunity to at last deal, if not handsomely, then at least justly, with the Mashonas and Matabele tribes, so cruelly wronged for a period of twenty years!

But with the decision an entirely new element emerged—agency, and the consequences thereof to the British taxpayer. This is set forth in the following paragraph:

Furthermore, the Charter itself reserved to the Crown the right, at the end of twenty-five years from its date and thereafter at the end of every succeeding decade, to repeal so much of the Charter as relates to administrative and public matters, and thereby to put an end to the Company's capacity to administer Southern Rhodesia, and this right is in addition to whatever right the Crown might have independently of this reservation to revoke its appointment of the Company as administrator and to repeal the Order in Council. The Company's right to reimbursement was therefore limited thus far at any rate, that it had not any perpetual or immutable right to continue to conduct the realization of the unalienated lands for the purpose of accomplishing its own reimbursement. On the other hand, nothing confers on the Crown under the form or by the procedure of exercising this power, the right to take away from the Company a right already conferred upon it. Hence it follows that, in the event of the exercise of this power by the Crown, the Company must have the right to look to the Crown to secure to it, either out of the proceeds of further sales of the lands, by whomsoever

made, or, if the Crown should grant away these lands or proceeds to others, then from public funds, the due reimbursement of any outstanding balance of aggregated advances made by it for necessary and proper expenditure upon the public administration of Southern Rhodesia. With items or details, with the amounts or the book-keeping of such expenditure, and with the terms of reimbursement their Lordships have nothing to do.¹

The problem of "necessary and proper expenditure upon public administration," and the contingent and not less important one, of how these charges are to be met, raises issues hardly less vital than those arising from the land.

¹ Report of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, pp. 27-28.

PRESENTING THE BILL—£22,000,000 ?

LORD CAVE'S COMMISSION

THE ATTITUDE OF THE "DEBTORS"

The principle (to which His Majesty's Government attach great importance) is that *any new administration taking over the government shall not be saddled with a debt charge greater than the proportion of the corresponding asset*¹ which has been provided otherwise than out of administrative revenue.²

WHAT was the position of the Chartered Company as to the financial question prior to the submission of the land case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ?

In some quarters it had been assumed that the Chartered Company had surrendered altogether and finally its claim that its debts should be treated as an Imperial responsibility. This assumption rested upon Mr. Rochfort Maguire's declaration of 1913, which captured even so brilliant a student and writer upon Colonial affairs as Miss Violet Markham, who in her book *The South African Scene* says :

The question of the debt was also one of the most disturbing to the Rhodesian mind when I was in the country. In the event of Crown Colony government being established, would they be saddled with the past

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

² Sir John Anderson to the Chartered Company, October 16, 1914.

deficits of the Company and start life with a public debt? This was the question commonly propounded, and the possibility of such a position was vigorously repudiated. This point the Company have waived.¹

If Miss Markham had given to Mr. Maguire's declaration the incisive and microscopic examination to which every statement of the Chartered Company is now subjected by the settlers, she would have realized that the Company had no intention whatever of waiving unconditionally its claim upon Imperial resources for some millions sterling. It is only fair to say that Mr. Maguire's statement implied that if it were ultimately decided that the commercial ownership of the land was not vested in the Company, then the claim for large financial returns would be revived. The statement made by Mr. Maguire is as follows:

The Company regards the accumulated deficits upon administration and defence as part of the cost of the acquisition, maintenance and development of the land and minerals of the territory.²

The settlers pointed out at the time, that to acquiesce in this proposal of the Company carried with it an admission of the Company's claim to the commercial ownership of the land, and to this they resolutely refused to become party. In the *Quarterly Review* of April 1914 was set forth under the heading "The Future of Rhodesia" two articles by the spokesmen for the Company, and the settlers respectively. In his article on behalf of the Chartered Company, Mr. Ian D. Colvin puts this aspect of the question beyond the possibility of dispute.

¹ *The South African Scene*, Violet R. Markham (Smith, Elder).

² Statement of Policy, March 22, 1913.

If, on the other hand, the Judicial Committee decides that the land belongs not to the Company but in some way or other to the Rhodesian community, the shareholders' claim to be reimbursed by the community for the cost of acquiring, maintaining and developing that asset *would be revived with irresistible force.*¹

Quite so—the very fact of the Judicial Committee advising against such commercial ownership of land, thereby removing from the Chartered Company of its apparent security for accumulated debt, should, it was thought, enormously enhance before a partially informed public the justice of the claim to these indefinite millions.

That the Company had for years meditated a huge Imperial grant is established by numberless utterances, although naturally enough there was no such suggestion at the time the Royal Charter was granted, nor apparently had any such suggestion ever entered the heads of the officials in Downing Street. The question of Imperial responsibility for the debts of the Chartered Company appears to have been raised publicly for the first time after the Jameson Raid into the Transvaal and the contingent native hostilities.

In the Chartered Company's Report for 1897 the Directors say :

Separate accounts are being kept of the amounts received and expended by the Company in the discharge of its duties as a government. These accounts comprise administrative revenue and expenditure and the cost incurred in the settlement of the country. The balance of expenditure under these headings, not met by revenue, will constitute a public debt whenever the inhabitants of Rhodesia are prepared to take over full responsibility for its administration. The Company will thus be reimbursed a considerable portion of its outlay, and be left in possession of its mining and commercial interests.

Italics mine.—J. H. H.

In 1899, Mr. Rhodes made a speech upon the subject, and, apparently emboldened by the fact that neither the Imperial authorities nor the settlers registered any sort of protest against the "financial policy" as set forth in the 1897 report and a speech made in 1898, developed the idea still further, as the following passage shows :

I think that when the State governs itself it will have to repay to the Charter shareholders (and I take the opportunity of again stating this) in debentures probably your full expenditure on war, public works, and everything connected with the occupation of the country and its present administration.

It would seem that with two years contemplation of a potential Imperial grant, the appetite had grown very considerably. The almost innocuous sentence of 1897 had after the lapse of a couple of years gathered to itself the comprehensive adjectives, "*full*¹ expenditure on war, public works, *everything*¹ connected with the occupation of the country and of its administration;" clearly a very large sum was beginning to take definite shape in the mental vision of the "Colossus" and his friends. The British public might squeal, but with its proverbial bad memory would forget the Transvaal Raid, the causes of the Matabele hostilities, the limitations of the Royal Charter—and in the end would pay up!

But still the public came no closer to the actual sum. In 1904 there was a somewhat involved passage in a speech by Mr. Beit dealing with a suggested compromise with the settlers; this speech was quoted by Mr. Hawkesley at the Bulawayo Conference in 1906, and in it there was *inter alia* the following passage :

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

... I think if you will reckon beneficial occupation—those sums which you would recognize anyhow—buildings and roads and telegraphs and so on, I think the price of £5,000,000 is a very reasonable one.

The obscurity of this passage hardly justifies the deduction that £5,000,000 sterling was at this time the figure in the minds of the Chartered Company's Directors, probably it was; but there is no published evidence that either £5,000,000 or any larger or smaller sum was in mind. All that can be said is, that soon after this date the sum of £7,500,000 began to emerge; whilst Mr. Bouchier Hawkesley let the financial cat out of the bag at the Bulawayo Conference in 1907 by declaring in reply to an interjection that the sum he had in mind was £10,000,000. In reply to Colonel Napier, who had raised the question indirectly, Mr. Hawkesley said:

... he could not adopt it (Colonel Napier's proposal) until he saw the £10,000,000 which had been subscribed by the shareholders returned.

It is just possible that since that day, fifteen years ago, when Mr. Hawkesley mentioned the sum of ten millions sterling, the Chartered Company's claim had grown beyond even the ten millions. It is probable that £7,500,000 represents what is called the administrative deficit and ten millions the sum in round figures which at that time the Chartered Company expected to obtain in order to cover everything. One additional suggestion is that the difference between the £7,500,000 and £10,000,000 was due to the question of "public works,"—the only financial liability which the Royal Charter covered,—and this is set forth in Article 33 of the Charter:

We (the Crown) do further will, ordain and declare that it shall be lawful for Us Our heirs and successors and We do hereby expressly reserve to Ourselves Our heirs

and successors the right and power by writing under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom at the end of 25 years from the date of this Our Charter, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add to alter or repeal any of the provisions of this Our Charter or to enact other provisions in substitution for or in addition to any of its existing provisions. Provided that the right and power thus reserved shall be exercised only in relation to so much of this Our Charter as relates to administrative and public matters. And We do further expressly reserve to Ourselves Our heirs and successors the right to take over any buildings or works belonging to the Company and used exclusively or mainly for administrative or public purposes on payment to the Company of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed or as failing agreement may be settled by the Commissioners of Our Treasury.¹

In his statement of policy at Salisbury, Mr. Rochfort Maguire, referring to the question of public works, quoted the above article and then said :

It is therefore proposed (by the Company) that public works and buildings, erected up to October 1914, shall, whenever the administration is taken over from the Company, be dealt with in the manner above laid down, that is, they may be taken over at a *fair valuation*.²

Mr. Rochfort Maguire ought to have known that the Royal Charter said nothing of the kind. This passage was at once seized upon by local chartered accountants, and declared to be further evidence of the manner in which the Chartered Company twists phrases to its commercial advantage, for in normal commercial transactions compensation is based on prime cost less depreciation and occupancy, whereas "fair valuation" would mean original cost plus the value of "unearned increment"!

When the Report of the Judicial Committee

¹ The Royal Charter.

² "Statement of Policy," March 22, 1913.

was issued, it entitled the Company to claim from the British Government its out-of-pocket agency expenses, but with certain very clear limitations and some consequences not of pleasant contemplation for the shareholders. The first limitation was that these expenses must be shown to have been "necessary and proper." The second that they must have been incurred strictly upon "public administration." The final condition opens up a further large vista for controversy, namely, whatever the agreed sum, it must apparently be derived "from further sales of the lands, by whomsoever made, or if the Crown should grant away these lands or proceeds to others, then from public funds."

The amount ultimately claimed by the Company was stated only "provisionally" to be £7,569,435. But almost at the same moment as this figure was stated in the House of Commons an article appeared in *The Times* of June 13, 1919, indicating that other financial questions will be raised whenever any change is proposed in the form of government in Rhodesia.

The writer of the article in *The Times* was evidently in possession of information not available to the public, and he suggested a sum of £18,000,000 as the total which any new government would be required to find in order to obtain full control of the territory of Southern Rhodesia. This estimated sum of £18,000,000 was made up of the following items:

	£
Administrative deficits	7,500,000
Interest on deficits	2,500,000
Railways	5,000,000
Mineral royalties	2,500,000
Sundry "assets" and "charges" ..	500,000
	<hr/>
	£18,000,000

But this figure of £18,000,000 omits two substantial items, namely, charges arising from the war, estimated at something over £1,500,000, and public works, which probably reach a figure of not less than £2,500,000. The total sum ultimately involved upon the basis of these figures will be about £22,000,000. This has to be met by one of three parties—

(a) The Union of South Africa in the event of the incorporation of Rhodesia within the Union.

(b) The taxpayers of Great Britain.

(c) The Rhodesian people.

In a later chapter the political situation is outlined, but it may be of interest to note at this point that Rhodesians have at present three outstanding features in their policy—they do not wish to enter the Union; they do wish to terminate "Company government;" they will not accept responsibility for one penny piece of the Chartered Company's debt.

In July 1919, the appointment was announced of a Commission composed of Lord Cave, Lord Chalmers and Sir W. Peat, to whom was submitted the financial claim of the Chartered Company with terms of reference limited to the giving of advice upon the £7,500,000. Lieut.-Colonel Amery, speaking upon the functions of this Committee during the Colonial Office Vote (July 30, 1919), said that naturally the Company would wish to make its full claim, and then, after paying a tribute to the reputation of the Commissioners, stated that whatever the findings of Lord Cave's Commission, they would be accepted both by the Crown and by the Company as a final and definite assessment—as to the amount, yet Mr. Bonar Law had on April 16th given a pledge to the House of

Commons that no commitment would be made without first consulting the House of Commons :

This claim (£7,500,000) clearly demands the closest scrutiny, and the Government will not commit themselves to any payment without the sanction of the House of Commons.

The attitude of the creditors and potential debtors is interesting. The real creditors are the thirty or forty thousand shareholders of the Company, many of whom have waited twenty years for a dividend and have never yet had a penny for their "Chartered," however much they may have drawn from allied companies. The shares stand to-day at about 17/6 but many were foolishly bought for £5, £6, and even £8. The premiums paid on the shares led to an interesting argument submitted to Lord Cave's Commission in Rhodesia. In a document prepared for the settlers by Messrs. Raymer & Co., accountants, of Bulawayo, the following passage occurs :

The amount received from premium on shares, namely, £4,246,469, the greater portion of which was received prior to 1902, up to which period we believe it is claimed by the Company they had no commercial operations in this country. If there is a semblance of basis for such contention it is evident that the high price at which it was able to issue the shares to the public was due to the great assistance the administrative control was believed would give to the Company. . . .¹

The argument submitted was, as will be seen, that these premiums were due to the possession of a Royal Charter presumed to give administrative control in aid of financial operations, and

¹ Report on British South Africa Company's claim by Raymer & Co., p. 9.

as such should be used to reduce the total claim upon the administrative deficits of £7,569,435. To the general reader the principal value of these premiums, exceeding as they do £4,000,000, is that of demonstrating the extraordinary but misplaced credulity which the flotation inspired.

The shareholders of the Company found their claim most resolutely opposed by the Rhodesian settlers. Rhodesia's white population of 25,000 has within its ranks some very keen Scotch and Irish brains, with a good sprinkling of stolid and sound-hearted Englishmen; these men are formidable opponents, and none more so than the leader of the People's Party, Sir Charles Coghlan, the most notable figure in the Legislative Council and probably the soundest lawyer in the country. When Lord Cave reached Bulawayo, Sir Charles Coghlan appeared in order to voice the opinion of the settlers, and in doing so stated in terms which were both clear and incisive that Rhodesians would not allow any of the alleged deficits to be attached to the people of Rhodesia.

I wish to make it perfectly plain to your Lordships. I see from the proceedings in London that there have been suggestions made that possibly the people in this country might become liable for what your Lordships find to be due. I wish to make it perfectly plain that we repudiate any liability of that sort at all, and our appearing before this Commission must not be taken in any way to be an admission either that such a debt can be placed upon the shoulders of the people of this country, or that we admit the possibilities of that happening. I wish to make that perfectly plain from the beginning.¹

From this declaration it is perfectly clear

¹ Sir Charles Coghlan before Lord Cave's Commission in Rhodesia, third day, p. 5.

that Rhodesians, in the opinion of Sir Charles Coghlan, will refuse to accept a vestige of responsibility for the deficits of the Chartered Company : not only so, but they will drive a hard bargain when the question is raised of minerals, railways and public works. It is equally futile for the British taxpayer to hope that the Union of South Africa will accept liability. The absorption of Rhodesia in the Union is very remote indeed, but even so, politicians of the Union are much too wary to accept financial liability, for, like the Rhodesian settler, they hold strong views about the necessity of the Chartered Company's deficits. Thus the incidence of the Chartered Company's deficits must fall upon either the Imperial Exchequer or the unfortunate natives.

IMPERIAL PRACTICE

The land laws and land customs of West Africa are different from the law of land tenure in England, while the concessions are framed in the language of English conveyancing, and purport to convey the fee simple, or to grant a lease with the conditions which are incident to such transactions here, but are probably unintelligible to the native signing the instruments. It is uncertain how far native chiefs possess the right of making alienations of this character for their own benefit, and in some instances concessions have been brought to the local government for approval, which have proved to be signed by men who had no title to the land. In the interest of all the native tribes and chiefs, as well as of British investors, it is essential that the local government should be able to see that such transactions are made in good faith and on reasonable terms, and that the conditions are thoroughly understood by the natives.¹—JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN.

The title to the land is not fully vested in the king and chiefs.²—SIR EVERARD IM THURN (Governor of Fiji).

It is of transcendent importance that the British people should at this stage of history grasp very clearly the broad principles upon which land settlements have hitherto been made in British controlled territories, when impact had once been established between indigenous peoples and immigrant races. The foregoing quotations by those two eminent authorities, the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Everard im Thurn, emphasize the now recognized

¹ Cd. 5103, p. 22.

² Cd. 205, p. 13.

fact that the alienation of land ownership is seldom, if ever, within the power of primitive rulers. It is all too glibly asserted that the habit of "muddling through" is characteristic of British administration everywhere; that temporary confusion has arisen, and must inevitably arise in our far-spread dependencies and dominions, and none would deny but that there are certain fixed boundaries in policy and practice which the discerning eye can easily detect. This is pre-eminently the case with the evolution of the land problem, and for the purposes of this book there are three areas with regard to which this is especially true—the Fijian Islands of the South Seas, Uganda, and the Colonies and Protectorates of West Africa.

In the above quotation from Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons in July 1896, we see the germ of the policy which was later to find expression in West Africa, and, in point of fact, to lay the foundations of a comprehensive land policy by which it is hoped to save the British Empire from foundering upon the rocks of racial conflict. Mr. Chamberlain in his speech here sounded a warning as to the right of any West African chief to alienate the ownership of land at all. This fact, which he then declared to be "uncertain," has since been established beyond all doubt, for shortly after this speech was made, the Colonial Office was in possession of material which clearly proved that whatever sovereign rights were conferred upon a paramount chief, these could not under any conceivable circumstances include the alienation of land-ownership, because such alienation would shatter the whole social fabric of native life.

A few months after Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons, the Governor of the

Gold Coast Colony caused a message to be read in the Legislative Council, in which action by the Imperial authorities was foreshadowed ; in this message there occurred the following passage :

There is good ground for believing that the practice adopted by native headmen of making grants to strangers, particularly to Europeans, of waste land and of minerals, and of concessions of forest land (which is quite modern) is *illegal according to native law and custom*.¹

The message clearly indicated the fixed determination of the Imperial Government to maintain the indigenous legal position so far as practicable, and also to allow no political change to vary the basis upon which the system of native land tenure reposed. True, certain natives protested against this action of the Government, and quite naturally, but that was due rather to the fact that control had passed from an indigenous to a white paramountcy.

The passage at the head of this chapter, quoted in the despatch of Sir Everard im Thurn, Governor of Fiji, and dated from that island in 1908, is taken from a voluminous memorandum dealing with the confusion into which the system of land tenure in Fiji had drifted owing to inadequate knowledge, on the one hand, of indigenous custom, and on the other, to the terms of the treaty of cession to the British Crown. An indication of the extent of this confusion is shown in the following extract from the speech of Sir Everard im Thurn to the Legislative Council on May 18, 1908 :

But—and now I come to a new and most important point—it is too true that all Sir Arthur Gordon's successors as

¹ Cd. 5103, p. 21. (*Italics mine.*—J. H. H.)

Governor of Fiji have unquestioningly followed him into the pit which he first dug. We—for I am a culprit too—followed his lead in thinking that the Fijians had good claims to the surplus land. Indeed, to make a full confession, I have erred more deeply in one way than my predecessors; for more land has been leased and sold in my time than in that of my predecessors, and the price, in the case of both leases and sales, has been handed to the native claimants.¹

In the extremely able memorandum² on the system of land tenure forwarded by the Governor from Fiji, three propositions are advanced: first, that the title to the lands was not fully vested in the king and chiefs of Fiji. In this respect native law and custom was thus shown to be in harmony with that of the rulers of other communal tribes within British dominions, notably of British protected territories in the African Continent, including the case at issue—Lobengula, paramount ruler of the Matabele.

The second proposition laid down was that the power of alienation was limited by custom, but that upon occasion, when sufficient inducement offered, a powerful chief had been known to disregard the limitations imposed upon him by his unwritten constitutional law.

The third proposition dealt with the rights of the British Crown through the treaty of cession, and as these were the subject of varying interpretations, it was advised that legislation should be amended regulating the land system throughout Fiji. The total area of Fiji is just over 7,000 square miles, with a population of 130,000, including 3,700 whites. The natives occupy effectively $4\frac{1}{2}$ million acres of land, or 50 acres per head of the whole population.

¹ Cd. 205, p. 76.

² Cd. 205, p. 13.

The attitude adopted by the Imperial Government was set forth by Lord Crewe in a despatch dated July 15, 1908.¹

The basis of this policy was that the lands of Fiji, other than those in the possession of Europeans and those required by the Crown, were, despite all alleged cessions to the contrary effect, *the property of the indigenous peoples*.²

It seems clear that, apart from those lands alienated or in occupation, there were from various causes lands which could be regarded as *bona fide* "waste lands," and with regard to these Lord Crewe states :

. . . I consider that the interests of the natives in these waste lands must be deemed to be the same as in the lands actually occupied by them, and that accordingly they should be given full value for such lands.³

How rigidly Lord Crewe safeguarded the rights of the natives of Fiji from even a shadow of confiscation is demonstrated by the following remarkable passage in his despatch :

. . . In view of the position which I hold as to the rights of the natives in the waste lands, the proceeds either of sale or of lease would require to be paid to the native owners. I see, however, no objection to the Government charging a percentage—say, 10 per cent.—on the proceeds of sale or lease, provided that the sum thus raised is applied for the benefit of the natives ; and in return for this royalty I would ask you to consider whether it might not be possible to modify the existing rates and incidence of native taxation.⁴

The Colonial Secretary in conclusion pointed out that whatever delimitation of waste lands

¹ Cd. 205, p. 77.

² Italics mine.—J. H. H.

³ Ibid. p. 78.

⁴ Cd. 205, p. 78.

was made must not be allowed in any way to infringe upon occupancy rights :

Lands actually occupied by the natives would not be alienable at all, inasmuch as the delimitation by the Commission would include as waste all such lands as were not required for the occupation of the natives, and it would *ex hypothesi* not be proper to permit either the sale or the lease of such lands.¹

In the Uganda Protectorate the land difficulties present features closely akin to those of Southern Rhodesia. The protectorate came under British influence only two years later than Rhodesia. It had been ruled by a despotic and barbarous line of kings, with whom Lobengula offers a not unpleasing contrast. The area of the Uganda Protectorate is only 20,000 square miles less than Southern Rhodesia. British troops under Sir Frederick Lugard, then Captain Lugard, the accredited agent of the East Africa Chartered Company, fought and defeated the Mahommedan Baganda, and through the work of Sir Frederick Lugard, Sir Gerald Portal and a splendid line of British administrators and missionaries, Uganda is now both peaceful and prosperous.

In 1899 developments in Uganda rendered imperative the despatch of a special Commission under the direction of Sir Harry Johnston. To this Commission was entrusted the task of arranging a land settlement with the native rulers of Uganda. The basis of the settlement ultimately reached was that all genuinely waste and unoccupied land should be handed over to the administration, whilst secure tenure for beneficial occupation was duly safeguarded.

¹ Cd. 205, p. 78.

Mineral rights were retained to the occupant subject to a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* tax upon mineral output with the exception of minerals discovered on waste lands, these royalties to be the property of the administration.

The financial return for the surrender of the control—and the control only—of waste lands was as follows :

In return for the cession to Her Majesty's Government of the right of control over 10,550 square miles of waste, cultivated, uncultivated or forest lands, there shall be paid by Her Majesty's Government in trust for the kabaka (upon his attaining his majority) a sum of £500, and to the other regents collectively £600, namely, to the katikiro £300 and the other two regents £150 each.¹

Also a pension to Mbogo, a Mahommedan chief, of £250 per annum. This is of course in addition to the guaranteed allowance of £1,500 per annum to the kabaka as paramount.

These constitute the main features of the agreement signed on March 10, 1900. Prior to this date the Baganda had been showing great uneasiness, because the impression had gained ground that the British Government intended taking from them the ownership of their lands. Major Woodward, attached to the Intelligence Department of the War Office, says :

The idea that they would lose their lands and become the tenants of European landlords caused the natives (of Uganda) to look forward with dread to the advent of European control. This feeling has, however, been to a great extent dispelled owing to the general arrangement regarding the land settlement effected during 1900-1.²

The reason the Baganda accepted this agreement so promptly, was due primarily to the

¹ *Hertslett's Treaties*, vol. xxiii. 1905.

² Major Woodward, War Office Report.

fact that it recognized native tribal ownership over land in beneficial occupation, and secondly, state control only over all "waste lands." It will be observed that all the Imperial Government asked, and all the Baganda surrendered, was the "right of control" (not the ownership) over about 10,000 square miles. A further clause in the agreement stipulated that all revenues derived from the waste lands, either by lease or sale, would be devoted to administrative purposes.

This then is a typical land agreement made between the British authorities and a native state, compared with that of the South African Chartered Company, which claimed the right to ignore native law and custom, confiscate native land tenure, and place the revenues derived from leasing and sale of such confiscated land in the private purses of the Company's shareholders.

The policy of the British Colonial authorities of recognizing native law and customs in the solution of land problems found its fullest development in Northern Nigeria, but what is still more interesting is that historically and inherently the land problems of Northern Nigeria were almost identical with those of Southern Rhodesia, presented to the Judicial Committee for adjudication.

British history in Northern Nigeria commenced with the explorations of Barth, Clapperton, Allen and McGregor Laird. In 1877 Sir George Taubman Goldie, then Mr. Goldie Taubman, conceived the idea of uniting certain conflicting interests in some form of administration under Royal Charter. In the early eighties the National African Company was founded, and an appeal made for a Charter, and after the

elimination of French and German interests, the African Company blossomed out under the full title of the Royal Niger Company.

In 1897 hostilities broke out between the Company's military force and the Fulah power, with the result that the Fulani were beaten. These hostilities were followed by an even graver danger threatened from the French "invasion" of Burra, to meet which the British Government sent out Sir Frederick, then Colonel, Lugard. In 1895 the natives of the Brass region had attacked the Royal Niger Company's station at Akassa, resulting in loss of life and much destruction of property. Sir John Kirk was then sent out as Special Commissioner to investigate the cause of this attack, and as a result of his recommendations, it was decided that the administrative rights and powers of the Royal Niger Company should be transferred to the Crown, the transfer taking effect on January 1, 1900. The Company trades to-day under the name of "The Niger Company, Limited."

To Sir Frederick Lugard and Sir Percy Girouard, and especially to their able lieutenants, is due the credit for initiating exhaustive enquiries upon the native land system, the incidence of land taxation, and the question as to how far these shall be varied, if at all, through conquest. The result of these enquiries has led to the application of three main principles, to which every other consideration is subordinate; these principles are set forth in the Proclamation of 1910. The first principle is that the land is "native land;" the second, that the Government is trustee overlord of these lands; and the third, that the Governor's action as trustee must operate within the orbit of native law and

custom. There is in this threefold principle nothing to prejudice, but everything to preserve the social life of the people, whilst at the same time keeping the door open to the legitimate enterprise of immigrant colonists.

The first principle is set forth in the following terms :

The whole of the lands of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, whether occupied or unoccupied on the date of the commencement of this Proclamation, are hereby declared to be native lands.¹

The foregoing principle only consecrates what is after all the basis of native land tenure throughout negro and negroid Africa, the communal conception that land is the property of the entire human race, and that none can hold a monopoly, not even the paramount chief. African history teems with stories of autocratic and barbarous rulers with numerous slaves and herds of cattle, and the fairest of women either as wives or concubines, but where in these histories are the chieftains powerful enough to earmark for private revenue the land of the people? I venture to assert such cannot be named.

The second principle, that of administrative trusteeship, is covered by section 3 of the 1910 Proclamation :

All native lands, and all rights over the same, are hereby declared to be under the control of, and subject to the disposition of the Governor, and shall be held and administered for the use and common benefit of the natives of Northern Nigeria; and no title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the Governor.²

¹ *Laws of Northern Nigeria*, vol. 65, 1910.

² *Ibid.*

This section consecrates one of the most prevalent and most rigorously restricted native customs, whereby the paramount chief, the head of the state, controls the lands of the country, not as owner, but as trustee for the nation. "For the use and common benefit of the natives" seems at first sight to go somewhat further than native custom, but in practice this is not so, because any alien may, subject to tribal sanction, become an integral part of the tribe or state, which carries with it the right to occupy land sufficient to provide sustenance.

The third principle established by this Proclamation is found in section 4 :

The Governor, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this Proclamation with respect to any land, shall have regard to the native laws and customs existing in the district in which such land is situated.¹

This principle, like the two preceding ones, involves a minimum of local disturbance, and recognizes native law and custom as the governing factor. These three cardinal principles safeguarding native rights have been laid down by the British Government, in spite of the fact that large areas of Northern Nigeria had been conquered by the British Imperial forces.

For the purposes of comparison with the Rhodesian question, we must bear in mind that both the Royal Niger Company and the British South Africa Company were operating under a Royal Charter in the dual capacity of administration and commerce. Both claimed land by concession, both came into conflict with native tribes. But the Royal Niger Company did not

¹ *Laws of Northern Nigeria*, vol. 65, 1910.

levy any direct taxation upon the native peoples, the Royal Niger Company did not make the natives pay the Company shareholders tribute for continuing to live in their own country, the Royal Niger Company did not advance "conquest" as giving the right to confiscate indigenous private property, the Royal Niger Company, in short, observed generally native law and custom, particularly the land laws.

From Sir Percy Girouard's memorandum¹ upon land tenure, which he drafted at Zungeru in 1907, we learn that the Royal Niger Company's effective claim to the land rested so lightly upon the people, and so completely conformed to native custom, that :

though as a matter of fact native towns are situated upon them, the inhabitants . . . so far as I am aware have no knowledge that their rights in the land they occupy have ever been alienated.²

In view of the British South Africa Company's attempt to claim the "rewards" of "conquest," Sir Percy Girouard's view with regard to Northern Nigeria is both interesting and important :

The Government has, in my opinion, the right to go still further, and to claim the right of disposal of all such land as is included in a district declared to be public lands, provided that it is not in actual occupation, and cannot be proved to be the private property of an individual. Conquest by a civilized Government does not confer the right to confiscate private property.³

The whole argument of these and other sections of this invaluable treatise on African land tenure is that nothing, be it concession or conquest by a sovereign Power, can destroy national law and custom, and that in the event of the

¹ Cd. 5103.

² Ibid. p. 5.

³ Ibid. p. 5.

paramountcy changing, the paramount chief, be he white or coloured, becomes the trustee of national interests.

How different in principle and practice is the situation in Rhodesia; the Chartered Company claimed not the ownership merely, but the *commercial* ownership of the lands. It claimed the right, and acted upon it, to dispossess the native communities of land, regardless of the native law and customs it was bound by its Charter to observe. It not only claimed the right to exact, but to enforce the exaction of, tribute from the natives in favour of its shareholders for the privilege of continuing to live in their own country, on behalf of the alien speculator living in the four quarters of the globe.

Those preposterous claims have been beaten, but only up to a point. The danger arises from the fact that the policy of expropriation based upon vicious titles is being upheld. The consequences which flow from this position, if it continues to be defended in Southern Rhodesia, cannot fail to affect British Colonial land policy in the dependencies, and can hardly fail to imperil still further the peace and security of all the territories south of the Limpopo.

There are in South Africa three outstanding problems connected with the six millions of natives living under the rule or the protection of the British flag. These problems are land, labour, and a form of franchise. For nearly a generation these absorbing subjects have been fully discussed, not without leading to many a "regrettable incident" that we would gladly see effaced from British history. It will probably, however, be accepted, even by natives themselves, that the general trend of treatment

has been distinctly upward, showing within recent years a marked acceleration of movement.

With this upward movement, however, opinions have crystallized upon the three major problems affecting the natives. The white employer of labour on the Rand is more and more weighing native aspiration in the scale of justice regardless of the consequences. The labour party is beginning to realize that it cannot say to oceanic waves of native progress, "thus far and no farther." The governing bodies are convinced that South African progress depends primarily upon a sustained supply of contented labourers, which can in turn only be maintained from reserve areas of territory suited to native occupation and shielded from the worst evils of white civilization.

What is required in South Africa, and happily that to which all avenues of thought and conviction are leading, is, so far as possible, uniformity of policy, whether it be in the Union or Protectorate territories. Thus it becomes imperative that nothing arising out of the Rhodesian situation shall be permitted, which would either retard or prejudice the outworking of such uniformity of policy. It would, for example, be disastrous to set up in permanent form some anomaly which became a source of perpetual irritation between, say, the Bechuana and Matabele tribes.

For good or ill, the South African Union has satisfied the white population that the salvation of the white and coloured races will be found in a form of land segregation. It is from every point of view impolitic, and indeed impossible, to evolve a cast-iron system of racial segregation, and any system of land segregation must be, if adopted, sufficiently elastic to permit of native development within, and native industry without,

the boundary lines of any segregated area. From the social and economic standpoint, hardly anything could be more successful than the Basutoland experiment, and, in its own measure, that of the Transkei.

The population of Basutoland has increased within a century from 40,000 to 400,000; her budget never knows a deficit, and her people are so supremely contented that it is their constant prayer that they may live for ever under the British flag. The whole of the territories beyond the border of Basutoland benefit by this prosperity and contentment, even to the 70,000 labourers who go forth every year to garner for the white man the vegetable and mineral wealth of South Africa. But the Basutoland experiment is the segregation of the entire nation.

The acceptance by General Botha, when Prime Minister, of the portfolio for Native Affairs, led for the first time to the launching of a comprehensive native policy which to-day holds the field as a basis for the whole of South Africa. This was formally established at the instruction of General Botha by the Secretary for Native Affairs, in a despatch addressed to the President of the Native Congress. The late Mr. Dower, after dealing with the provision of the Land Act of 1913, said:

When the time arrives for introducing such legislation, it is the intention of the Government to make full legislative provision for such gradual expropriation of lands owned by Europeans within defined native areas, as may from time to time be necessary for the settlement of natives on such lands under a regularised system; for the acquisition of land by natives within such areas; for the gradual extension of the system of individual tenure wherever the natives are sufficiently advanced to appreciate

its advantages ; and for the good government and the local administration of affairs in native areas by means of Native Councils and otherwise.

This, then, is the determined policy of the Native Affairs Department of the Union, deliberately launched with the full consent of the late Prime Minister. It is not without noticeable defects, no less than it is without its critics, but—and this is of enormous importance—the main tendency of the criticism is not upon the Act itself, but upon the “intention” or the “ability” of the Department to carry out the policy in an impartial manner. The declared object of the South Africa Land Act is rather that of the separation of land ownership than racial segregation, but it does aim at dotting Africa, south of the Limpopo, with modified Basutolands or reserve areas. The success of this policy will turn upon the size and suitability of the areas. There must be “elbow room” in the areas set apart solely for native occupation and ownership.

It matters little what these proposed areas are called, but as in the Transkei and Basutoland, they should be large enough to permit both communal and individual land tenure. Transkei, for example, is 2,500 square miles, and Basutoland 11,000 square miles in extent. It would, of course, be impossible now to obtain in single blocks, areas of the extent of 10,000 square miles, but it should not be impossible to earmark numbers of much smaller areas, each of which would be large enough for a single tribe. Next in importance to the extent of these areas is the water and timber supply ; the native and his cattle must be within reach of good and sufficient water.

It would seem that British statesmanship in South Africa should be directed towards securing the largest possible measure of racial harmony, and it is elemental that no such harmony is possible without a reasonable land settlement. It is of course true that the territories south of the Zambesi differ in character from those of West Central Africa, by reason of the fact that Rhodesia, the Protectorates, and the Union Provinces are relatively colonizable by the white races, but equally must it be admitted that the broad economic and social factors governing native landholding do not vary to any appreciable extent. *Sufficiency, Suitability* and *Security* of native land tenure is always and everywhere the soundest policy for the immigrant white races to adopt and uphold.

In shaping a permanent native land policy in Rhodesia, there are three factors to take into consideration. First should be remembered the substantiated wrongs done to the Mashona and Matabele, and then the necessity of what amends are possible and practicable; secondly, the necessity of applying to the fullest possible extent the same lofty principles as those which are at the root of British native land policy elsewhere; thirdly, Rhodesian land policy should be so adjusted that it will generally harmonize with the land policies of the protectorates and provinces of the Union, but always with the proviso that the solution in Rhodesia should be so generous that it will constitute an ideal to which the other provinces will aspire. These conditions will be met by the very practical and modest suggestion of giving security of tenure to all native communities on those lands where there are no white men.

BRITAIN'S "ACID TEST"

WHY is Rhodesia Britain's "acid test" in Colonial policy? The answer is as simple as it is definite and challenging. British Colonial policy is at the parting of the ways in Rhodesia, because the question raised is whether a wrong having been clearly proved Great Britain should now deliberately choose to persist in that wrong and uphold all its consequences, or conversely, whether, that wrong having now been demonstrated, the British people should choose to do the *Right*.

It is not really material that the wrong is a great wrong, nor is it material that in point of fact it is easier for the British nation to do *right* now than at any past or future period. Again, the view rightly held by many, including Lord Buxton and the Bishop of Mashonaland and the author of this book that there is kindly feeling in Rhodesia between the races is entirely beside the mark—is in fact as much beside the mark as would be the argument that James MacLean was not a highway robber because he robbed his victims courteously, dined generously, and wine copiously at White's!

It is a choice between morality on the one hand, and on the other expediency and temporary material advantage. The natives of Rhodesia have been expropriated from all their lands, first, by misleading the Imperial Government, and secondly, by proceeding with the expropria-

tion of native land rights for over twenty years upon the assumption that a worthless concession was valid. Thus upon a title doubly vicious have these people been robbed. The land and the cattle taken from them cannot be restored ; but the way is open for Great Britain to-day, as never before, owing to the Judicial Committee's report, to make certain amends.

It is not merely that this wrong has been done and that the evil consequences flowing from it are being upheld, but almost every development of that wrong cuts right across British Colonial principles elsewhere, and thereby threatens a fundamental departure in Colonial policy which must accentuate the recognized danger of a catastrophe in South Africa and vitiate British dependency rule within and without the African Continent.

The expropriation of the land rights of both the Mashonas and the Matabele is of the most absolute kind known to history. No ownership rights of any sort or kind have been left to them. With the exception of two Matabele who have purchased garden plots from the Chartered Company, no single native owns individually, no tribe owns collectively, the ground on which their huts are erected, the gardens and fields which they till, the grazing grounds for their cattle, the springs from which they draw their water, nor the sacred patches of land wherein they bury their dead. Could national expropriation go further? The nearest parallel to this in Africa was King Leopold's Congo administration. This had in it features which ought not to be compared with any British administration, but in point of demonstrable fact the land laws did not go anything like so far as those of Southern Rhodesia, where expropriation

of land rights is without parallel in British or any other Colonial administration.

The "acid test" which Southern Rhodesia presents to British Colonial statesmen is indeed a very simple one, namely, that to do the right thing now would involve the tacit admission that their predecessors allowed themselves to do wrong by being hoodwinked and misled in 1893-96. But surely the fact that the full measure of this official misapprehension was only complete with the Enquiry of the Judicial Committee of 1914-18 should "strengthen the feeble knees" of any body of Government officials possessing a spark of desire to "be just and fear not."

The Matabele lost their land ownership rights so far as Rhodesia was concerned by a "land concession," and through an alleged murderous attack upon the Mashonas *and* the white subjects of the British Crown. In order to regularize the situation the British Government of the day, in the full belief that the land concession was genuine, and equally in the belief that the "blood-thirsty" Matabele had indeed attacked the white men, issued an Order in Council in 1894, which has recently been stated by Sir Henry Lambert to be the instrument governing the relationship of the Matabele and later the Mashonas to the land:

Legally the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the land case does not in any way affect the position of the natives, which is determined solely by the provisions of the Orders in Council. This has been the position ever since 1894.¹

But it is now established beyond any question that the information upon which the Colonial

¹ C.M.D., 547.

Secretary of the day acted when he issued this Order in Council was entirely misleading—the Lippert Concession, always declared invalid by the Matabele, was authoritatively stated to be so by the Judicial Committee in 1918, whilst at a date *subsequent* only to the issue of the Order in Council did the Home Government become aware of the fact that there was never a vestige of truth in the allegation that the Matabele had attacked the white subjects of Queen Victoria!

It has hitherto been regarded as an elemental feature in the jurisprudence of every civilized country that when it can be shown that decisions have been reached upon misleading evidence the case should be reopened for consideration. If the British Government and people, after the disclosures before the Judicial Committee of 1914-18 and of those before Lord Cave's Commission of 1919-20 refuse to reconsider the case of the Matabele and Mashona natives, they will fail in that post-war "acid test" which this Colonial problem offers to them.

The Order in Council, which we are told governs the attitude of the Imperial Government upon this subject, gave Imperial approval in 1894 to the proposal to treat the land ownership rights of the Matabele as having lapsed, and proceeded to lay down instructions for allotting to the natives, lands upon a form of sufferance title on which they could exist at the pleasure of the white race. As the natives were presumed to have lost title by concession and by military operations, no legislation formally dispossessing them of ownership was deemed necessary.

But this was not all; a further Order in Council was issued whereby the pastoral Matabele next had their cattle taken from them!

The following are the material passages of this Order in Council :

(a) All such cattle as were in Matabeleland on or before the 31st day of December, 1893.

(b) The offspring of such cattle as in sub-section (a) hereof mentioned born after the 31st December in the year aforesaid and now in the possession of any native resident in Matabeleland shall be, and the same is hereby, vested in the British South Africa Company.

Provided, however, that if any cattle in the possession of any such native shall be proved to be the lawful property of any person, not being such native as aforesaid, the provision of this section shall not apply, but the onus of proof of such lawful property shall lie on the person alleging the same.¹

The Imperial Government again only "regularized" action already taken by the servants of the Chartered Company. These cattle were included in the "loot" promised to the invaders by Sir Starr Jameson in the famous secret agreement of the previous August. Thus the Matabele lost tens of thousands of their cattle. The monstrous nature of this act can hardly be described more convincingly than in Mr. Carnegie's depositions before Sir Richard Martin :

In the meantime, Native Commissioners were appointed in nine districts, into which the country was divided. Two districts were also reserved for native locations, but these being on the whole unhealthy, have, up to the present, not been occupied by the natives, who dread the fever from past experience. Each Native Commissioner was expected to send fifty head of cattle from his district monthly for the use of the Company, and this number was considerably increased at times. Thus the natives speedily understood that their cattle—the food of their children—were fast disappearing, and as far as they knew would soon be all gone.

¹ Cattle Proprietary Regulation, 1895.

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After over 200,000 head of cattle had been taken from the natives, a very considerable number of which had been their own private property by inheritance, a residue of about 80,000 were left. Of these the Company took some 45 per cent., and gave the rest to the natives as their own absolute property.¹

From this it would seem that the total cattle owned by the Matabele in 1893 was about 280,000, that of these 200,000 were first taken and then 45 per cent. of the remaining herds, which would leave them less than 50,000 out of 280,000 !

For all purposes of expropriation the unfortunate Mashonas were treated as part of the Matabele, but the Mashonas have always declared that they have never been conquered by the Matabele, that they were not subject to them, hence they had no sovereignty over them. In support of this contention the following arguments are advanced by those who have studied this feature of the question and by the Mashona and kindred tribes :

(a) The Mashonas did not pay annual tribute.

(b) The fact that the Matabele raided the Mashonas periodically and forcibly exacted a toll of cattle is in itself evidence that the Mashonas were not a subjected people.

(c) In order to render a concession of Mashona lands valid by the Council of Indunas, it would be necessary to obtain the consent of representative indunas from the Mashona tribes. No such consent was given, no Mashona indunas at any time sat upon the Matabele Councils which sanctioned the Rudd-Rhodes, or Lippert, or any other concessions.

(d) Sir Henry Loch, in a despatch dated November 19, 1894, says : From the information collected by me before the war, I am of opinion that a circle drawn at sixty miles radius from Bulawayo would have embraced the whole of the land in actual beneficial occupation by the Matabele nation and their slaves, and though the limits of sovereignty claimed by

¹ Cd. 8547, p. 81.

Lobengula were held by him to extend to any point south of the Zambesi where he had carried a raid, nevertheless, in speaking of the Matabele nation and of the people ruled by Lobengula, it was usual to refer only to those people who were in the immediate vicinity, and under the immediate and personal rule of Lobengula.¹

It would be difficult to produce anything more conclusive and authoritative than the foregoing upon the limits of the sovereignty of Lobengula.

The Mashonas did not oppose the advance and settlement of the pioneers into Mashonaland in 1893. The Chartered Company's agents were allowed to enter and occupy such territory as they required, without any obstacles being placed in the way of legitimate colonization. That the Mashonas owed no allegiance to Lobengula is also shown here by the fact that the Company at this time promised to protect them against their "hereditary foes" the Matabele, and this was the principal reason why the Mashonas made no opposition to the Company's activities.

The '93 "conquest" of Matabeleland by the Company could not obviously affect the Mashonas' title to land, because the excuse advanced for these hostilities was that of preventing the Matabele impis from interfering with the "poor Mashonas." Moreover, the Mashonas were the "friendlies" who co-operated with the Company's force in the invasion of Matabeleland, and such co-operation should have provided an added safeguard against the confiscation of any Mashona tribal land.

But even the above do not stand alone. It would seem that Selous held strongly to the view that the Mashonas were entirely independent. In the Enquiry before Lord Cave's

¹ Cd. 8130, p. 3.

Commission, a letter was produced on January 28, 1920, by Sir Gordon Hewart, the Attorney-General, written to the Duke of Abercorn, in which statements of the highest importance were made upon this feature. The letter was dated March 31, 1890, and in this Cecil Rhodes informed the Duke of Abercorn that Selous:

... was full of an alleged concession that he had got in Mashonaland from a Makeri-keri chief, and he was about to write a series of articles advocating that Mashonaland was independent of Lobengula and had never been under his control. I saw at once the danger of our position if a series of articles appeared in the papers from a man of Selous' position, claiming that Mashonaland was independent of Lobengula. Selous said that of course when he went in he had no idea we should get a Charter, but when he saw that the only hope for the country was the success of the Charter he agreed to throw his lot in with us.

He agreed to abandon his concession, which I told him was not worth the paper it was written on. Johnston, Heaney and Borrow had also shares in this concession. They agreed to tear up their scrip; they deemed it fair, if I could give Selous something for the time and labour he had spent. *I gave him personally £2,000 out of my own private fund*, but on the distinct understanding that it was nothing to do with his concession, and that I recognized it in no sort of way.

It would seem that even whilst writing this letter Rhodes had a twinge of conscience, for later on in the same letter he says:

I still consider I did the right thing with Selous, as it would have been most dangerous to us to have had his able pen advocating in the home papers that Mashonaland was independent of Lobengula, and his mind was certainly running in that direction.¹

The question of secure *occupancy* is of an entirely different order, but it is material to

¹ Lord Cave's Commission, January 28, 1920.

bear in mind the fact that *occupancy* in African land title is secure, whereas the European interpretation of *occupancy* generally connotes occupancy by the sufferance of the white inhabitants. In Southern Rhodesia the expropriation of land ownership rights goes hand in hand with insecurity of occupancy, for not merely do the natives own nothing, but they have no security of tenure whatever.

Lieut.-Colonel Amery, defending this condition of affairs and speaking upon this feature of the subject in the House of Commons on July 30, 1919, said :

If we go back to the history of this question, it is quite right to remind the Committee of what the position was before the Chartered Company. The Matabele invaded the country that is now Southern Rhodesia even in our own lifetime. I have talked myself to people about their own recollection of that invasion, but they were defeated by the Boers. At that time certainly the position of the great majority of the inhabitants of that country was anything but a happy one. They had no security of tenure either in their lands, their cattle, or their wives.¹

This is an extraordinary reading of history. The Matabele settled in the Zambesi valley in 1838 (Keane), that is, over eighty years before the day when the gallant and vigorous Colonel stated that the Matabele had only entered Matabeleland "in our own lifetime." Nobody who has met Colonel Amery either in the Colonial Office or in the House of Commons would credit him with carrying the weight of more than eighty years ! The importance of keeping correct dates in mind lies in the fact that in South Africa, even upon the European basis, "prescriptive title" in Southern Rhodesia follows

¹ "Hansard," C.O. Vote, House of Commons, July 30, 1919, p. 1453.

an occupation of twenty-five years. The second curious feature about this statement is that it completely ignores the fact that the Mashonas, who number half the population, were settled in the Zambesi generations before the Matabele, and that they equally with the Matabele have had their lands expropriated. Finally, it is quite incorrect to imply that the Matabele simply raided the Mashona country, and that the Mashonas had no secure title. The Matabele were forced from the fertile Marico valley and driven across the Limpopo into the Zambesi valley by the whites led by Maritz and Pogieter. Whilst it is true that great cruelties can be established against the Matabele, it would not be easy to establish an allegation that the organized Mashona tribes "had no security of tenure" after the country had settled down subsequent to the Matabele being driven by the whites into the Zambesi basin.

But this parallel by Colonel Amery wholly ignores the cardinal factor of differentiation. The Matabele were quite contented with their homes in the Marico valley; the whites drove them from their homes into the Zambesi valley, whilst nobody drove the Chartered Company from England to the Zambesi valley. The Chartered Company went there, not in search of a home, for this they had both secure and ample in their own country, they went there with the simple object of seeking additions to their already substantial wealth.

In the one case the Matabele were driven by whites to seek a new home, in the case of the Company none had imperilled their homes, none had robbed them of their daily bread, none had stolen their cattle and slaughtered their people, they were at no time confronted with the cruel

necessity of seeking a new home far from the ravages of advancing "civilization." The invasion of Matabeleland and Mashonaland by the Chartered Company, when stripped of all tawdry tinsel, was mainly if not wholly the pursuit of personal gain.

The land of Rhodesia is occupied by the natives to-day in a threefold category :

- (1) *Unalienated Land.*
 - (a) Reserves (insecure).
 - (b) Outside Reserves (insecure)
- (2) *Alienated Lands.*
 - (a) In most cases natives continue to live on their homesteads, which the Company has either given or sold to whites. The natives, for the privilege of continuing to live on their own lands, pay a "rent" to the white owners.

There are three facts of outstanding importance with reference to the Native Reserves. First, that the title of the natives is a very insecure one; secondly, that their area is ample; but thirdly and conversely, the character of the soil! The total area of the Reserves is roughly 20,000,000 acres, occupied by about 400,000 natives, or approximately 50 acres per head of the population.

According to the Chartered Company's own reports, the greater part of the Reserves is anything but attractive to agriculturalists. In the report of 1910 the Company's own committee thus describes the soil :

The Native Department officials . . . point out that in certain Reserves a large portion of the soil is poor, that water is deficient and that certain localities are *wholly unsuitable for human occupation*.¹

¹ Native Affairs Report, 1910-11. (*Italics mine.*—J. H. H.)

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In the Report of the Reserves Commission appointed in 1914-17 the Commission says :

Soil.—The comparative values of the different soils of the territory and their suitability for white and native use was a matter of constant enquiry and comment during journeys which totalled over 5,000 miles by road throughout every portion of Southern Rhodesia. There is an immense variety of type and of value. A responsible official with special opportunities of forming an opinion considers that 85 per cent. of the total area of the territory is granite.¹

The Commissioners also admitted that with regard to the Gwaai and Nata Reserves "80 per cent. of the total area is uninhabitable under present conditions."

But of these areas which upon the Company's own confession are so largely uninhabitable by reason of being rock-ridden, waterless, or fever stricken, the tenure is of the most flimsy nature. One of the consequences which have flowed from the initial wrong of expropriating all native land rights is that everywhere the tenure of native occupancy is insecure.

The extent to which the natives have been betrayed is clearly shown by the steep descent in the scale of wrongdoing. The guarantees given to the Matabele were substantial, there was the treaty of amity, there was Queen Victoria's request that any troubles arising from the presence of white men should be reported upon immediately, there was the assurance that invasion was not contemplated (when in fact it was agreed upon), and finally there was the assurance based upon the very clear safeguard for native land rights in the Royal Charter itself :

In the administration of justice to the said peoples or

¹ Native Reserves Commission Report, 1915. Cd. 8674.

inhabitants, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands and goods and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce and legitimacy and other rights of property and personal rights, but subject to any British laws which may be in force in any of the territories aforesaid, and applicable to the peoples or inhabitants thereof.¹

Could any form of words safeguard more absolutely the rights of the natives to their lands—could any obligation imposed upon the Chartered Company be more definite? Yet this obligation has been completely ignored by the simple process of denying that any such rights exist! The rights of the Mashonas were ignored again by a very simple process, namely, by declaring that the Mashonas were subjects of Lobengula! Those who know anything of the history of Rhodesia and of African native law will realize the absurdity of this contention. No Mashona chief sat upon the Matabele Council, and without the consent of Mashona indunas no land concession could be valid; no tribute was paid to the Matabele, no levies were called either for public works or for military expeditions. Moreover, Sir Henry Loch, in his despatch of November 19, 1894, informed the British Government that Lobengula's sovereignty did not extend beyond a radius of sixty miles from Bulawayo—that is, the sovereignty did not reach to Mashonaland.²

What then is left to the Matabele and Mashona people? An occupancy void of security. First in order of occupancy are the natives, who continue to live on their lands which have

¹ The Royal Charter, clause 14.

² Cd. 8130, p. 3.

been sold or given to white men. These natives number about 250,000; they are at liberty to leave and go into the Reserves, but are so attached to their kraals and lands that they pay the white "owners" about £1 per head for permission to remain; they also pay head tax to the Company for administrative purposes.

The second category of natives is of those on the Reserves, namely, about 400,000. Their tenure is very doubtful, for it is governed by the following two clauses of an Order in Council, issued on July 18, 1894:

(49) The Land Commission shall deal with all questions relating to the settlement of natives on the lands in that part of the territories within the limits of this order which is known as Matabeleland. It shall without delay assign to the natives inhabiting Matabeleland land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements, including in all cases a fair and equitable proportion of springs or permanent water. It shall also direct the Administrator to deliver to them cattle sufficient for their needs; and the Administrator shall give effect to such direction.

(51) The Company shall retain the mineral rights in all land assigned to natives. If the Company should require any such land for the purpose of mineral development or as sites of townships, or for railways or other public works, the Land Commission, upon application by the Company, and upon good and sufficient cause shown, may order the natives to remove from such land or any portion thereof, and shall assign to them just and liberal compensation in land elsewhere situate in as convenient a position as possible, sufficient and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements, containing a fair and equitable proportion of springs of permanent water, and, as far as possible, equally suitable for their requirements in all respects as the land from which they are ordered to remove.¹

The flimsy nature of this tenure leaps immedi-

¹ Matabeleland Order in Council, clauses 49 and 51.

ately to the eye. Any student of native affairs knows that it is the easiest thing in the world to show "good and sufficient cause" for the removal of natives. A moment's reflection will demonstrate the unenviable position of the natives on these Reserves. "Good and sufficient cause" can be set up through the alleged discovery of minerals, the need for railways, public works, towns—this much is in the Order in Council itself. But the Order in Council has recently received a most illuminating example of the manner in which it can be interpreted. The story should be read in full in the correspondence issued by the Colonial Office.¹ It begins about the year 1910, when there was a local "contention" as to the adequacy or otherwise of the Reserves. The matter then came before the Native Affairs Committee of 1910-11, and the Company's land surveyor, who now comes into the picture, expressed the opinion somewhat strongly that the land allotted to the natives was excessive and should be cut down. The Native Affairs Department, ever watchful over native interests, took a very different view, and the 1910 Committee of Enquiry stated in their Report:

... the testimony of the Native Department officials is substantially against him. They point out that in certain Reserves a large portion of the soil is poor, that water is deficient, and that certain localities are wholly unsuitable for human occupation.²

There, it was thought, the matter had ended, at least so far as Rhodesia was concerned, but the scene then appears to have shifted to

¹ C. M. D. 547.

² Report of Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 11.

London. The Colonial Office, admittedly unaware of any local "contention" upon the matter, and also apparently without knowledge of the above Committee's Report, asked Lord Gladstone in 1912 to furnish a report upon the question of the Native Reserves. There is a good deal of matter undisclosed to the public upon the subject, for the next step, as set forth in a White Book,¹ appears to have been taken when a Director of the Company called upon Lord Gladstone in Arcadia, Pretoria, and discussed the question.

Now comes a series of proceedings which, if serious issues were not involved, would be almost comical. A Commission of three gentlemen was appointed, and Lord Harcourt urged the obvious desirability of nominating upon this Commission a Native Affairs Commissioner, but nothing of the kind happened: no native, no missionary, no private person and no Native Commissioner was allowed to serve upon the Commission of three. The three men appointed were all of them either employees or ex-employees of the Company, and the chairman was actually one of those entitled by the infamous secret agreement of 1893 to take from the Matabele his 6,000 acres of land, his gold claims and his share of the "loot." Nor was this all. Sir Francis Newton, the second member, as was obvious from the start, could not serve, and actually the Company's land surveyor, whose opinions were well known and on record, was appointed as deputy!

It can be no matter for surprise that Sir Starr Jameson publicly hailed the Report of such a Commission as "very satisfactory" to the shareholders of the Chartered Company.

¹ Cd. 8674, 1917.

The Reserves were recommended for reduction by 6,000,000 acres of relatively cultivated lands, whilst over 35,000 natives are to be evicted from kraals, gardens and cultivated lands to seek new homes in another 5,000,000 acres of unalienated land elsewhere. In one place where a "railway" may some day run the natives are to be evicted over a belt twelve miles wide, whereas if white settlers were concerned only fifty yards either side of the projected line would be required, and even then only at the price of adequate compensation. These facts show the unfortunate position of the natives on the Reserves.

But the position is infinitely worse for the 100,000 to 120,000 natives on the so-called unalienated land, where there are to-day no white men at all. These natives have not only lost every vestige of ownership, but their occupancy is only tolerated until some one, speculator or settler, comes and buys their homesteads from the Company. These natives pay their direct taxation, their indirect taxation, and to the Company an additional £1 per head for living on their own lands! Thus it comes about that the speculator judges the value of the land very largely by the number of natives from whom he can extort a competency by charging them £1 per head for occupying their own lands. The pathetic condition of these people is well set forth in a paragraph from the Company's own publication, the Native Affairs Report, 1910-11:


We see no objection to the present system of allowing natives to occupy the unalienated land of the Company and pay rent. The occupation however is merely a passing phase; the land is being rapidly acquired by

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settlers, with whom the natives must enter into fresh agreements or leave.¹

This, then, is the position of the native inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia to-day. In simple faith they trusted the white men as they first appeared before them in the persons of Moffat, Helm, Carnegie and Mackenzie, and relying upon the character of these men they entered into a treaty of amity with the Great White Queen. They were then betrayed by a concession which, though valueless, was deliberately acted upon for over twenty years; until, in fact, every vestige of ownership was taken from them. In vain the denunciation of the concession by natives, missionaries and others, and in vain appeals for redress. At last the scandal of expropriation, greed and avarice reached a point when it could no longer be ignored, and the main issue, namely, the notorious concession, was submitted to the highest tribunal in the British Commonwealth, with the result that it was declared "valueless." The British Crown in succession to Lobengula now holds legal title, and it is thus open to the British Parliament and people to make some amends, if only to confer upon the natives absolute security of tenure in those parts of the country where there is to-day no white man. The question whether the British people decide to take this very simple step, or whether from apathy they allow this open sore to continue and thereby infect policy throughout Africa, is the "acid test" which history submits to-day to the British nation.


¹ Report of Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 10.



PART V

RHODESIA OF TO-DAY

The Settler's "Paradise."
The Cost of Living.
The Native—An Industrial Unit.
Christian Missions.



THE SETTLER'S PARADISE

Southern Rhodesia, comprising Mashonaland and Matabeleland, is rapidly becoming recognized as one of the most attractive of our colonies.—*Chartered Company's Prospectus.*

Cheap land, easy terms of payment, magnificent pastoral and agricultural capabilities, and steadily increasing markets, are some of the attractions which Southern Rhodesia offers to the farmer with moderate capital at his disposal. When to these are added a pleasant life and a delightful climate in a country where a farmer can be in his fields practically every day in the year, and can soon hope to earn more than a bare living, it will be admitted that a man is well advised to consider this rising young colony before turning his attention elsewhere.—*Chartered Company's Prospectus.*

If you go into the Strand, where the Rhodesian offices are, you can see what the country is capable of producing. What you are told there and what you see exhibited look all very well, but with the numerous cattle pests, the insufficient rainfall, and so on—I say that unless you give the returned soldiers better terms than you give the present settlers I should advise them not to go out there. I know what I am talking about.—*A Shareholder at the Company's Annual Meeting, April 6, 1916.*

THE interest in Rhodesia to the rising generation of Britishers is the opportunity which that country affords to the young man searching for a useful and lucrative future. That young man will first weigh carefully the commercial possibilities, whether agricultural, ranching or

mining, and in the end he will be guided mainly by three factors of cardinal importance: (*a*) the capital required, (*b*) the cost of living, (*c*) the labour supply. In the consideration of capital outlay the emigrant will naturally compare the attractions of Rhodesia with those of Canada, Australia and New Zealand; in weighing the cost of living he will include the cost of transport, and this again will be contrasted with other fields which dangle tempting offers before the eye of the intending emigrant. Finally, the all-important problem of labour will lead to the subsidiary question as to which of the Colonies is most essentially a "white man's country." In this chapter an attempt is made to show how Rhodesia answers such test questions.

In general, the answers to these tests will probably be found somewhere between the optimistic advertisement of the Company and the critics, of whom the shareholder quoted above is a fair and by no means an isolated example. Above all, the potential settler will do well to take thoroughly to heart the following passage from the Company's prospectus: "It must, however, be clearly understood that Rhodesia is essentially a country for workers."

The initial question of land, we are told in the literature of the British South Africa Company, is a simple matter, for it can be bought outright or leased with the option of purchase upon "exceptionally favourable terms." The unimproved land, we are then informed, averages about 7s. per acre, so that its price has considerably appreciated since the day Mr. Rhodes in a characteristic speech suggested "3d. an acre"! Applicants for land must satisfy the Company that they have a reasonable amount

of capital—the “reasonable amount” being about £1,000—whilst more than ordinary importance should be attached to the Company’s own statement that “many wealthy men have given their sons a good start in Rhodesia;” moreover, the fact should not be overlooked that the “Home for *poor* Whites,” run by the Salvation Army, is generally pretty full!

The British South Africa Company tell us that “Rhodesia’s ultimate prosperity is bound up in farming”—cold comfort this for the thousands of holders of non-paying gold scrip! We are also told by the Canadian Government that Canada “is pre-eminently an agricultural country,” but how different is the attraction of Canada. A comparatively short and cheap sea passage, a grant of 160 acres of land upon an initial payment of £2 only and occupation conditions, which include residence of six months, the cultivation of 80 acres, and a purchase of land by instalments at 12s. per acre, whilst grazing land can be leased at 1d. per acre per annum up to 100,000 acres. Compare, again, New South Wales with Rhodesia. The emigrant farmer can commence with quite small capital by a system of “share farming,” which provides ground ready prepared, seed, tools and haulage. If a colonist prefers a farm in his own right, the Government will place at his disposal an “irrigated farm,” contenting itself with a low rate of interest on the capital outlay. The initial expenditure of £500 covers two years, and includes a home, fodder, crops laid down, a planted orchard, the necessary live stock and working plant.

Following upon the initial outlay upon land purchase or leasing in Southern Rhodesia is the question of stock and the maintenance of

the colonist for the first year, for which joint considerations the British South Africa Company tells the prospective emigrant that he must possess at least £1,000. We shall see later that he will be well advised to take a great deal more. In Canada, on the other hand, a man requires a minimum of only £256, or a maximum of £390, which will build two houses, purchase a team of four horses, ploughs, wagon and tools, and maintain his household and farm for six months. In the second year the Canadian immigrant requires from £130 to £190, but the minimum return is £250, and thus is covered the expenditure of the first complete farming year. Rhodesia has attractions for the settler too, but it certainly does not offer attractions for *every* class of colonist. The emigrant of limited means should shun Rhodesia, though Rhodesia admittedly may be the place for the man who has a few thousands to gamble away upon a colonial prospect which offers the certainty of sinking capital sums for a period, but with just the possibility of ultimately making a handsome fortune.

The principal agricultural prospects of Southern Rhodesia are corn, fruit, tobacco, and ranching. If the intending emigrant pays a visit to the offices of the British South Africa Company he will be shown wonderful pictures setting forth the amazing natural and cultivated wealth of Rhodesia: giant cobs of Indian corn which have no equal in any other market in the world, and huge stacks of mealies "ready for shipment"; in another picture is a magnificent fat ox in foreground and fields of glorious green in the background, leading the onlooker to believe that the fat stock industry of the homeland will soon be driven to bankruptcy. The

fair companion at his side, pledged to share the hardships of a settler's life, goes into ecstasies of delight as she draws attention to luscious grapes, peaches, and rosy apples in huge preserve bottles, and the young and enthusiastic may be excused if, with such convincing evidence, they believe that at last they have discovered, rolled into one, the land of Canaan, the fields Elysian, and the lost El Dorado. A few months later those fair companions will say strange things as they endeavour to cut something called "beef" in Bulawayo, or have to pay 6d. for a badly bruised Canadian apple at Gwelo, whilst other fruit is either tinned or prohibitive in price!

The world consumption of maize averages about 20,000,000 tons, and of this Great Britain consumes from two to three million tons, or, expressed in figures sterling, from twelve to fifteen million pounds worth. There is one feature with regard to maize or Indian corn which distinguishes it from other cereals, in that it possesses a very high proportion of oil. There is no question that the corn grown in Rhodesia is of a very fine grade, and if its supply and quality could be guaranteed both manufacturers and distillers would give every encouragement to its import. The Chartered Company in one of its generous pre-war advertisements claims that "no other country in the world is better suited to the growing of maize on a large scale than Rhodesia."¹ It is also asserted in the same pamphlet that 300 acres will produce 1,800 bags, worth in the local market £810, which, less cost of production, gives a net profit of £315. The reason for this productivity is stated to be that the country

¹ British South Africa Company's Maize pamphlet.

"revels in sunshine"—so it does in weevils, sandstorms and droughts, but this fact is discreetly kept in the background.

The real test of the maize industry is to be found in its export figures, yet, in spite of the Chartered Company's claim that this is one of the finest maize producing areas in the world, its export to Europe has never greatly exceeded the trivial sum of £10,000. The best that can be said of corn possibilities in Rhodesia is that the export industry varies considerably, and that, given an elaborate and costly system of irrigation to overcome the periodic droughts, there is some probability of the maize export assuming quite generous proportions. The question is, will the Chartered Company, or any future Government, provide that system of irrigation by which alone the Zambesi waterways could be utilized to supply agriculture with its greatest need—water. If this can be done the maize future of Rhodesia is indeed bright with promise; if it cannot, then maize will continue to occupy the same position that it has done for centuries, a harvest barely adequate for local South African consumption.

Any prospective Rhodesian settler studying the country's corn industry should compare the extravagant maize pamphlet of the British South Africa Company with the carefully worded reports of its own administrative department, wherein he will find the following authoritative opinion:

The Co-operative Society intends to export some 40,000 bags of maize, but it is, I think, generally felt that farmers could more profitably use the surplus grain on their farms rather than export it under present conditions.¹

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, February 23, 1911, p. 61.

Maize in Rhodesia is an indigenous product, and the present-day experiment is that of stimulating it into an industry sufficiently large to establish and maintain a progressive export. Much, of course, will depend upon the place which maize will take as the raw material for the manufacture of industrial alcohol. Fruit growing is even more of an experiment, because it is not, as in Jamaica or the Canary Islands, an indigenous industry. Moreover, the country is an immense distance from the seaboard, either 400 miles through Portuguese territory to the Indian Ocean, or over 1,500 miles to the Atlantic.

Mr. Wilson Fox is the enthusiastic "Fruiterer" of the Chartered Company, although nowhere does one find any explanation why the late manager of the Company should be regarded as an expert on oranges and lemons. The legal mind with which Mr. Fox is credited usually adopts an economy of language which inspires confidence, and upon the strength of the following expression any man has a fortune awaiting him by growing fruit in Rhodesia:

The prospects for citrus fruit growers in Rhodesia are almost too attractive.*

Can any prospective settler desire anything more comprehensively encouraging than such a statement by Mr. Wilson Fox? There is enough in that pregnant sentence to justify any man selling all that he possesses, taking a ticket to Rhodesia, and planting oranges and nothing but oranges and lemons for ever more. Yet, as if a sudden recollection of the pricelessness and scarcity of fruit in Rhodesia

* British South Africa Company's Report, 1914, p. 82.

rushed to his memory, Mr. Wilson Fox concludes with the following damaging statement :

The development of the industry cannot, however, be unduly forced, *and at the best ten to twelve years must elapse before any large income can be secured.*¹

The Chartered Company having demonstrated, at least to its own satisfaction, that Rhodesia is pre-eminently an orange country, proceeds, quite in accord with its generous advertising policy, to array a formidable series of facts upon what is done in *other* countries. Readers of Chartered Company's reports are reminded that the orange consumption of the United Kingdom alone is two and a half million sterling, and that the simple Britisher in Covent Garden will probably pay as much as 22s. 6d. a box, which, by the way, works out at over 2d. each wholesale for boxes of 100 or over, or 1d. each for boxes of 200. Next, the reader is told that in the more tropical and humid regions of Natal a single acre produces 100 boxes, or, at 22s. 6d. a box, a yield of well over 100 guineas per acre ; taking everything into consideration, the Natal yield should not be less than £50 to £75 per acre. The inference to be drawn from this array of facts is that what is possible in Natal and California is equally possible in Rhodesia. This, however, can only be demonstrated by large expenditure, and admittedly something like ten years must elapse before any appreciable profits may be secured.

The Company's statement of potential profits is much more modest than those quoted for Natal and California. For a citrus farm planted with fifty bearing trees per acre the gross profit

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

is estimated at £30 per acre. The Chartered Company itself, as if less confident than its legally minded Fruiterer-in-Chief, emphasizes that the premier advantage of Rhodesia is that its supply of oranges would be available "between seasons" of other countries. But—but can we be quite sure that when during the summer months the European market is glutted with strawberries and luscious stone fruit from English and French gardens there is going to be a great demand for Rhodesian oranges? If so, then there is a future for the citrus industry of the Zambesi, but when everything has been said in favour of this experiment we are bound to come back again to that cautious statement of Mr. Wilson Fox: "The development of the industry cannot, however, be unduly forced, and at the best ten to twelve years must elapse before any large income can be secured." Thus, citrus farming in Rhodesia is for the "sons of the wealthy" and not for the settler with limited means.

The third agricultural product which the Chartered Company so widely advertises is that of tobacco cultivation. Twelve years ago the Chartered Company informed its shareholders that:

It may be stated with confidence that there is practically no limit to the quantity that can be produced, and that the quality is at least not inferior to the best at present grown in South Africa. The reports show that every portion of the country is favourable to its cultivation, and the only difficulty in the way of immediate production on a large scale is the uncertain labour supply.¹

What is wrong with Rhodesian tobacco? If, after twelve years' experiment upon an

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, 1903, p. 45.

"annual" crop the condition of the industry is still unsatisfactory, then presumably there is something radically at fault with the commodity itself. It is a curious fact that the Rhodesians who smoke the local weed are very limited consumers. The natives will smoke it, but the 10,000 male whites appear to have so little liking for the Chartered Company's product that they import about £80,000 worth of raw and manufactured tobaccos!

The *African World* records, and deplores the fact, that the Government during the war refused the tender of the Tobacco Company of Rhodesia and South Africa. The editor of the *African World*, commenting upon this refusal, says that the "tender was declined without a reason being stated," and concludes:

We think it is all the more to be regretted that the Rhodesian industrial community, and indeed, the people as a whole, should have the unpleasant experience of witnessing official unconcern of their welfare, and a total disregard shown for their sacrifices, not only in personal service, but through their pockets also.¹

A convincing reply to this criticism is surely that it will be time enough to supply Rhodesian tobacco to our soldiers and sailors when the Rhodesians themselves are prepared to smoke the Company's product instead of importing the "weed" at the rate of nearly £8 per head of the male population per annum.

At the same time there appears to be no solid reason why an ever-increasing market should not be found for Rhodesian tobacco—at a price—but the Company's carefully edited Report of 1914 provides very different reading upon this subject from that of 1903, already quoted.

¹ *African World*, February 13, 1915.

In the 1914 Report there is the curious and somewhat involved statement that:

The progress of the tobacco industry has been so rapid that it has outrun the local demand in the South African protected market. It has accordingly become necessary to seek overseas markets at lower prices, with the inevitable result that many growers have been placed in a position of considerable difficulty.¹

Further on it is admitted that an attempt to sell the local crop of 1912-13 by auction had to be abandoned, and that this has led to a reduction of the cultivation. The Company in a chastened mood has taken over the warehousing of the leaf in the hope of reviving confidence in the tobacco industry.

There is, however, no apparent reason why this industry should not succeed, for nowhere can any disadvantages be discovered, which, as in the case of fruit and corn, so strongly prejudice the experiment. The closer attention given to the question of preparation and export by the Company appears to have led to good results, for the export promises to reach a figure of 1,500,000 lb. As Great Britain imports about £15,000,000 worth of tobacco every year there should be a market for all the leaf Rhodesia can supply.

The reader will probably tire of the repetition of the claim that Rhodesia is essentially the country for this, pre-eminently the country for that, or the finest country in the world for another industry, but these claims are not advanced by the author, they emanate from the well-conducted and vigorous advertising agency of the Chartered Company, run at a

¹ British South Africa Company's Report, December 17, 1914.

cost of £3,000 to £4,000 per annum. In a pamphlet issued by the British South Africa Company, Professor Robert Wallace, of Edinburgh, says, "Rhodesia is essentially a live stock country," and the worthy professor is quite right. How came it, then, that, like the citrus industries, ranching is still, after twenty-five years of white occupation, only in its experimental stage?

The experimental stage, moreover, is proving a very prolonged one, for nearly twenty-five years ago the Chartered Company took over 30,000 head of cattle from Lobengula,¹ and yet there is no sign of an export trade. The Company itself is now engaging in definite ranching enterprise, possessing some 30,000 head of cattle, and the scope of this undertaking has been organized on a "scale of exceptional magnitude." Whatever criticism is levelled at the Chartered Company's advertisement methods, the most unsparing critic must admit that in ranching, as in the citrus and tobacco experiments, the Directors show very emphatically the courage of their convictions by embarking upon these costly undertakings, though there exists the local taunt that "it is done with the shareholders' money."

The ranching industry of Rhodesia has two terrible enemies, disease and drought, and of these the more formidable is the latter; rinderpest and East Coast epidemics are bad enough, but the torture suffered by herds of cattle during the prolonged droughts is indescribable. Visions come back to the writer of cattle in death agony along the bush tracks and railway sidings perishing for a draught of water none could spare.

¹ Cd. 8130, p. 16.

Professor Wallace in his paper condemns the native custom of keeping the cattle shut in until eleven o'clock, which he rightly says imposes the disadvantage that the cattle are thus deprived of grass softened by the dew. It is probably unwise to break up this custom too hastily, for natives are seldom at fault in their knowledge of nature, and though they may not be able to give the reason, the probability is that this precaution is taken to preserve the cattle from lurking danger of disease germs. I know that on a Government experimental farm north of the Equator¹ the Italian director of Agriculture follows the native practice, because he argues the early morning dew brings a disease carrying tick fatal to the bovine branch of his industry. When the British South Africa Company has overcome the prevalence of disease the difficulties caused by drought will still demand attention, and the only solution would seem to be that of constructing irrigation works from the Zambesi, an undertaking which competent local engineers declare to be comparatively easy, though admittedly costly. One thing is certain, and this applies to other branches of agriculture—success or failure will ultimately depend upon an adequate water supply.

The particular breed of cattle suitable to the climate of Rhodesia may not be the most profitable and attractive for export purposes; doubtless the local cattle are the most hardy, and some of them are fine specimens, including, it is said, descendants of King Lobengula's fine herd seized by the Company when Sir Starr Jameson invaded Matabeleland, but it is exceedingly doubtful whether as "beef" it would find a ready or remunerative sale in the

¹ The Aruwimi, Belgian Congo.

European market, for it is very "hard," and in appearance unattractive. It will be remembered that during the war many butchers in Great Britain refused to sell South African beef, and declared that it was "trek" beef. With commendable wisdom the Chartered Company is introducing new blood, but the following passage in Professor Wallace's report is extremely disappointing :

. . . All breeds, he says, of European cattle and their high-grade crosses get extremely emaciated at the most trying season of the year, the early maturity shorthorn being probably the one which, as a pure-bred animal, shows greatest weakness in this respect. With the loss of power to retain flesh, the benefits to be derived from a tendency to early maturity naturally vanish. While native cows will produce at least a calf every year, and some even six calves in five years, often only 80 per cent. of imported European animals yield calves, and these require much care in rearing. The advantage of greater weight in a European as compared with a native animal is more than lost by the reduction in numbers, and to this must also be added the greater death rate due to their periodic thin condition.¹

One of the greatest drawbacks in the ranching industry is the tendency of the Chartered Company in this, as in other matters, to paint the picture in too glowing colours, with the result that expectations are raised to a pitch impossible of realization, ultimately causing widespread depression not altogether justified, considering the difficulties attendant upon the experiment. The following incident illustrates this feature. Upon the return from Rhodesia in 1914 of Lord Winchester, the Hon. E. Baring, and the late Mr. D. Brodie, the last named, the Secretary of the Company, was credited with saying,

¹ *Cattle in Southern Rhodesia*, Robert Wallace, Professor of Agriculture and Rural Economy in the University of Edinburgh.

amongst other interesting things, during an interview :

Rhodesia has suffered from a sequence of dry summers, and the drought has been a prolonged one ; *but despite this the cattle everywhere were in the pink of condition, and a credit to the stock-farmers in Rhodesia.*¹

That sentence reproduced in Rhodesia caused widespread disgust with the Company's methods, because it was notorious that for months cattle had been dying in hundreds from drought. But this "advertisement" was doomed to a striking contradiction, even in the local organs. For some months the local price of meat had been hotly debated in Bulawayo, Gwelo and Salisbury, and early in December 1914 there was such an outburst of public opinion that the *Bulawayo Chronicle* made a thorough enquiry as to the cause. The "pink of condition" interview appeared on the 26th of November. Five days later, and as a result of its enquiries amongst leading butchers, the *Bulawayo Chronicle* published the following :

*The manager, in the course of a general chat, said that for some time past local stock had been totally unfit for slaughter, and, owing to the drought in the Colony, mutton had gone up in price tremendously. On the reporter remarking that it had been stated only recently at a farmers' meeting that the farmers in Northern Rhodesia had plenty of stock and could not get it off their hands, the speaker replied that doubtless they had the stock, but how much was worth killing? For example, in the Kafue district, a gentleman there, one of the biggest farmers in the country, and one who went in for first-class stuff, probably at this time of the year would have only about 15 per cent. out of a total of 10,000 head fit to kill.*²

¹ *Bulawayo Chronicle*, November 26, 1914.

² *Ibid.* December 1, 1914. (Italics mine.—J. H. H.)

It was also stated that joints consumed by the white population could not be sold under 1s. per lb., and that within the knowledge of one butcher sixty others had gone into the bankruptcy court within ten years.

In reviewing the whole ranching industry the impartial investigator will probably come to something like the following conclusion: That ranching has a probable future of some kind; that the remunerative export of chilled beef is remote, and that of chilled mutton infinitely more so; that before ranching can be successful in Rhodesia an adequate system of irrigation is imperative; and, finally, that after twenty-five years ranching is at present only in the experimental stage.

There is, however, one factor which should be considered in connection with Rhodesian agriculture, namely, the possibility that some day the potentialities of Rhodesia will excite the vision, not of a "Political Colossus," but of a "Commercial Colossus." If that day should dawn, there is quite the possibility of such a financial revolution in Rhodesia that we could view with equanimity even the closing of the mines. Economists tell us that the magnetic point of industry is "Power." Given Power and Produce, it should not be difficult for Brain and Capital to work wonders along the Zambesi. A moment's reflection will demonstrate the possibilities of Southern Rhodesia. The three sources of power are well-nigh illimitable; there are the mighty Victoria Falls, there are the Wankie coalfields not a great distance from the Falls, and there are all the possibilities of industrial alcohol from the Indian corn. Thus power is both accessible and inexhaustible.

It is difficult to believe that the meat and fruit of Rhodesia will find a good and adequate European market, but the scope for meat canning and fruit preserving knows no limit. Moreover, the ranches and fruit farms of Rhodesia are no great distance from the sugar plantations and wattle farms of Natal.

If the wizard wand of some "Commercial Colossus" could be applied to the situation, what might not happen? It should not be difficult to turn the volume of produce—meat, fruit, leather, tobacco—towards the centre of Power, and there to assemble, cure, can, preserve, and pack the agricultural wealth of the Zambesi Valley for the benefit of mankind. But this is, again, a job for a man with millions at his disposal and bold conceptions, and not for the settler with a few thousands to spare and none to risk.

Apart from the highly technical problems of gold mining and incomprehensible city finance, how does Southern Rhodesia strike the ordinary observer of the gold mining industry?

The prospects of gold mining in Rhodesia are entirely different from those of agriculture. Though fortunes and lives have been lost in winning the precious metal, fortunes—bright shining ones—are yet to be made out of Rhodesia's gold. It may be permissible to quote a personal experience in this connection. My mind goes back to a certain stormy day upon the bleak Matoppos, when the very Kaffir dogs shivered, howled, and whined at the inhospitable weather. I had sought protection and shelter from the raging tornado when soon another storm-driven traveller joined me. He was quite a stranger, but with Britishers it is always "well met." My new companion lit his pipe

for comfort, and as he smoked I noted a contentment, a joyous light in the eye and a cheeriness not often met in Southern Rhodesia; his conversation flowed on with no little ease and charm, and presently he drew from his coat pocket three small pieces of granite: "See that, friend"—"x . . oz. to the ton"—"for years I have been seeking, seeking, and seeking—now I have struck it at last!" "x . . ounces to the ton" meant fortune at last to that hardy gold-seeker of fifty-five years. I asked him what he was going to do, whether he would build forthwith and mine—not he. "I will put things in order here, then to London I go to form a company, and then for a home in bonnie Scotland!"

In Southern Rhodesia they tell you of one mine with a "gold pocket" whose mouth is big enough to carry a solid iron door, the secret key of which never leaves the person of the mine manager; but whenever the percentage of gold in the stamps and mills falls below a certain level, this man opens the door of the "gold pocket" and brings forth a bucket filled with granite which glints in the sun with dazzling brightness. The precious granite is thrown into the "stamps," with the result that the percentage of gold is raised to the fixed level of normal output. I cannot vouch for the truth of this story, but any one in Rhodesia knows the mine to which it is supposed to refer; this much is certain, the mine in question pays from 100 to 140 per cent.!

The general impression one gathers of gold prospecting in Rhodesia is that of all places in the world to seek yellow ore Rhodesia is at once the most romantic and attractive. The Chartered Company certainly does not

exaggerate in stating that gold may be found all over Rhodesia, but only the fortunate ones find the spots where it is hidden away in paying quantities. Most prospectors follow the time-worn practice of searching for old workings, which abound buried beneath scrub and debris. A prospecting licence costs £1, and gives the holder the right to search for minerals upon vacant land. Upon the discovery of gold he has a prescriptive title for thirty-one days within a radius of 1,000 yards of his "peg." Having "pegged" his claim and decided to obtain title, he applies for certificates and commences work. The conditions upon which he secures the title include the payment of royalties upon a graduated scale from $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., according to the grade and output.

Southern Rhodesia has to-day an enormous number of mining and allied companies at work, something like five hundred it is said, but besides these there are numbers of small concerns and private ventures. The waggish spirit animating many of the early British gold-seekers is disclosed in the names given to the "propositions." "Old Nick" is there, managed curiously enough by H. U. Moffat, son and grandson of famous missionaries. Then there is "Cheshire Cat," "Last Kick," "Tuff Nutt," "Cross your Luck," "Johnnie's Folly," and, of course, the "Rose of Sharon," "Up to Date," "Winston," and the "White" and "Red" Rose. "Old Nick" leads at the head of these wags with an output of nearly £50,000 per annum.

In the mining industry at present there are employed some 3,000 white men and about 30,000 native labourers, a miniature industry compared with the gigantic concerns stretching

for thirty miles all along the Rand. The total amount paid out in dividends by the gold mining companies of Rhodesia averages about £500,000 per annum, but this, it must not be overlooked, is paid by a few "propositions." If reference is made to the literature of the British South Africa Company's handbook, it will be seen from one table of statistics that only twelve dividend paying companies are mentioned, and that of these dividends, one company pays $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., three others 5 per cent., one 15 per cent., one $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. (coal), one 20 per cent. (chrome), one $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., two 30 per cent., one 45 per cent., and one 140 per cent. Whilst the young gold-seeker should bear in mind the fact that numbers of men fail to find gold in Southern Rhodesia, he should not overlook another fact equally well established, that he may find an "El Dorado Bank," or even a "Globe and Phoenix." If Solomon, the Queen of Sheba, or whoever the ancients were, gathered the early outcrop to the tune of more than £70,000,000 sterling, and present day gold-seekers £45,000,000, it is fairly good proof that at paying levels odd millions still remain to be won as a reward for the optimism of youthful enterprise.

Rhodesia differs from Canada, Australia, and other partially undeveloped colonial territories in that the bulk of the unskilled work is and must be done by natives, in which respect Rhodesia has more in common with British East Africa. The Chartered Company for years raised a considerable controversy over the alleged inadequacy of the local labour supply, but if reliance is to be placed upon one of its latest publications, there is no longer any difficulty in finding labour.

Farm labour in Rhodesia is entirely native and is both plentiful and cheap.¹

The language of certain farmers who may read that sentence can well be imagined. To use an Americanism, there would be some "scorch" about it. Nevertheless, it is perhaps hardly fair to take the above sentence too literally; for it appears in the Chartered Company's advertisement pamphlet, and consequently is but part of the "shop window." The prospective settler is probably wise enough to accept with some reserve this very optimistic statement.

The labour situation in Rhodesia is no worse, probably a good deal better, than in other territories in South Africa, and what is more important is that, properly managed, it will ultimately solve itself; that this is so is shown by the growth of the labour supply in recent years. The Chartered Company itself but a few years ago had so little faith in the possibilities of solving its labour problem that on November 19, 1903, they wrote an urgent, it might be described as a panic, despatch to the Colonial Office begging Mr. Lyttelton's permission to introduce Chinese labour into Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Jones, the secretary, said:

I am further to say that the Board of the Company having been informed that the Council of the Rhodesian Land and Mine Owners' Association has requested the favour of an interview with Mr. Lyttelton, with the object of laying before him the urgent necessity which, in their view, exists of obtaining immediately from foreign sources unskilled labour in number sufficient to save the mining industry of Rhodesia from the collapse which at the present time appears to be imminent.²

¹ *Grow Maize in Rhodesia*, British South Africa Company.

² Cd. 2028, p. 1.

In order to appraise this panic demand at its real valuation, Mr. Lyttelton consulted Sir Marshall Clarke, the British Resident at Salisbury, who replied that "the recent agitation in favour of the introduction of Chinese labour lacked spontaneousness."¹

Sir Marshall Clarke then proceeded to deal in a convincing manner with the actual condition of the labour supply, and the following section from his report is an echo of reports from almost every colonial field where there is an alleged shortage of labour.

It is also to be considered that throughout the territory scarcity of labour is much more felt at some mines than at others. Those that have a bad name amongst the natives are always in trouble; even when they manage to secure the numbers they require desertions are frequent, and they are soon again in want. The managements are sufficiently alive to their own interests to do their best to make the mines attractive. The natives seldom complain; they prefer to run away, and it is often difficult to ascertain the cause of their dissatisfaction. I believe, in some cases at least, it is due to the way in which natives are treated by European miners in charge of them, and over whom it is impossible to exercise an efficient and constant control. If this is the case it will probably be found that the substitution of Chinese for natives will not relieve unpopular mines.²

Considering the illiteracy of the native unskilled labourer, it is amazing how intimately he becomes acquainted with the character of the good and the bad "boss." The surest indication of an unhealthy condition of mines, or of inconsiderate treatment of the employees on a farm, is whether or not the employer suffers from a chronic shortage of labour. In support of Sir Marshall Clarke's opinion, which was in complete conflict with the Chartered

¹ Cd. 2028, p. 11.

² Ibid. p. 12.

Company's request to Mr. Lyttelton, there are the statements of those who knew the native conditions best. Mr. H. J. Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner, said :

*The natives of this province (Matabeleland) are essentially an agricultural and pastoral people and do not take kindly to mining,*¹

whereas farming is carried on under favourable circumstances, the supply being always equal to the demand, and the same may be said of domestic servants.²

The Inspector of native compounds was even more emphatic :

On the whole, labour has been fairly plentiful this year at nearly all the mines. This may be due in a measure to the large amount of prospecting work closed down, probably on account of the war (the Boer War). I am unable to give the total number of men on the mines before the war, but so far as I can remember, labour has never been more plentiful than at present, and the class of boys offering (chiefly Shangaans) was never better.³

To meet the demand of certain mines for Chinese labour, which was strongly supported by the Chartered Company, Mr. Lyttelton submitted for consideration the suggestion⁴ that the Legislative Council be dissolved and an election taken upon the subject. The Company strongly opposed Mr. Lyttelton, and met his suggestion in the following manner :

. . . The Board, on general public grounds, is strongly opposed to the recommendation of Sir Marshall Clarke that the Legislative Council should be dissolved at the present time ; and the Board proposes, as the Legislative Council elected only two years ago will meet on May 24th, that

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

² British South Africa Company's Report, 1900-2, p. 162.

³ Ibid. p. 174.

⁴ Cd. 2028, p. 18.

an expression of its opinion should be obtained on the question of the importation of indentured Asiatic labour before any decision be adopted as to the expediency of putting the country to the expense and inconvenience of an emergency general election.¹

Some of the foregoing extracts will show how certain mine and landowners were convinced that no local solution of the labour difficulty was possible, and in this attitude they were vigorously supported by the Directorate of the Chartered Company. There is no advantage now in a discussion of the Chinese labour question; it is sufficient that the experiment ended in such a fiasco that to-day it hardly possesses a single disinterested apologist throughout South Africa.

To its credit the Chartered Company at once came to grips with the labour problem locally, perhaps at first not altogether willingly, but it pursued the most statesmanlike course, and in this matter set an example which might well be followed in other subtropical territories. The Company allowed itself to be guided very largely by its Native Commissioners, appointed with unerring instinct by Cecil Rhodes, who had realized that the first principle of successful control of natives lay in securing their confidence, and there are few territories under the dominion of Great Britain where natives have greater or more merited confidence in their Native Commissioners than in Rhodesia. But the Company did not stop there; the Directors assisted in the creation of a Labour Bureau, and found nearly half the initial capital required; they took other steps less defensible, and which were ultimately abandoned. It is quite true that the Bureau was not at first a success, and

¹ Cd. 2028, p. 19.

equally true that it may soon become superfluous, but this does not lessen the important service it has rendered and will yet render.

The greatest problem of labour supply is that of setting up and then maintaining the "current" until the flow of labour is assured, and in that work the Labour Bureau has played, to say the least, the principal part. The Rhodesian Labour Bureau in its present form commenced working nearly four years ago with a capital of £74,000, of which the Chartered Company's Directors found £36,000. It was early laid down that the labour should be impartially supplied to satisfy as far as possible the demand. The Bureau since its original inception has supplied to employers some 125,000 labourers; it does not claim more. It is, however, clear that its work has not ended there, for it has linked the local supply of the kraals to the areas of demand in a manner which will probably lead to a sustained supply of free labour—a result well worth the expenditure and labour involved.

The labour situation in Rhodesia is well set forth in the 1915 report of Mr. Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner :

The supply during the year shows an appreciable increase, the average number of natives in employment at any stated time being 81,010, an increase of 7,821. At certain periods of the year the supply was in excess of the demand, and at no time could it be said that any real shortage existed. Numerous instances occurred where boys came from long distances to look for work, and, failing to find employment in Rhodesia, many proceeded to the Rand and elsewhere.¹

The future of the labour supply is even more promising, as a glance at the map will demon-

¹ *South Africa*, July 10, 1915.

strate. Southern Rhodesia has a great reservoir of labour in the Portuguese territories to the East, whilst both Northern and Southern Rhodesia lie right across the main routes to Central Africa; to the South-East there are the extensive territories of the Bamangwato and kindred tribes, and it is not too much to say that with regard to the labour question Rhodesia is geographically more fortunately situated than almost any other territory in the African continent. From the labour standpoint, therefore, Rhodesia should prove relatively attractive to the prospective settler.

THE COST OF LIVING

WHATEVER the prospects in Rhodesia, be they agriculture, ranching, trading or mining, they must inevitably turn very largely on the cost of living; no man looking for a colonial future will take the final step without giving very full consideration to the many items involved in the general title "cost of living." The prospective settler will desire to know what rent he must pay for a house, or, if he build his own, what will be the cost of material. He will also wish to know transport and rail charges. His fair partner will ask practical questions about the price of beef and mutton, flour and soap, and if she is at all far-sighted the inevitable fees for nursing and medical attention; whilst she ought not to overlook the dangers to domestic bliss which always attend colonization in areas where native women compete in the "attractions" of white men. Both partners will make careful enquiries into that bugbear of modern civilization, rates and taxes.

Fortunately the most complete and authoritative information is available upon the pre-war cost of living. The constant criticism upon this subject in Rhodesia led the Company's Administrator to set up a Commission in 1912 to study the whole question and report. There were four members of the Commission and a secretary. The terms of reference covered a

wide range of subjects, including prime and ultimate cost, transport, the credit system, and local wages. The report of this Commission is one of the clearest and best tabulated Government documents published by the Chartered Company, and the facts for this chapter are mainly drawn from its pages. The effect of the war has been the same in Rhodesia as elsewhere, namely, prices have generally appreciated by something over 100 per cent.

Rhodesians, being Britishers, almost to a man lay full claim to the national prerogative of "grumbling," and upon the initial question of high rents Rhodesians wax furiously eloquent. It was only the very few and fortunate who before 1914 could get a house in Rhodesia, and a very tiny one too, for £5 per month; even then this would not have more than three rooms and a kitchen. For a married couple with a small family four rooms and a kitchen provide the minimum accommodation, and for this cottage they would have to pay from £120 to £140 per annum. A similar cottage in English country districts could be obtained prior to the war from £15 to £20, exclusive of rates. The Rhodesian Commission in its report pointed out that authorities on domestic economy hold that a rent charge should not absorb more than one-eighth of a man's total income, and that in some European countries it often amounts to less than that proportion.

In Rhodesia, says this Commission, a working man whose average earnings do not exceed £25 a month is fortunate if he obtains a cottage at £5 a month, and his proportion for rent is at least one-fifth of his income, and in most cases more—sometimes more than a third.¹

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 14.

There is, of course, the alternative of building a house, which has its advantages, but many settlers when arriving in Rhodesia are by no means certain that they will stay long in any given place. Supposing a man is unwilling to pay continuously a high rent and decides to build, he is confronted at once with the high cost of a site, because most of the suitable land is held for speculative purposes by one of the Trusts. As a leading official in Salisbury remarked to the Commission :

I think that the cost of living in a town is increased all round by reason of the fact that a large number of stands are held by companies who will not disgorge under a certain figure.¹

Another witness gave the high cost of sites as one of the principal causes of the high rents :

. . . the first cause of the high rent is the abnormal cost of the stand. You take a stand in Cape Avenue. It would cost £400. That is not a fair value. Reckoned at 8 per cent. (the normal rate of interest) it makes the rent about £3 per month before starting building.²

It is not merely the cost of sites which acts as a deterrent to house building, and thereby raises so enormously the rentals; the cost of materials was also extremely heavy before the war, and well nigh prohibitive now. Rhodesia itself possesses a very limited supply of timber suitable for building purposes, consequently most of it has to be imported overland, and yet again from oversea sources. How seriously this increases the home cost will be gathered from the following schedule of figures of material for a large

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 15.

² Ibid.

building at the Portuguese port of entry—
Beira.

			Pre-War Home Cost.			Pre-War Cost at Beira.		
			£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Flooring	201	4	1	358	18	10
Ceiling boards	88	3	10	149	14	4
Deals	723	10	6	1,282	1	11
Scantlings	90	9	10	170	8	0
Shelving	31	15	11	50	16	11
Clear pine	35	4	7	47	15	10
			<hr/>			<hr/>		
			£1,170 8 9			£2,059 15 10		
Iron 24G	£345	11	8	£479	10	8

But this is not all; these materials are even then only about half way along the economic road to Rhodesia, and to the above prices must be added railway and other charges, which absorb a very large part of the cost of building a house. In order to obtain exact data for this branch of its enquiry the Committee on the cost of living asked for a specification and quantities for a £900 cottage:

The specification was then handed to a firm of importers, who quoted £343 10s. 10d. as the selling price of the material in Bulawayo, and stated that the railage included therein amounted to £110 14s. 10d. This confirms the Salisbury architect's estimate of 38 per cent. as the proportion of imported material to total cost of house, and indicates that the proportion of railage to total cost of such a house is about 12 per cent.

Presumably the remainder was absorbed by labour and sundries. In the same report it is shown that the average cost of a four-roomed cottage at pre-war rate was about £915, and this would bear a rental value of £120 per annum.

Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 17.

It is not merely the cost of materials which enhances that of building, it is also the labour problem. Compared with Europe the wages of the white artizan in Rhodesia are very high. Bricklayers, carpenters and masons could even before the war command from £6 to £10 a week ; according to the European standard this seems an extraordinarily high rate of wages, but compared with the general cost of living it is doubtful whether a wage of, say, £7 a week has a greater purchasing power than two guineas in England. Cheaper labour, and good labour too, can be had from trained coloured men, but the colour antagonism so characteristic of the Rand is equally powerful in Rhodesia, as the following evidence shows :

One witness in Salisbury gave evidence of his attempt to build a cottage outside the town with the aid of trained natives, many of whom came down from north of the Zambesi. Having the stone on his own ground, the witness made a contract with some of these natives to put up a house for him, and had he not been interfered with, he would have had a remarkably cheap house. As, however, the house was nearing completion, he was visited by some of his customers in Salisbury, customers who were working men, and was told that if he liked to employ trained natives to do his building for him he could go to trained natives to sell his goods. He made his peace by dismissing the natives, and employing white men to finish the house.¹

There is one guiding fact which the prospective settler must bear in mind with regard to the cost of those three principal items of provision—fruit, corn and meat. It is that at present local supplies cannot be relied upon to provide a daily fare cheaper than the home markets. If a man goes to Rhodesia in the hope of buying in a cheap local market he will be grievously

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 20.

disappointed. Rhodesia is probably now, and for some years to come, the most expensive place in the British Colonies, if not in the whole world, in which to live.

The fourpenny family loaf of normal times in England was in most parts of Southern Rhodesia 8d. to 1s., the price varying considerably according to area; for example, a 2-lb. loaf in Salisbury cost a fraction under 1s., whereas in the Umtali district one witness declared that the charge for a 14-oz. loaf of bread was 9d., or nearly 1s. 9d. for the household loaf, which at that time sold in London at fourpence. The cost now has, of course, increased proportionately.

Those who have studied at all carefully the literature of the Chartered Company upon ranching prospects would expect to find that meat at least would be cheap, but European cuts could not be purchased anywhere in Rhodesia under 10d. per lb. in 1914, and that even for meat which cannot be called first quality, whilst 1s. was the ordinary rate for steak and sirloin cuts. The cost of mutton is greatly increased by railage, for most of this is imported from the South; moreover, the loss of flesh in transit has also to be taken into consideration. One butcher giving evidence said:

It always takes six to seven days from Kimberley, and the shrinkage in weight is very great owing to the long detention—the cost of railage is over 2d. per lb. Each sheep costs us 5s. 7d. for railage. Thus, as the Committee on the cost of living points out, the average price for mutton seems to be 1s. per lb.¹

Dairy produce varies considerably with the

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 42.

seasons. Sometimes milk can be purchased in Salisbury as cheaply as in London, but the average price of eggs was only a fraction under 3s. per dozen when they were 14 for 1s. in London. Fresh butter is never either plentiful or cheap, and sometimes is so prohibitive that recourse is had to tinned supplies. It is very seldom that fresh butter can be purchased under 5s. a pound. The larger part of Rhodesia's butter supply comes from Cape Colony. If Rhodesia can make good cheese, and this does not appear in doubt, there is surely no reason why good butter should not also be made in sufficient quantities to at least supply local needs. Bacon and poultry are both expensive, and the former barely eatable, while fowls commanded 4s. to 5s. each when similar birds could be purchased in London for 2s. 6d. each.

Market gardening in Southern Rhodesia, as in most African colonies, is almost entirely in the hands of Asiatics, either Chinese or British Indians. Both make excellent gardeners, and raise more successfully than the whites almost every vegetable with which we in the homeland are familiar, but the housewife has to pay, and pay heavily—peas, 9d. to 1s. per lb.; cauliflower, 1s. to 5s. each; the homely cabbages, we are naïvely told, "seldom go higher than 1s." A married official put down 15s. a month for vegetables, and even with this said "he had practically to go without them." This civil servant added that "a few weeks ago he paid 7s. 6d. for three cabbages"!

The Commonwealth of Australia is admittedly well up in the world's scale of the cost of living. Comparing the principal items of monthly expenditure per person of that Colony with

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Rhodesia prior to the war, one gets the following illuminating table :

				Pre-war Australia.			Pre-war Rhodesia.		
				£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Food	1	1	2	3	15	6
Housing	0	10	0	1	10	0
Clothing	0	10	6	1	4	0
Fuel and light	0	2	6½	0	6	1½
				£2 4 2½			£6 15 7½		

But there are other expenses in Rhodesia which eat into the banking account of the settler ; he may not drink too much, but he must drink something, for Rhodesia is indeed a dry and thirsty land. Whatever the colonist drinks it will cost money, and big money too. The Committee on the cost of living tells us that the liquor bill per male adult averages over £50 per annum, or but a fraction less than £1 a week. This figure is alarming, but the spirit consumption confirms it, for Rhodesians appear to drink in quantity more spirits than the inhabitants of any other part of the world. The following are the figures of principal countries :

				Gallons of spirits consumed <i>per cap</i> ;
South Africa 0·36
United Kingdom 0·70
United States of America 1·14
Denmark 2·16
Southern Rhodesia 4·42

It is useless to consider the colonization of any territory unless it is capable of family life, and therefore every settler going forth to Rhodesia to seek his fortune should contemplate the responsibility of taking to himself a wife and bringing up children. No decent minded Englishman will deliberately commit himself

permanently to the mode of life which too largely obtains in Rhodesia to-day, but this it can at least be hoped is a temporary evil. Nevertheless the family man has two inevitable and extremely heavy items of expenditure, education and medical attendance.

Medical attendance spells doctors' and nurses' fees, and in a country with the climatic conditions of Southern Rhodesia these are certain to be a frequent, perhaps heavy, charge, much heavier if the patient elects to be treated in his own home instead of going into the hospital. For working men the cost of an illness frequently spells ruin. One employer of labour made the following statement to the Commission on the cost of living :

One of my men had typhoid, and his bill came roughly to £100. I made enquiries, and found that pretty well every man who goes to the hospital with such a disease as typhoid finds his cost is about £100.¹

That bill was for the man himself. He may, of course, have been a single man without parental responsibility, but the plight of married men with children, who are naturally prone to sickness in Rhodesia, was put by one such parent :

The thing that strikes me most is the abnormal cost of sickness in addition to the rent. In March 1910, my baby got malaria and had to go into hospital, and my wife got sick through nursing him. Afterwards I had to send them to Marandellas to try and recuperate. . . . My wife was again sick and my baby got whooping cough. I sent them to Beira in June, and my baby died of dysentery. I calculate those three months cost me anything between £150 and £200.²

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 53.

² Ibid. p. 54.

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Perhaps the gravest statements were made with regard to the birth of children. One witness declared that

many have come to the conclusion that it is financially a dangerous matter to have children in Rhodesia, and I should say the idea is bound to affect the birth-rate.¹

Apparently the lowest cost (on a pre-war basis) involved by the birth of a child into a workman's family is as follows:

	£	s.	d.
Doctor	10	10	0
Waiting at hostel	4	4	0
Confinement and recovery..	10	10	0
Cab fares	0	10	0
Child's outfit	2	10	0
Laundry	0	10	0
	<hr/>		
	£28	14	0 ²

The Committee, not without some courage, point out that:

The estimates given of the cost of the birth of a child vary from about £20 to £50, but it may be said that about £30 would be the average cost. When this sum is compared to the pay of the working man or clerk or salesman, it can be understood that to many a family the birth of a child should be looked upon as a calamity. The cost is calculated to deter men from marriage, and married men from paternity. It is an event which, under present conditions, will probably load a family with debt which it cannot throw off for years.³

That this position gravely imperils the future of Rhodesia is shown by other sections of the report. It seems clear that nearly one-third of the married men find it cheaper to keep their wives and families somewhere outside Rhodesia

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 55.

² Ibid. p. 52.

³ Ibid. p. 57.

—either in Natal or Cape Colony. One witness said :

I found that when my wife was at home in England I could save more money than when she was keeping a house here. I was sending her £10 a month, and after allowing for that I was in pocket.

Another witness said :

I do not think this is a country for a married man ; it is far cheaper for my wife to live at home and for me to send her a certain sum each month. That would pay me better than keeping a house out here . . . there are, of course, a considerable number of married people of small means who can manage it—people who are good housekeepers, who can practise a life of self-denial, whose business in life, next to making a living, is a serious and protracted struggle to keep within their incomes.¹

It is no use shutting our eyes to the realities to which this evil is certain to lead, and unless the situation is changed rapidly it must spell disaster to colonization in Rhodesia. The import of the following evidence clearly demonstrates this :

Quite a number of families have gone this year. I know many instances where they have gone to the coast or home, owing to the cost of living here.

This was the evidence of the Salvation Army officer at Salisbury. The effect on the men is bad in every way. "Prostitution in Salisbury," said one witness, "is an abnormal evil, owing to men sending their families away."²

The local discussion upon the cost of living is generally met by the "high wages" argument. It is admitted that the cost of living would

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 68.

² Ibid. p. 69.

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even in war periods alarm the Britisher in the homeland, but it is contended that wages are enormously higher in Rhodesia. All this is perfectly true, but the real question to answer is, what purchasing power has the sovereign? We know very well that three sovereigns in Rhodesia have less purchasing power than one sovereign in England in so far as provisions alone are concerned, and in other respects it has still less value. The pre-war rate of wages was as follows for the principal branches of the wage-earning community :

Clerks	£350 to £450 per annum.
Carpenters (300 days)	£350 to £400 " "
Bricklayers	£400 to £450 " "
Plasterers	£400 to £450 " "
Civil servants	from £210 " "

The Committee on the cost of living quote groups of family income and expenditure in seven principal districts of Southern Rhodesia, and these are as follows :

		Pre-war monthly income.			Pre-war monthly expenditure.		
		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Bulawayo, No. 1	30	0	0	33	18	6
" No. 2	30	0	0	30	10	2
Salisbury, No. 1	21	10	0	23	1	6
" No. 2	22	10	0	20	0	3
" No. 3	27	10	0	29	6	8
Charter, No. 1	20	0	0	17	7	3
" No. 2	26	6	8	33	7	5
Melsetter, No. 1				13	3	9
Umtali, No. 1	30	0	0	29	2	0
Gwelo, No 1	40	0	0	46	13	8
Victoria, No. 1				29	6	0

It will be observed that in three cases only was the family able, and then only barely, to

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, pp. 10 and 11.

cover expenditure by income; indeed it is obvious that in those instances where expenditure was covered, there was some fortunate circumstance, such as the absence of illness, the possession of an exceptionally cheap house, or private financial assistance. The Committee in a concluding paragraph on this section make the following serious comment upon these family budgets:

Witnesses who submitted budgets showing an excess of expenditure explained in some cases that they had private means, or were helped by friends, or were drawing upon reserves, or were getting into debt, and in some cases that they had sent their families away in order to save. Some were determined to continue the struggle in the hope of improved conditions, some found the harness on them and had to go on pulling, while others await events and lead bachelor lives. The figures go to show that it is more than difficult for a married man of limited means to maintain his family in comfort in townships of Rhodesia, to provide for sickness, maternity and other contingencies, and to put aside something for the future.¹

The experiences of some families in Rhodesia as told in their own language is distressing in the extreme; many are given in the report under consideration. The burden falls with exceptional incidence upon the married and very hard-working civil servants of the Chartered Company. A selection of four cases only make painful reading. Of these two are officials and two railway employees. No. 1, an official,

has four children, and his pay is £32 10s. a month. They make their own bread; he runs no butcher's account, but buys meat as he wants it and has the money for it. He has three rooms and a kitchen for himself, his wife, and four children, and he pays £7 a month for the cottage. His expenses for the month were £39 2s. 6d., and he lives by the help of his friends.

¹ Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, p. 11.

No. 2, also an official :

His pay is £27 15s. 6d. per month. He has a wife and two children. He had some money and bought a house, keeps his own fowls, grows his own vegetables, makes his own bread, and spends over £37 per month. He is experimenting in growing vegetables with the aid of native boys, and will no doubt come to the conclusion that it is cheaper to buy, or stint the family. His only remedy, so far as he can see, "is to quit," so he says, and there was nothing in his household expenditure to indicate extravagance.

No. 3, a railwayman :

His pay was £19 per month, and his expenses £22 19s. 7d. He has savings, and is drawing upon them.¹

No. 4, also a railwayman :

His pay is also £19 a month, and he has a wife and four children. "You are living on your salary?" "Yes, but by stinting. We never have eggs or bacon."²

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the high cost of living is Rhodesia's most serious handicap. It is no consolation now to say that salaries and wages have increased, because the cost of living has followed a steep ascent. The hard fact remains that at present Rhodesia is probably the most expensive colony in which to live. The "household budgets" quoted from the Chartered Company's own report are by no means exceptional, whilst if the conditions are examined amongst the poorer classes of the farming community there is a measure of privation and hardship which to the farming community of the homeland would be incredible. In most

¹ Some housing advantage is generally given to railwaymen.

² Report on Cost of Living in Rhodesia, pp. 68-69.

of Britain's colonies there is something cheap, either fruit, vegetables, dairy produce or meat; in Rhodesia nothing is cheap. This chapter has not been based upon items in household economy which are exceptionally dear, everything is alike. Cabbages are quoted at their lowest at 1s. each; bread at its lowest 200 per cent. dearer than the normal price in London; rent one-third of a man's income; a single illness of typhoid costing £100, and the birth of a child "a calamity;" whilst 135s. in Rhodesia is shown to have only the same purchasing power as 44s. in Australia. No "settler" should go to Rhodesia without reading from beginning to end the Chartered Company's official report on the cost of living.

The cost of living, whilst it remains at this abnormal standard, must tend to divert from Rhodesia the stream of white emigration to other Colonies, where it is possible to colonize, that is, to colonize in the sense that it does permit of the normal family life of the homeland. It is useless to close eye and ear to the testimony of witness after witness upon the evil of emigrants living apart from their families, or refusing to bring white partners with them. None but madmen could deliberately blind themselves to the evils which promiscuous and irregular cohabitation with native women must bring upon both races, whether the practice is viewed from the social, moral or political standpoint. It is, moreover, obvious that common justice will demand that the children of these white fathers cannot be permanently relegated to the squalor of certain miserable areas of these sub-tropical regions. The day is coming, more rapidly than many care to admit, when the rising generation will say to the white race:

"Your freedom with *our* daughters must carry with it social and political freedom for the children you beget." Can the justice of this demand be denied?

The greatest factor in the solution of this problem is that of a reduction in the cost of living, and there is very little hope of such a solution until Rhodesia has been given a permanent government representing the people. With such settled government confidence would be restored. With the restoration of confidence would come an influx of colonials, with such influx would come a flow of capital and the reduction of the rate of interest (industry cannot progress with normal interest ranging from 8 per cent. to 10 per cent.). There would also be the further happy development in that settled government would lead to the removal of that bane of Rhodesian administration—the intermixture of commerce with government. Given the foregoing conditions the cost of living in Rhodesia would probably fall to figures approximating to those of the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth.

THE NATIVE—AN INDUSTRIAL UNIT

THE native inhabitant of Rhodesia is the greatest asset of the country, for without him there can be no successful farming upon the land, neither can the gold be won from beneath the soil. The value of the land of Rhodesia will rise or fall in future years according to the rise and fall in the density of the native population.

It is not going too far to say that in Rhodesia even more than in the Union territories the economic stability of the country reposes ultimately upon the administration securing a contented and an ever-increasing native population. The supreme importance of the native question in South Africa received striking emphasis when General Botha added to his onerous responsibility of Premiership that of Minister for Native Affairs, but Rhodesia is 1,500 miles nearer the Equator than Cape Town, and over 600 miles nearer than Johannesburg, whilst the altitude of Rhodesia is nearly 1,500 feet lower than the Rand. What does this mean in practice? It means that Rhodesia comes so far within the sub-tropical zone and so near to the tropics that coloured and not white labour must provide the human machinery for the maintenance and expansion of industry.

It is to the credit of Rhodesians that they are recognizing the immense importance of the

native to them and to their welfare; in very few African territories is the fact so clearly grasped as in Rhodesia that the native question is the major proof problem, and especially is this true of the Native Affairs Department. There is one feature of the Chartered Company's administration for which it has few peers, namely, the excellence of its publications, in which, dealing with native affairs, nothing could be more exhaustive or more excellently tabulated than the Company's reports upon native questions, the greatest of all its problems. Amongst the best and clearest of these is the report of a Native Affairs Committee appointed in 1911 by the then Administrator, Sir William Milton, which Committee recognized in its report the fundamental fact that Rhodesia's industrial development depends upon the indigenous native.

The Committee regard the question of the labour supply from the indigenous population as one of the most important of Rhodesian problems, and, from an industrial point of view, they believe that the future of the country depends upon a satisfactory solution of it. And again: . . . The Committee realize that ultimately the European community must depend almost wholly on the indigenous population.¹

Intending settlers should take particular note of this emphatic declaration that the European community must depend almost wholly on the indigenous population. Such dependence upon the black man implies, of course, that Rhodesia is sub-tropical, that the whole domestic industrial and social machinery must in the last resort evolve round the Matabele and Mashona—nurse, cook, horse boy, pit boy, and labourer. It

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 34.

means that food, shelter, clothing, banking account all repose upon that indigenous African, hence his dominating position in every calculation, and the necessity of a complete knowledge of his habits of thought and aspirations if settler and native are to extract by hand and brain from Mother Earth the wealth both beneath and upon the brown, rock-strewn soil of Southern Rhodesia.

The native population is composed to-day of the Matabele and of the so-called Mashona tribes, in reality the representatives of the once powerful Makaranga nation, which have for generations absorbed immigrant units from surrounding territories. There is also a small population composed of immigrant natives from different parts of South and East Africa, chiefly Fingoes, Zulus, Basutos and others, including even a few Somalis. The total estimated native population is 749,277, but this official estimate is generally regarded as being well within the mark. Some authorities, including the Chartered Company, put the number well over 800,000.

These 800,000 natives are popularly regarded even in Rhodesia as British subjects, and if you assert that this is not so, the Rhodesian will ask in surprise: "If they are not British subjects, what are they?" This, of course, is one of the anomalies of our somewhat loosely organized British Empire. Harshly stated, these 800,000 natives are politically aliens in their own country. They owe allegiance to no sovereign power. They possess no rights beyond what the Chartered Company cares to confer under the direction of the protecting sovereign. This fact is authoritatively set forth in the following sentence, which was incorporated

in a despatch from Sir Henry Loch to the Marquis of Ripon: "The natives of Mashonaland are not British subjects, or subjects of the British South Africa Company."

The Matabele were not included in this statement for reasons obvious from the context, but their political status is identical. As the cardinal qualification for the exercise of the franchise in Rhodesia is British citizenship, the indigenous native cannot apparently qualify under any circumstances whatsoever, be he ever so industrious. At present very few if any of the natives of the Zambesi valley appear to be sufficiently advanced for exercising the franchise, nor is there much prospect of their becoming so in the near future. There are, however, other "natives" in Rhodesia whose qualifications clearly entitle them to such right, and nothing should be done to close the door, a very narrow one, to such advance. The Committee on Native Affairs, as will be seen from the following passage, recommended the repeal of the existing law admitting natives to the franchise.

Only fifty-one natives are registered as voters in this territory, but there has been practically no change in the number since 1904, and that very few of those registered are indigenous.¹

Following upon this statement the Committee recommended:

- (1) That the present law admitting natives to the franchise for the election of members to the Legislature be repealed:
- (2) That the present condition of the native races in Southern Rhodesia does not necessitate the consideration of any measure for their popular representation.

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-II, p. 25.

(3) That for the present, in any case, the representation of the native races in the Legislature will be sufficiently provided for by the inclusion in the Legislative Council of the Secretary for Native Affairs.

(4) That natives at present on the register be allowed to retain that privilege so long as they possess the necessary qualification.¹

When the Company's Directors appealed originally for a Royal Charter the strongest ground advanced in support of such appeal was that the civilization of the natives would be one of their main objects. They said :

The petitioners believe that if the said concessions, agreements, grants and treaties can be carried into effect, *the condition of the natives inhabiting the said territories will be materially improved and their civilization advanced.*²

Thus the natives of Rhodesia, after twenty-five years of "improvement" under Chartered Government rule, find themselves without nationality, without any voice in deciding either the general affairs of the territory or their own native questions, whilst by a claim doubly vicious they have lost their sacred and immemorial rights to the ownership of land, though under their beneficial occupation.

There prevail generally two absurd fallacies with regard to native races, particularly the African. The first of these is expressed in the hackneyed phrase "the lazy nigger," or its variant, "the damned nigger." The second fallacy is that the African is a vicious brute, so inured to crime and vice that special forms of punishment must be invented to secure his

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-II, p. 25.

² Ibid. (Italics mine.—J. H. H.)

evolution towards an industrial and law-abiding citizen. The natives of Southern Rhodesia are no exception to this prejudice, but happily the report of the Native Affairs Committee makes short work of such ignorance and folly.

It must first be admitted that contact with the white race, whilst it has done good in some directions, has in others led to the degeneration of the native races, a feature common to most other dependencies. The Committee's evidence upon this is emphatic.

From the evidence of many of the witnesses, it would appear that the natives have degenerated in some respects, and that contact with civilization has had a retrograde effect, especially in regard to sexual immorality.

The immorality of women, both married and single, in the vicinity of mines and other industrial centres, is a growing danger to the future welfare, both moral and physical, of the native races. It is alleged that husbands allow their women to take beer for sale to natives employed at these centres, that this leads to prostitution, and that the former share the proceeds of money so earned. It may be mentioned that prior to our rule prostitution was practically unknown amongst natives, as the punishment was so severe.¹

The statement that "prior to our rule prostitution was practically unknown" is as true of Rhodesia as of other parts of Africa. But the indictment of that single phrase is really tremendous. Vice and corruption, it plainly states, owe their origin to entrance of the white races. This allegation is supported by quite a different Committee, namely, the Committee upon the cost of living, which reported upon the prevalence of prostitution by and for the white men. It surely does not lie with the white races to

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 2.

denounce the Matabele and Mashonas for the vice and corruption for which responsibility rests much nearer home. Not only so, but facts are eloquent in support of those who point out where the responsibility rests, for the criminal statistics show that the so-called savage Matabele and the degenerate Mashonas are easily the most law-abiding section of the community. The figures alone are sufficiently impressive:

			Population.	1909 Criminal Prosecutions.	Percentage.
Indigenous Matabele and Mashona natives	697,000	5,997	0·8
Europeans	23,000 (est.)	1,813	7·9
Alien natives	42,000	5,942	14·1
Asiatics	1,000	146	14·6

The *convictions* were about 88 per cent., and the Committee comments upon the figures in so far as they affect Asiatics and natives:

The proportion of crime amongst aliens, as compared with indigenous natives, is remarkable, when the difference in the numbers of the two classes is considered.¹

But what is infinitely more remarkable in the light of the flippancy with which crime is laid at the door of the natives is the arresting fact that prosecution of natives are only 0·8 as compared with 7·9 amongst the whites.

That these tribes are not only law-abiding but industrious, was also clearly established by the evidence; the Committee thus state and dispose of the popular prejudice:

It is frequently urged that native males lead an idle life at their kraals. This is not borne out by the evidence which

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 13.

we have received. On the contrary, they appear to do the bulk of the heavy work, and the woman is not the slave which she is so frequently alleged to be.¹

This allegation of idleness is further considered and then vigorously and authoritatively dealt with in an appendix to the Report of the Native Affairs Committee, under the signature of all the leading Native Commissioners of the territory, who say :

It is a commonly made statement that most of the male natives of Southern Rhodesia do no work at all, and if left to their own inclinations, lead a lotus-eating existence in their village, while their womenkind perform the manual drudgery required to keep them supplied with the necessaries of life. It is argued that the native, unless engaged in working for a white master, is a useless member of the community.

We submit that the time has arrived for this fallacy to be once and for all exposed.²

The Native Commissioners then proceed to demonstrate this particular fallacy by pointing out that the native is an agriculturist and stock breeder, and that his products form "an important factor in the commercial output of the country." Around his own kraal the native prepares the land, harvests, threshes, and transports his produce to the market. To the man also falls the task of hut building, with the exception of grass cutting and plastering. The grain produced by the natives in one year was estimated at over 2,000,000 bags, and the value of their cattle at the low average of £3 per head works out at £600,000. These Native Commissioners then pertinently ask :

Do those who press for compelling all natives to work for

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1909-11, p. 3.

² Ibid. p. 51.

European employers realize what would be the economic result of withdrawing them from their agricultural and pastoral industries ?¹

But the natives, so far from leading the "lotus-eating lives" which interested motives or prejudice depict, do not, of course, limit their activities to indigenous industry. They supply a large and continuous labour force to the white industry of winning gold.

The South African Native Affairs Commission of 1905 reported that to satisfy the requirements of Southern Rhodesia at that day 25,000 labourers were necessary, but this total was apparently short by nearly 10,000. Five years later, 1910, the native labour force employed on the mines alone was over 37,000, and of these nearly 13,000 were drawn from local tribes. But if we take conditions another five years later, we find an extraordinary increase in the labour supply. Mr. Taylor, the chief Native Commissioner, in his report for 1915 says :

The supply of native labour during the year showed an appreciable increase over last year, the average number of natives in employment at any stated time being 81,010, an increase of 7,821. Those employed in work connected with and incidental to the mining industry averaged 35,946, and for other than mining purposes the average number employed was 45,064. At certain periods of the year the supply was in excess of the demand, and at no time could it be said that any real shortage existed ; on the other hand, I have noticed with regret numerous instances where boys coming from long distances to look for work failed to find employment, with the result that many of them proceeded to the Rand and elsewhere.²

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 51.

² Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for 1914, p. 4.

Mr. Taylor attributes this remarkable increase in the labour supply to improved conditions of employment, and says with truth that "a contented native is the best recruiting agent." But the reports of the Native Commissioners themselves impress the reader with the fact that no little credit is due to the staff of civil servants that the Chartered Company has been able to secure to watch over native affairs. If this impression is gathered from the annual reports, a visit to Rhodesia deepens that impression into one of settled conviction.

That the native of Rhodesia, as in every other part of the African Continent, is capable of rising rapidly in the scale of civilization is also evidenced by his ability to improve his agricultural methods and the readiness with which he absorbs a working knowledge of skilled trades :

In Matabeleland alone over 2,000 ploughs have been acquired by natives. Oxen are being broken to the yoke, and are used for ploughing and transport. A number of natives have purchased wagons, carts, etc.; some are investing in corn crushers; European articles of clothing are fast replacing the skins of animals; enamel plates, cups, etc., are largely used. Some natives are improving their stock by using better bulls and rams.¹

Amongst the young people there is, as in Uganda, a craving for educational facilities which present resources seem hardly able to satisfy. The Committee, drawing attention to this, observes :

Of the natives there is evidence that their ambition is largely to be able to read and write, and thereby to carry on correspondence with their own people. Trivial and unimportant as this may seem to be, the Committee nevertheless recognize in it many influences for good. In

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 3.

its crudest form it provides a means of gaining or conveying news of home and work, which may well induce a longer and more contented period of employment. In a higher form it is a definite and important stage on the road of civilization and progress. . . .

There are some who would keep him the raw untutored menial, but there was gratifying proof in plenty of the realization that in this country our own development is so closely interwoven with that of the native that it is vital for our own interests, as well as for his, that he be mentally raised and encouraged to improve himself.¹

In the Report upon Native Affairs the Committee drew attention to the immigration of natives, chiefly from Nyassaland, who have been trained as skilled workers in the building, saddlery, boot repairing, and other trades. It is pointed out, however, that serious opposition prevails against the training and employment of natives for skilled tasks, because it is quite bluntly admitted that the native would compete with white men! In spite of this local attitude the Committee considered "It would be extremely difficult, if not unfair, to limit the extent of training which labourers so employed should be permitted to acquire."²

It is not in Rhodesia alone that this objectionable feature of native industry obtains. It is becoming a marked feature of the Rand, and is already causing ever-increasing anxiety amongst careful observers. The Rhodesian Committee, however, seem to have no great uneasiness, for they say in their report:

The Committee are convinced that, in the end, economic considerations will prevail, and that the rougher and less skilled work will be assigned to natives, but that where quality of workmanship is a material point, the superiority of the white man will assert itself.³

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 12.

² Ibid. p. 14.

³ Ibid. p. 15.

The care of the native population throughout Southern Rhodesia is under a staff of commissioners, whose chief, Mr. J. G. Taylor, resides at the capital—Salisbury. At present there are no native councils, and the natives, even the more influential chiefs, have no voice in framing ordinances or in the legislation for regulating native affairs.

The activity of the native population is further circumscribed by the pass laws, which, however necessary they may be for the mass of the population, press heavily upon many a native, and impose not a little indignity upon the chiefs of all the tribes. How heavily this bears upon some of the people is shown by the following passage :

... many objections were submitted with regard to the visiting and labour passes, especially the former. It is undeniable that at present very great hardship is imposed upon those who desire to observe the requirements of the law. For instance, it was shown that a native might have to travel over 200 miles to get a pass to go a few miles. The Government has endeavoured to prevent hardship in such cases by instructing Native Commissioners "not to press charges against indigenous natives found travelling without a pass beyond the limits of their own districts unless satisfied that the law was being evaded for some wrongful purpose." This relaxation of the law does not seem entirely to meet the circumstances, as a Native Department official informed the Committee that the pass laws are regularly contravened; another felt sure that many natives do not observe the pass laws where they are absolutely unreasonable; and another was of opinion that the police should not prosecute for contraventions of the pass law except on the direction of the Native Department, and that he knew an appreciable number of cases which should not have been prosecuted.¹

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 22.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to depict to some extent the moral, social and industrial condition of some 800,000 Matabele and Mashona. It shows them in a very different light, somewhat different from that to which the public was accustomed twenty years ago. With the lapse of time has come a truer perspective, and instead of savage Matabele incapable of steady industry, we see them as the most law-abiding and industrious section of the community, and this upon the unanimous testimony of a body of local white men. But the picture also shows those natives living in a land in which, whilst they have privileges, they have few, if any, rights of citizenship. True, they may not, as some assert, feel to-day the indignity of being Gibeonites in the land of their fathers, but the day is coming when they will not only feel it, but when they will demand, and that rightly, a larger share in the management of their own tribal affairs and a recognition of their just rights, and it should be the white man's responsibility, no less than his privilege, as it will be to his own advantage, to accord those rights step by step as this native population advances along the path of social and economic progress.

The question of native land tenure affects the white immigrants no whit less than the native himself. The increase of native population, so vital to the very existence of the European, depends upon an adequate and secure tenure of land, and without such increase of population European industry is immobilized. The native in Rhodesia bears, as we shall see, a very large, if not the largest, share of the taxation of the country. The extent to which he is able to bear this burden depends upon

the land he occupies and the security of the title ; the landless African perishes both economically and physically. Thus in two respects, both of them in the material interests of the white settlers, adequate and secure land tenure for the natives is an essential element in the welfare of the entire community.

The advent of the British South Africa Company in the Zambesi valley brought with it for the natives two convulsive features entirely foreign to native conception : (a) private property in land, (b) direct taxation. Both these are products of civilization upon the merits or demerits of which European opinion is sharply divided ; to the native of Africa, whose mind is normally conservative, both are utterly bad—at least for the African himself.

Prior to the imposition of this European system of land tenure the natives, as we have seen, regarded tribal ownership of land not merely as a title, but one of the most sacred rights of human society. For good or evil the Chartered Company has almost destroyed that native system, and substituted for it not merely a system of private ownership for every unit in the state, nor merely a commercial ownership for every such unit, but as a first step confiscation of all indigenous rights.

The natives thus dispossessed of their rights are now permitted to live in the country under the following "tenures" :

- (a) Communal, in Reserves.
- (b) Communal, on land controlled by the British South Africa Company's administration, described generally as unalienated land.
- (c) On private farms as rent-paying tenants.

It seems from all the published evidence

available that only two natives of the original tribes possess ownership of any land at all, and these two Matabele apparently purchased their land from the Chartered Company, either at first or second hand. The securest title open to the natives is that of the Reserves, but it was claimed that the commercial ownership even of these "Reserves" was vested somehow in the Chartered Company! The claim to the commercial ownership of the Reserved Land was apparently advanced before the Judicial Committee by the Company in virtue of the Order in Council dated September 10, 1894, and the High Commissioner's Proclamation of July 1, 1902, whereby the land of Rhodesia was conditionally vested in the British South Africa Company.

It has been argued that, because neither the Reserves nor any portion of them can be alienated by the Company without the sanction of the Imperial authorities, the natives are therefore secure. This argument overlooks, first, that if good cause can be shown portions of the Reserves can be alienated. A "good cause" can almost always be shown when there is only one articulate party to such a case! Nor is this all, for efforts are constantly being made to vary the size and position of the Reserves. No less important a person than the Surveyor-General of the Chartered Company wrote as follows in 1911:

I believe that Reserves contain land which is not used, and not desired, by natives, but which might be used for other purposes. And it seems quite probable that many Reserves could, with general advantage, be altered in position and shape, or, in parts, absolute relocation. For this reason, and the fact that, in my opinion, many

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Reserves should be reduced in area, I do not think it is an opportune time to generally beacon the Reserves.¹

There is in some quarters the strongest disagreement with this opinion, but this single sentence shows how utterly insecure is the native tenure even of the Reserve areas upon which he is supposed to be safe. The total Reserve areas are approximately 22,000,000 acres, or about one-fourth of the territory, and are occupied by some 400,000 natives, or just over one-half of the entire indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia.

The following Schedule gives at a glance the native Reserve areas of Africa south of the Zambesi, and from this it will be seen that the acreage of the Rhodesian natives on the Reserves as at present allotted is 30·49 *per caput* :

Country	Area of Native Reserves (Acres)	Total Native Population	Population on Reserves	Acres (on Reserves) per head of population	Acres (on Reserves) per head of population now therein
Basutoland ...	6,587,520	400,058	400,058	16·4	16·4
Swaziland ...	1,601,179	108,733	84,000	14·7	19
Bechuanaland Protectorate	56,640,000	123,303	117,000	459	484
Pondoland ...	12,608,050	1,519,939	1,145,645	8·3	11
Transkei ...					
Remainder of Cape Province	3,905,610	214,969	430,528	6·6	14·7
Zululand... ..	2,425,698	738,429			
Remainder of Natal Province	1,861,026	1,219,845	436,846	1·5	4·2
Transvaal Province ...	156,750	325,824	69,184	0·5	2·3
Orange Free State Province	21,732,222	712,783	400,000	30·49	54
Southern Rhodesia ...					

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 59.

As we have seen, the Surveyor-General holds that the area of the Reserves is more than ample for native requirements. Many missionaries who know the country and the people well are strongly opposed to this view ; and in this attitude they are authoritatively supported by several Commissioners. The Committee upon Native Affairs, in its comment upon the position adopted by the Surveyor-General, says :

... The testimony of the Native Department officials is substantially against him (the Surveyor-General). They point out that in certain Reserves a large portion of the soil is poor, that water is deficient, and that certain localities are wholly unsuitable for human occupation.¹

This condition of affairs applies to only half the population. What happens to-day, and what is to happen to-morrow, to the other half? There is little room for them on the Reserves even if the tenure were secure ; and herein lies one of the most amazing features of Chartered Company rule—the remaining natives, numbering over 400,000, *pay tribute to private interests for the privilege of living in their own country.*

This has no relation whatever to administrative taxation, but is "rent" which finds its way largely into the pockets of individual settlers, and hitherto into the commercial account of the Chartered Company. It is estimated that the Chartered Company has derived many thousands of pounds every year from this source ! This is not merely the allegation of the occasional traveller through Rhodesia. It is a well-known public fact, for which there is ample confirmation in the Chartered Company's literature. The

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 11, par. 73.

Committee upon Native Affairs says with regard to natives occupying the so-called unalienated land (land in dispute): "All adult able-bodied males have to pay £1 per annum rent, which goes to the commercial side of the British South Africa Company." The native population on "unalienated" lands, who have hitherto paid rent into the commercial coffers of the Chartered Company, is given as 113,875.

The unenviable position of these natives is set forth in the following passage in the Native Affairs Committee Report of 1910-11:

... The occupation of land by natives is merely a passing phase; the land is being rapidly acquired by settlers with whom the natives must enter into fresh agreements or leave. We consider, too, that it would be a very short-sighted policy to remove these natives to Reserves, as their services may be of great value to future European occupants.¹

Another 160,274 natives live on land which is described as *alienated*, that is, land which has been given away or sold, with its original native occupants, or land without original inhabitants now occupied by certain natives, chiefly, however, the former. Native occupants on these lands pay to farmers, traders and missionaries "rent of from 10s. to 40s. per male adult; and in some cases an extra 10s. for each polygamous wife."²

The natives throughout Southern Rhodesia are also subject to direct and indirect taxation, whilst the native population until the outbreak of the war paid the entire direct taxation of the country. The taxable age appears to be eighteen years, although it must be very

¹ Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 10, par. 71.

² Ibid. par. 61.

difficult to establish this standard. Moreover, it is recommended that the age be reduced to fifteen years. The first tax imposed was 10s. per hut, in 1901 it was amended to one of 10s. per hut for every adult male, and 10s. extra for each wife exceeding one. In 1904 the tax was raised to £1 on each adult male and 10s. upon each wife exceeding one.

In round figures the total annual revenue of Rhodesia is about £700,000. Towards this revenue the native paid, until 1914, the whole of the *direct* taxation, or about £250,000. The Controller of Customs supplied the following table, showing the native contribution towards *indirect* taxation :

1. Articles on which the whole duty may be said to be paid by the native	£ 10,610
2. Articles on which an appreciable proportion of the duty may be said to be paid by the native	16,541
3. Amount roughly estimated as paid by the native on all other importations ..	510
Grand total	£27,661

or 13·8 per cent. of the total duty.

Mr. Boyne, the controller, comments upon this analysis in the following terms :

In analysing the above percentages it should be remembered that the rate of customs duty affects the percentage. What I wish to convey by this is that, supposing an article is equally demanded by the white man as by the native, the fact that the native purchases the foreign article, which is liable to a higher rate of duty than the British article, which is probably demanded by the white man, raises the percentages in favour of the native.*

The Chief Native Commissioner, Mr. H. J.

* Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, p. 62.

Taylor, commenting upon the native contribution to indirect taxation in 1918, said :

I do not think the public realize sufficiently what a valuable asset the native in this country is to the customs revenue. When it is borne in mind, for instance, that for each foreign blanket purchased by the native he pays indirectly in respect of customs duty a quarter of the home cost, and in the case of the British blanket a fifth, some idea may perhaps be gathered as to the result native purchases have on the revenue of the country.¹

Thus one-third of the natives of Rhodesia pay, *first*, rent for living in their own country, thus paying tribute to private and alien interests; and *secondly*, as a whole they contribute towards administrative expenditure about £250,000 out of the total revenue of about £700,000, or well over one-third of the total administrative revenue.

The native population, it should be remembered, has no voice whatever, either direct or indirect, in the raising or spending of this revenue. They have had no voice whatever in the administrative action which has taken from them all rights in their land, whilst in point of fact they have never been dispossessed of their ownership in land by any legal instrument. A large portion of this native population has not at any time engaged in hostilities, but actually suffered loss of life and property in these hostilities in greater proportion than the white race. Yet by the action of the Chartered Company the rights of these tribes have been entirely confiscated. There is no impartial court that the mind of man can conceive which would deny that these native tribes have suffered and still suffer substantial injustice for which readjustment and redress are long overdue.

¹ Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for 1918, pp. 11-12.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS

CHRISTIAN missionary effort has a glowing record in Rhodesia, and no consideration of the position of Southern Rhodesia would be complete without some record of the work of Christian Missions, for their work is writ large throughout the territory. Years before the Chartered Company was thought of, a generation before Cecil Rhodes and Leander Starr Jameson were born, the foundation of missionary work in the Zambesi valley was well and truly laid by that Christian statesman, Dr. Robert Moffat. But it was not until the year 1857 that this fine old Apostle of Christianity, then sixty-two years of age, set out to secure from Umsiligasi permission for the establishment of missionary work amongst the Matabele tribes.

In his sixty-second year Robert Moffat, having just completed the translation of the Bible into Sechuana, received from his Directors in London the suggestion that he should devote one year to the task of persuading Umsiligasi to open Matabeleland to Christian missionaries. Moffat was received with open arms by Umsiligasi; but the Matabele themselves feared that if they allowed the missionaries to enter, other white men would follow, a condition which they believed would lead ultimately to their being dispossessed of their country. But friendship for and trust in Robert Moffat ultimately pre-

vailed, although Umsiligasi stipulated that "Ramary" himself should come with the missionaries, for, said he: "These new men, I do not know them. All men are not alike." After delays inevitable to all African enterprise the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, with Moffat at their head, settled at Inyati early in 1860—thirty years almost to a day before the Chartered Company's pioneers commenced their journey from Kimberley.

With the arrival of Bishop Knight Bruce in 1887-8 commenced the splendid missionary work of the Anglican Church in Southern Rhodesia. Happily this good Bishop, being a man of sound commonsense as well as a singularly self-sacrificing missionary, decided to select an area for his work which would avoid that regrettable overlapping which is one of the acutest of modern missionary problems. Bishop Knight Bruce therefore selected Mashonaland as the Anglican sphere of operations, and gives the following excellent reason for his decision:

Here (Mashonaland) was a country absolutely without a missionary of any sort or description—a country, so we thought in those days, without a chance of having one. It had always seemed unfortunate that different views of Christianity should have to be put before the people, as in Basutoland; and I had refused to found a mission in Northern Bechuanaland when asked to do so by one of the chiefs, as I considered the people to be under the care of the London Missionary Society. But here in Mashonaland was a field on which no one could object to our entering.

The country which seemed to the Bishop to stand very little chance of having any other missionaries soon proved an attractive sphere to the missionaries of the several British and American denominations. Amongst the long line of Christian missionaries following in the

steps of Moffat, Helm, and Knight Bruce there are several names of men who were not only missionaries but Christian statesmen, whilst many of the sons and daughters of these men are to-day devoting themselves in civil and commercial spheres to the evolution of a progressive British colony.

The following are the religious denominations now at work in Southern Rhodesia :

The Anglican Church under the control of Bishop Beavan, the London Missionary Society, the Roman Catholic missionaries under Father Sykes, the Wesleyan Methodist, the Dutch Reformed Church, the Presbyterian Church, the American Foreign Missions, the American Methodist Episcopal, the Seventh Day Adventists, General Nonconformists, the Salvation Army, and the United Hebrew Congregation. The total number of ministers of religion and missionaries is between 140 and 150, and the total number of native members of the congregations is about 30,000. Within recent years the proportion of members of the Dutch Reformed and Roman Catholic Churches appear to have decreased, whilst the percentages of the Anglican, Presbyterian and Wesleyan communicants have appreciated. The Methodist Episcopal Church leads the way with a native communion of close upon 9,000.

Amongst the Christian missionaries who have lived in Matabeleland and Mashonaland there are several outstanding names of those who have served the country with unexampled devotion, not merely in the spiritual sphere, but in certain other spheres which affect vitally the economic and political conditions of Rhodesia. Dr. Moffat, the founder of British-Matabele interests, Bishop Knight Bruce, the

pioneer of Mashonaland, Charles Helm, who countersigned the Rudd-Rhodes Concession, J. S. Moffat, who became British Commissioner and countersigned the Lippert Agreement—these are but a few names closely interwoven with the welfare of the native races of the Zambesi. These forerunners of the Christian faith have thrown their mantles upon worthy followers, who to-day are, with few—very few—exceptions, in the van of every cause which has for its object the social and religious progress of Rhodesia.

The general progress of missionary effort and the high standard of devotion which has characterized the work, throws into a strong contrast the attitude adopted by one or two whose conduct has occasioned pained surprise and vigorous criticism. For example, the sermon preached by Mr. Sylvester in 1893 from a pile of ammunition cases, when he declared that the "sons of Ham would all be cleared out," is not quite the kind of sermon one would have expected at such a juncture from a Christian minister. What a spectacle for the Agnostic and Atheist! Here was a man whose chief glory it should have been to follow the martyr throng to the stake, if need be, in the cause of simple justice, declaiming against the oppressed, and giving every encouragement to the lust of conquest and avarice.

It is a relief to turn from these sentiments to those of other and more representative leaders of the Christian Church, whose views upon the treatment of the natives, upon giving them some voice in purely native affairs, and upon labour and social problems, are characterized by far-seeing statesmanship and by a sympathetic appreciation of a difficult situation both now

and in future years. The firm grasp of colonial principles and native conditions by the Revs. Shearly Cripps, Charles Helm, and John White, as shown in their evidence before various commissions and in State papers and news, demonstrate that even in the darkest days of native history in Rhodesia the people of that land have never lacked champions in the ranks of the Christian missionaries.

In missionary literature there is abundant testimony to the work done by Christian Missions in Rhodesia, but striking though this may be, there is something more convincing still, because entirely disinterested, namely, the tribute to their work by the officials, merchants, and farmers. One such observer is Mr. J. Kerr, who, in his evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1905, said :

I think there is nothing detrimental to the interest of the native in Christianity. I think it is the correct thing to do if it is done wisely . . . it has, taking South Africa as a whole, and taking other native countries all over the world. I think the influence of Christian Missions has been very good.¹

If we turn to the report issued by the Rhodesian Committee on Native Affairs the testimony is still more emphatic, and, being both collective and considered, is naturally more authoritative :

After receiving ample testimony of the great services rendered in the past by missionary societies, and their strenuous efforts to keep pace with the increasing call on their resources, the Committee have come to the conclusion that no better policy could be adopted than that

¹ South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-5, No. 36792.

of fostering and encouraging the work of these societies. The Committee recommend, therefore, in their resolutions, increased State aid for missions, and such subsidies as shall allow of their widening and perfecting their sphere of operations to meet the growing need of the times.¹

And again: The Committee are, therefore, of opinion that in this phase of the native's training there is ample reason for the encouragement of the missionary bodies. We desire, moreover, to place on record our appreciation of the excellent work done by them in the past, and our conviction of the still greater assistance which they may be called upon to render the State in future.²

The question of State assistance to religious denominations in Rhodesia is one of peculiar difficulty, although up to the present no such acute controversy has arisen as that with which we are familiar in England, and it would happily seem to be remote, particularly if "inspection" is maintained in the same sympathetic manner in which it is applied to-day by the officials of the Chartered Company.

The monetary grants are insignificant compared with the educational work done by the missionary societies; but there is another feature which raises a curious situation, and for which there is apparently no parallel in the British Colonies, namely, land ownership on a considerable scale, carrying with it obligations from the natives towards the missionary societies. If the existing practice is maintained it is difficult to see how the missionary societies and their work can fail to be adversely affected, if not immediately, then ultimately.

There is no published record given of the total lands possessed by missionary bodies in Rhodesia, and apparently made over to them by the Chartered Company, but the total

¹ Rhodesian Committee on Native Affairs, 1910-11, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*

holdings of all denominations are variously estimated at from 50,000 to 200,000 acres.

Bishop Hartzell, in one of his reports dealing with one gift from the Chartered Company, says :

Mr. Rhodes said : " We will turn the old site into a mission." That reply, whether intended or not, was prophetic. Large portions of the buildings and property were removed, but, as the result of my application and correspondence with Earl Grey and others, the Company reserved for industrial mission purposes eight good-sized and several smaller buildings well adapted for our work. About 1,000 acres of land adjoining the town, with perhaps 5,000 acres more near by, the limits of which are yet to be fixed, are included in this magnificent gift to mission work in Africa. The buildings given us cost here, where materials and labour are high, perhaps £25,000. A conservative estimate of present value of buildings and lands, including lots in New Umtali, would be £15,000.¹

The London Missionary Society has one block of land of just over 6,000 acres, and four others totalling something over 25,000 acres, or together 30,000 to 35,000 acres. " Farms," as these blocks of land are called, are possessed by, I believe, every religious body in Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. Kerr, in his evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission, in reply to a question by Sir Godfrey Lagden, said :

The missions have land already . . . I think the bulk of the missions here pick their own farms which have been allotted them by the Chartered Company.²

The Rev. Charles Helm made an interesting statement in reply to Mr. Campbell's question :

Mr. Campbell : What is the size of your station ?

Rev. C. Helm : 6,000 acres.

¹ Company's Report, 1898-1900.

² South African Native Affairs Committee, 1903-5, pp. 36, 779.

Mr. Campbell: What number of natives have you on it?

Rev. C. Helm: Unfortunately, when the land was opened for pegging, I was on the road, and the rivers were full; I was delayed, and got here after the land was already pegged out, and I had to take what I could get on the farm, and it is all among the hills. There would be very little garden land, so that we have not very many natives residing at Hope Fountain; I think about 500.

Mr. Campbell: Do you charge them rent?

Rev. C. Helm: No.

Mr. Campbell: Do you make them contribute towards the church and school fees?

Rev. C. Helm: School fees we have not adopted; we make it compulsory for them to send the children to school. Their contributions to the church are purely voluntary. We make them work. If I want anything done on the farm, then I call them up, and they have to come and work.

Mr. Campbell: You do not pay them (the natives) for working?

Rev. C. Helm: I generally give them something.

Mr. Campbell: What would that something be for a week's work, say?

Rev. C. Helm: I do not call them up for a long time, just for a day or two. I would give them a piece of tobacco or something like that.¹

The "pegging-out" period to which Mr. Helm referred was obviously from the context the latter end of 1893, or early in 1894, when the land scramble took place, which prompted Lord Ripon's telegram to Sir Henry Loch, instructing him to invite Cecil Rhodes to "give Jameson instructions to moderate his proceedings. . . ."

The reasons for the original acceptance of these lands by the missionaries are various, but all of them, of course, from the best of motives. The most general reason advanced is that by so doing they provided "refuge areas" for the Matabele and Mashonas escaping from

¹ South African Native Affairs Committee, 1909-5, pp. 36, 359-364.

the "fire and sword" policy of the Chartered Company. But in the course of time the practice grew up of regarding the natives as guests on mission lands, whether indigenous or immigrant, and this developed into the theory that these native inhabitants were under obligation to the missionary societies. Mr. Helm states quite clearly that he had been in the habit of exacting a measure of compulsory labour from them, but at the time he gave evidence (1904) he was not requiring natives on mission farms to pay rent. This is no longer the case. Compulsory labour is not demanded, but the natives now pay rent to most of the missionary societies which, according to the Rhodesian Native Affairs Committee, varies from 10s. to 40s. per male adult. The practice also varies with the different missionary bodies, and I believe in no case is the rent so high as £2, whilst one missionary society asserts that it does not impose any rent at all. It is only fair to point out that the societies concerned appear to derive no financial benefit from such rents, the proceeds being used to improve the farms in occupation; of course the purposes to which the proceeds are put do not affect the principle.

If this feature is regarded from the general standpoint of missionary policy it is probable that exactions of any kind from native inhabitants prejudice the spiritual and educational work of Christian Missions, particularly where natives feel they have a grievance. It must not be overlooked that this rent is regarded by the native in the nature of a land tax, and that he pays this in addition to his administrative tax—both of them to him the abominations of civilization. That the natives, even so late as 1908, regarded rent paying as a grievance,

is shown by the Chief Commissioner in his report:

My experience teaches me that natives are willing and content to pay rent on occupied farms, but are not willing to pay on unoccupied ground. The great bulk of the natives in this district are living on unoccupied ground, and do not realize why they are paying nor to whom they are paying.

True, this passage refers to "unoccupied land," but the technical meaning of occupied and unoccupied lands awaits legal definition, and there appears to be good local evidence that the native does in fact object to paying rent at all, which to him is tribute for living on land, and this mainly because it is so absolutely repugnant to native law and customs.

The situation in the Congo basin prior to 1900 throws some additional light on this feature of missionary work. Certain mission stations, more particularly on the Upper Congo, had been in the habit of demanding provisions, workmen, paddlers, and children for the schools from the towns and villages within a certain perimeter of the mission station; payment, but not at market rates, was made for the labour involved, and in return for this the Congo authorities released the natives from "taxation," either in cash, rubber, or labour—a situation entirely satisfactory from the native point of view, because it saved him and his family from the prevailing oppression in the region. About the year 1900 a few "advanced" missionaries became convinced that the principle of missionary exactions from the native flocks was theoretically unsound, and would gravely prejudice their mission work. They decided, therefore, to fight the question out, and did so for nearly two

years, until every missionary (not without misgivings) gave up the exactions—with what result?

For a year the natives, misunderstanding the motive, felt that their missionary friends had done them an ill deed. The supply of provisions almost ceased, labour was difficult to obtain, children refrained from coming to the schools, but, worst of all, the natives in the vicinity of the missions, released from the "impositions" to the missions, were given tasks ten times heavier than anything the missionaries had demanded. During these anxious months the "Radicals" had anything but a happy time, either from their fellow missionaries or from the natives, and upon their backs was placed the responsibility for all the ills and failures of that year—*but those men saved the situation.*

The hands of these reforming missionaries were now free to fight the cause of the whole native people untrammelled in any way whatever by obligations to the Congo authorities or from the native tribes. The natives after a period saw what was happening, realized that a real fight had commenced for their liberty from King Leopold's thralldom. The attendance at church service, which formerly had in it an element of obligation, now became more sincere, and with this sincerity came added zeal and devotion. Attendance at the schools began to increase, and a remarkable change came over the older children, who developed an absorbing thirst for knowledge. To the great mass of the population the missionaries now appeared in a new light, and chiefs made long journeys to obtain counsel and comfort in their afflictions, but the final victory for this new policy was reached when King Leopold's own Commission

of Enquiry, reporting upon the maladministration of the Congo, declared the truth to an astounded world, and concluded with that memorable tribute to the Christian missionaries :

Hence the astounding influence which the missionaries possess in some parts of the territory. It exercises itself not only among the natives without the purview of their religious propaganda, but over all the villages to whose troubles they have listened. *The missionary becomes for the natives of the region the only representative of equity and justice.*¹

There is, of course, not the remotest parallel between the social and political conditions of the two territories—the Congo and Southern Rhodesia—but on this practical feature of missionary policy in its relation to exaction by missionaries from indigenous tribes the parallel is not un instructive. Missionary history has demonstrated that in the long run religious propaganda pure and simple should be restricted exclusively to spiritual and educational activities, and if commercial or kindred operations are undertaken, that they should be placed in the controlling hands of business men and under an organization created and set apart for this particular purpose.

It is possible that the missionaries and their work will remain unaffected by the trial of strength before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and before the British Parliament. Technically, they are not involved, but on the great moral issues at stake they can hardly limit themselves to the position of interested spectators. Some, regardless of consequences, have already joined hands with those who have decided to accept the challenge of the Chartered Company to the Commonwealth.


¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

Amid the Christian forces of Southern Rhodesia there stands out to-day one apostolic figure—Arthur Shearly Cripps, an apostle so bold that he never hesitates in his strong challenge, an apostle of such moral elevation that he knows but two principles—right and wrong, an apostle of such spiritual insight that to him public ridicule, sacrifice, social ostracism do not weaken, but increasingly strengthen the stout arm of faith by which he smites right and left for justice.

It is a mental and spiritual privilege to fight back to back with such a Christian knight-errant as Shearly Cripps, the Mashonaland missionary.

They will'd for us the leavings of our land,
Then as meek children, ask'd their Mother's aid
To finger o'er again rash gifts they'd made.
Grasp, England, grip in your own honest hand
Our homes, our little ones, to bind or free,
Be but yourself, to us an England be!


ARTHUR SHEARLY CRIPPS.



PART VI

RHODESIA OF TO-MORROW

The Political Future



THE POLITICAL FUTURE

It is too readily assumed by the British public that the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia within the Union is the inevitable and early future of the territories between the Limpopo and the Zambesi. Rhodesians have their own very strong views upon this subject, but what they cannot understand is the easy assumption of the comparatively well-read Britisher that the Union only needs to ask and thus to have Southern Rhodesia and the Rhodesians!

What are the main factors which govern the political direction of Rhodesia? The Royal Charter, Amalgamation of the Rhodesias, the South Africa Act, Annexation, Disparity between White and Black population, Debt.

The first step precedent to any political change in Rhodesia must, of course, be the termination of the Royal Charter. The Charter was granted on October 29, 1889, for a period of twenty-five years. It would thus have expired in 1914, or a few weeks after the submission of the Land Case to the Judicial Committee. The passage governing the termination of the Royal Charter is found in Clause 33, and reads as follows:

And We do further will, ordain and declare that it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, and We do hereby expressly reserve to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right and power by writing under the Great

Seal of the United Kingdom at the end of twenty-five years from the date of this Our Charter, or to enact other provisions in substitution for or in addition to any of its existing provisions. Provided that the right and power thus reserved shall be exercised only in relation to so much of this Our Charter as relates to administrative and public matters.

In response to a telegram from Lord Gladstone, Mr. Burns Begg, the Resident Commissioner in Rhodesia, reported in April 1914 upon the results of the election for members of the Legislative Council which had then taken place, and which had been fought largely upon the question of securing a termination of the Charter. The issues as they appeared to the Chartered Company's opponents were set forth to the people of Rhodesia in a "combined" appeal called the "Gwelo Manifesto." The total electorate was at the time 9,502, and of these 5,057 voted. The candidates were popularly described as "pro-Charter" and "anti-Charter." The "pro-Charter" candidates polled 3,324 and the "Anti-Charter" candidates secured 1,733 votes; in no district was an "anti-Charter" candidate elected. It is only fair to both sides to bear in mind that within the ranks of the 3,324 voters for pro-Charter candidates a very large number were either directly or indirectly employees of the Chartered Company.

Following upon this election of a minority of members to the Legislative Council, upon which body the Chartered Company possesses an official majority, the following resolutions were passed by that body on May 15, 1914, in the Legislative Council:

(1) This Council is of opinion that under existing conditions a continuation of the administration of the British South Africa Company is necessary in the interests of the

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territory, and humbly prays His Majesty that no change be made in the present form of administration.

(2) This Council at the same time desires, in view of the provisions of Section 33 of Her late Majesty's Royal Charter of the 29th October, 1889, to submit and humbly prays His Majesty that he will graciously take into consideration the following recommendations by way of revision of the said Charter or otherwise on the expiration of the first period of twenty-five years thereof : (a) that the continuation of the present form of administration shall not affect the right of provision at any time hereafter of a form of government which will confer upon the people of this territory the right of administering their own affairs ; (b) that an Auditor-General be appointed, and the Legislative Council, in addition to the powers at present possessed by it in fiscal matters, be further empowered on the initiative of any of the members thereof to control the allocation to the public service of each year of such portion of the public revenue as shall remain after the administration shall have made due provision for civil service, police, and the maintenance of law and order ; (c) that the Legislative Council be empowered, subject to the assent of His Majesty's High Commissioner, to raise loans from the British South Africa Company for permanent or reproductive public works and to make provision for the payment thereof.¹

At this stage Lord Harcourt intervened, and on June 17, 1914, asked for the views of the Directors upon the resolution. The Chartered Company replied on June 30th. The general result of this correspondence, in so far as it affected the termination of the Charter, was an agreement in the following terms :

So much of Article 33 of the Principal Charter as provides that it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, at the end of twenty-five years from the date of the said Charter, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add to, alter or repeal any of the provisions of the said Charter relating to administrative and public matters, or to enact other provisions in substitution therefor or in addition thereto, shall be read and construed subject to

¹ Cd. 7645, p. 9.

the proviso that if at any time after the 29th day of October, 1914, the Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia shall, by an absolute majority of the whole number of the Members of the Council as then constituted, pass a Resolution praying the Crown to establish in Southern Rhodesia the form of Government known as Responsible Government, and shall support such Resolution with evidence showing that the condition of the territory financially and in other respects is such as to justify the establishment of the form of Government aforesaid, it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, if We or They at any time think fit, to accede to the prayer of such Resolution, to add to, alter or repeal any of the provisions of the said Charter relating to administrative and public matters, or to enact other provisions in substitution therefor or in addition thereto for the purpose of establishing Responsible Government.¹

The requisite conditions, then, for a change are twofold: an absolute majority of the Legislative Council praying for a termination of the existing administration, and the production of evidence showing financial ability to govern. The "other respects" presumably include statements of policy towards the 800,000 native inhabitants. It will be observed that these conditions only relate to Responsible Government, and in no way appear to contemplate incorporation in the Union of South Africa.

Although upon the surface the political struggle of Rhodesia appears to be between "pro-Charter" and "anti-Charter," the real fight is between Responsible Government and Union Government. It is as well to face the fact that Rhodesians have never liked the Clause 150 in the South Africa Act of Union, which provides as follows:

The King, with the advice of the Privy Council, may, on addresses from the Houses of Parliament of the Union, admit

¹ Supplemental Charter, March 13, 1915.

into the Union the territories administered by the British South Africa Company on such terms and conditions as to representation and otherwise in each case as are expressed in the addresses and approved by the King, and the provisions of any Order in Council in that behalf shall have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

The Gwelo Manifesto of 1914 was issued as an anti-Charter appeal by a combination of political parties; the candidates knew that what little chance they had would vanish if they were suspected of any leanings towards incorporation in the Union, an impression which had gained currency owing to the fact that Mr. Longden, always a frank advocate of incorporation, was standing with the supporters of the Gwelo Manifesto upon their anti-Charter ticket. In order to remove this, to them, fatal impression, the following passage was included in the Manifesto, and supported by all the candidates, with the exception of Mr. Longden:

Union with the South.—To pledge ourselves, if elected, to take no action on this question, officially or unofficially, and should it be proposed or introduced by the British South Africa Company, the Imperial Government or the Union of South Africa, or by any other authority, to insist that it be referred to the people of Southern Rhodesia by means of a referendum or general election, and to resign in a body should any attempt be made to evade this course.¹

In 1914 Mr. Longden, as an anti-Charter candidate, was confronted in Bulawayo North with Sir Charles Coghlan as a pro-Charter advocate at the time. Both are amongst the strongest men in Southern Rhodesia, and Sir Charles Coghlan condemned incorporation with

¹ Cd. 7645, p. 7.

South Africa, and secured 330 votes as against Mr. Longden's 239.

In the autumn of 1915 Major Gordon Forbes, the member representing Bulawayo South, was killed, and Mr. Longden at once stood for the constituency, and in doing so had almost every apparent advantage over his opponent, Mr. Stewart. The issue was again anti-Charter, and upon this Mr. Longden would probably have won, but Mr. Stewart early received the support of Sir Charles Coghlan, and together they made "Yea" or "Nay" upon incorporation with the Union the platform issue, with the result that upon a vote of 376 Mr. Longden, who was known to favour incorporation, was beaten by ten votes.

Bulawayo is nearer, both geographically and in political thought, to Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town than any other part of Rhodesia; it is, in fact, the only part of Rhodesia where incorporation with the Union can even be discussed, yet even in this centre, where the atmosphere is more congenial than anywhere else, and where the candidate is of the exceptional calibre of Mr. H. T. Longden, the electors have repeatedly rejected him because of his advocacy of incorporation with the Union. Circumstances may bring about a rapid change; but all the evidence at present points to such general and deep-seated opposition that no impartial student of African affairs can come to any other conclusion than that incorporation is at present remote.

The Directors of the Chartered Company have quite their own ideas for the next stage in the political development of Rhodesia; they desire to see an amalgamation of the two Rhodesias—Northern and Southern—thus mak-

THE "ALL-BRITISH" STATE 283

ing the territories a single administrative unit of three Provinces :

Southern Rhodesia	}	Total area 438,575 square miles. Total population 1,850,000.
North-Western Rhodesia		
North-Eastern Rhodesia		

This programme of the Chartered Company would provide a single "All-British" area almost as large as the Union of South Africa. It is, of course, no part of the business of the Chartered Company to suggest still further amalgamations, but he would indeed be a blind individual who could not see that somebody has caught the vision of taking the next step and joining the Rhodesias with Nyassaland. If this were accomplished the Zambesi amalgamation would exceed the Union in area.

South African Union Area		Zambesi Provinces Area	
Transvaal	110,426	Southern Rhodesia	148,575
Orange Free State	50,389	Northern Rhodesia	
Natal	35,290	(Two Provinces)	290,000
Cape Colony ..	276,995	Nyassaland	39,315
<hr/> Total .. 473,100		<hr/> Total 477,890	

The Chartered Company's case for amalgamation is best summed up in their own words :

It may be argued that amalgamation with the North, just as it will make absorption in the Union more difficult, may also and for the same reasons postpone the date at which local responsible government will be possible. *Prima facie*, this argument has force, but in present circumstances, having regard to the numbers of the population of Southern Rhodesia, and to the position of the territory in the matter of administrative finance as emphasized by the war, the day of local responsible government must necessarily be deferred for some time. Moreover, if the confident expectation that the unification of Rhodesia will result in

increased prosperity and more rapid influx of settlers is justified by results, it may prove in the long run that the day of local responsible government has been accelerated rather than retarded.

This statement clearly discloses the fact that the advent of "the day of local responsible self-government" will not be very welcome to the Company's Directors. There is a good deal of "vision" in Rhodesia House, and it may easily be that the conception of a great Central African State whole-heartedly British has much greater weight with the Directors than those motives which are too often uppermost in the minds of those who control large commercial operations overseas. Whatever is the motive actuating the Chartered Company, one thing is abundantly clear, namely, that Rhodesians both north and south of the Zambesi will have nothing to do with amalgamation at present.

It is noteworthy that this pill was presented to Rhodesia coated with the attractive gilt that amalgamation "will make absorption in the Union more difficult." In spite of this being astutely put in the very forefront as the most attractive bait which could be offered, Rhodesians refused even to nibble, and rejected the proposals with such unanimity that "amalgamation" is for the moment a word none care to utter.

The reasons for rejection are many. Rhodesians south of the Zambesi believe that amalgamation will spell a postponement of responsible government, and consequently an indefinite extension of Chartered Company rule. At the Agricultural Congress held at Gwelo in March 1916, Mr. R. A. Fletcher said that amalgamation would "put them back, if they had to go and

develop it (Northern Rhodesia), twenty years"; and he then moved and carried the following resolution by 61 to 2 votes:

That this Congress, representative of the farming interests of Southern Rhodesia, is opposed to the suggested amalgamation of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, as it is inconsistent with the understanding on which the Charter was renewed in 1914; and, further, as it is convinced that such amalgamation is against the best interests of Southern Rhodesia.

The greatest difficulty in granting responsible government is, of course, that of entrusting so large a territory occupied by 800,000 natives to a form of government which would remove the bulk of the inhabitants from any measure of Imperial control. The Imperial Government was confronted with a similar difficulty in Natal when, in the early nineties, self-government was granted to that territory. It is true that the white population was twice that of Rhodesia, and that the native population of Natal was only about 480,000. The Imperial Government not only feared, but was soon confronted with "native trouble," and with it the stupid resentment of what was called "interference." The Mother Country has learned much during the intervening period of twenty years, and Rhodesians are too sensible to expect that the Imperial Government can hand over without retaining any measure of control the future of 800,000 people. There is, however, a factor of considerable importance which differentiates Rhodesia from Natal, namely, if and when Rhodesia is annexed, as it must be precedent to the grant of responsible government, the very act of annexation automatically extends the franchise to the natives!

The ordinary Rhodesian is a very reasonable person, and he possesses a very keen sense of justice; he is therefore very unlikely to ask the Imperial authorities for responsible government for himself and, in the same breath, the disenfranchisement of the natives. The resolution accepted by the British House of Commons in 1906 clearly and formally puts the alternative before the daughter nation of the Commonwealth—Franchise or Imperial Protection.

In the House of Commons, February 28, 1906, Mr. Winston Churchill, speaking on behalf of the Government of the day, used the following words:

We accept fully the proposition that there is an Imperial responsibility for the protection of native races not represented in legislative assemblies.

The British Government thus formally accepted the principle that where there is no franchise there must be Imperial responsibility for the unrepresented communities. The acceptance of that principle by Parliament means, of course, that the Departments concerned are guided by this formal acceptance in any step they may take. Rhodesians know full well that a conditional native franchise, as in the Cape, is infinitely more satisfactory to them than a grant of self-government, with the real and effective control of native administration retained by the Imperial authorities; hence the annexation of Southern Rhodesia with the grant of responsible government is a very different proposition from that of Natal in 1894.

The next objection to the grant of responsible government is the perpetual cry that Southern Rhodesia does not possess the men capable of assuming responsibility of government. This is

a ludicrous plea. There has been talent enough to raise and spend many millions more capital in private enterprise than the Chartered Company has found for all its operations put together. There has been talent enough to establish and build up vigorous and well-ordered industries. Before and since the advent of Chartered rule there was, and has been, white talent enough to create and maintain schools. There is to-day on the spot talent to run agricultural, mining and religious organizations, and a perusal of the activities of either of these shows ability of a very high order. There is also the fact that both Bulawayo and Salisbury possess daily papers with a large editorial staff, and even if it is argued that these organs are kept alive by the Company, that surely should not blind the impartial observer to the merits of their literary productions.

If one descends from generalities to look for individuals, there is no difficulty in finding them. There are men like Sir Charles Coghlan, H. Longden, the Brothers Fletcher, H. U. Moffat, and Colonel Grey, and these are not the only stars in the Rhodesian firmament. All the constituent elements of modern government are to be found in Rhodesia: the legal profession is there, the farming interest has its leaders, the mining corporations are guided by men strong and able, Chambers of Commerce are controlled by far-sighted Britishers, to say nothing of the scores of civil servants whose devotion to duty is second to none in the African Continent. Those who advance the argument that Rhodesia, with its 10,000 men of experience, cannot find amongst them a score of men able enough to give prosperity to the Zambesi basin, could not very well give voice to a more pessi-

mistic and unpatriotic statement. This was not the attitude of Rhodes, whose belief in the country would have precluded such an attitude towards Rhodesia and the Rhodesians.

A local writer,¹ commenting upon this attitude, rightly says :

When, in all history, has a British community lacked the man for occasions such as this? Our history is packed with men, born and bred to peaceful pursuits, who have led our armies; men trained to commerce, who have guided our Councils of State; Wolsey, the butcher's son; Cromwell, the country squire, and the greatest prince, in the field and in the Council, that ever ruled England; Clive, the East India Company's clerk, and the victor of Plassey; Hastings, a ledger-keeper, who, when occasion called, "administered government and war with more than the capacity of a Richelieu"; Abraham Lincoln, the quondam day-labourer, who guided America through her biggest crisis. It is true that Cromwells and Clives do not grow on every bush, and have not yet shown themselves amongst us, nor does the occasion call for transcendent genius, but we have men in plenty to carry on the government of this country.

A favourite argument issued from London Wall is that Rhodesia cannot shoulder the financial burden. The obvious answer to this argument is the perennial reply question, "What financial burden?" For years past nobody outside the Chartered Company's offices has been able to say what are the nett administrative charges and the total revenues. In Rhodesian finance the most important divergence of opinion is upon the question of debt responsibility. The debt charge submitted to Lord Cave's Commission must fall somewhere, but Sir Charles Coghlan has already, in the name of the settlers, formally repudiated liability of

¹ H. Bertin.

one penny piece. He said before Lord Cave's Commission :

I wish to make it perfectly plain to your Lordships. I see from the proceedings in London that there have been suggestions made that possibly the people in this country might become liable for what your Lordships find to be due. I wish to make it perfectly plain that we repudiate any liability of that sort at all, and our appearing before this Commission must not be taken in any way to be an admission either that such a debt can be placed upon the shoulders of the people of this country, or that we admit the possibilities of that happening. I wish to make that perfectly plain from the beginning.

The Imperial Government, in its letter of Oct. 6, 1914, has declared that any new government of Rhodesia must not be saddled with a debt charge in excess of its assets. Thus, from a twofold standpoint, the question of debt can hardly affect the settlers of Rhodesia, as they are apparently doubly safeguarded in the matter of the debt charge.

The revenue of Southern Rhodesia is to-day approximately £800,000, which apparently just covers administrative charges. The important fact to bear in mind, however, is that with a change of government, large and new sources of revenue would be available. A settled form of government would put an end to the uncertainty and lack of confidence which prevails to-day. The restoration of confidence in Rhodesia and its future should in turn lead to the influx of population, the lack of which constitutes to-day Rhodesia's gravest problem.

Those Rhodesians who oppose amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, and appear at present to oppose equally incorporation with the Union of South Africa, have recently issued a political

manifesto prepared by Mrs. Tawse Jollie, who possesses quite a unique position of authority in Southern Rhodesia. This manifesto, published as a pamphlet, sets forth the following main conclusions :

(a) *Termination of the Royal Charter.*

It is not that the Company is hostile or even indifferent to our interests or that their interests run counter to those of the country as a whole. It is a question of perspective. *The interests of a trading Company may, broadly speaking, coincide with the interests of the country in which they trade, but they do not constitute the whole interests of that country, and it is the right of the people to decide the proportion which private commercial interests shall bear to the wider question of the welfare of the community as a whole.*

(b) *Incorporation with the Union of South Africa.*


. . . very few Rhodesians would be prepared for immediate union—the majority have regarded it for some years as ultimately though disagreeably inevitable—and the amalgamation proposal, if it offered a genuine chance of developing in another direction, north instead of south, would be welcomed by many—has indeed been so welcomed . . . the basic reasons for union will also remain, whatever may be our relations with North Rhodesia, and we can only purchase a possible safety from union at the price of our own economic development.

(c) *Amalgamation of the Rhodesias.*


The amalgamation proposal, in the terms in which it was introduced, is a clear attempt to confuse the issues and to postpone the day when the people of Rhodesia can take the helm themselves. To reject it now does not and cannot mean any Imperial loss. Northern Rhodesia is under the British flag, and will remain so. It may develop independently of South Africa, and it may be taken over by the latter at some future time and in some other way. On the other hand, *Southern Rhodesia owes it to her founder, to the Empire, and to herself, to develop her own internal resources and build up her population now—not twenty years hence.*

(d) Responsible Government.

Until we reach the stage in which the people of Rhodesia are in a position to exercise those rights, we cannot hope for that general progress which has marked all self-governing communities of our race, and for which our natural resources entitle us to hope. We should have difficulties and we should make mistakes, but this will be the case as much twenty years hence as now. *We shall learn from our mistakes and we shall have to co-operate to overcome our difficulties—useful experiences both.*



APPENDIX



THE BRITISH-MATABELE TREATY

GUBULAWAYO,
February 11, 1888.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward certified copy of an agreement into which the Chief Lo Bengula is willing to enter with Her Majesty's Government. He has just put his own hand to it after protracted discussion and explanation. I am thoroughly satisfied that he understands what he has done, and that his desires and intentions are fully in accord with the tenor of the document.

There would have been very little hesitation about his signing it but for the fact that he and his councillors have been much perplexed by the pretensions which have been put forward by certain visitors to his country to be messengers from the English Government, more especially by two persons who were here recently and claimed to be on a secret mission to him from Government, with proposals of a much more serious nature than mine.

It was put to me as a serious difficulty that perhaps in my absence these or others might come with another kind of message, and how were they to know the true from the false. I referred them to the fact that wide publicity had been given to my mission, insomuch that every European in the country knew of my coming before I arrived, and also to the fact that I came with an escort of mounted police.

Two Europeans resident in the country were present during the whole discussion, but in view of a bitter feeling which exists here between English and Dutch, they preferred that their names should not appear. Those who have signed as witness(es) are troopers of the Bechuanaland Police. I ought to state, however, that I received the most valuable aid from Mr. Tainton, who is a skilled linguist, and acted when necessary as interpreter.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) J. S. MOFFAT,
Assistant Commissioner.

To His Honour the Deputy Commissioner,
Bechuanaland Protectorate.

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THE Chief Lo Bengula, Ruler of the tribe known as the Amandebele, together with the Mashona and Makakalaka, tributaries of the same, hereby agrees to the following articles and conditions :

That peace and amity shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects, and the Amandebele people ; and the contracting Chief Lo Bengula engages to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any rupture of the same, to cause the strict observance of this treaty, and so to carry out the spirit of the treaty of friendship which was entered into between his late father, the Chief Umsiligaas, with the then Governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the year of our Lord 1836.

It is hereby further agreed by Lo Bengula, Chief in and over the Amandebele country with its dependencies as aforesaid, on behalf of himself and people, that he will refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any Foreign State or Power to sell, alienate or cede, or permit or countenance any sale, alienation or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under his chieftainship, or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

In faith of which I, Lo Bengula, on my part have hereunto set my hand at Gubulawayo, Amandebeleland, this eleventh day of February, and of Her Majesty's reign the fifty-first.

(Signed) LO BENGULA, his X mark.

Witnesses—

(Signed) W. GRAHAM.

G. B. VAN WYK.

Before me,

(Signed) J. S. MOFFAT,

Assistant Commissioner.

February 11, 1888.

I certify the above a true copy.

(Signed) J. S. MOFFAT,

Assistant Commissioner.

February 11, 1888.

THE RUDD-RHODES CONCESSION

KNOW all men by these presents that whereas Charles Dunnell Rudd of Kimberley, Rochfort Maguire of London, and Francis Robert Thompson of Kimberley, hereinafter called the grantees, have covenanted and agreed, and do hereby covenant and agree, to pay to me, my heirs and successors, the sum of one hundred pounds sterling British currency, on the first day of every lunar month, and further to deliver at my Royal Kraal one thousand Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles, together with one hundred thousand rounds of suitable ball cartridge, five hundred of the said rifles and fifty thousand of the said cartridges to be ordered from England forthwith, and delivered with reasonable despatch, and the remainder of the said rifles and cartridges to be delivered so soon as the said grantees shall have commenced to work mining machinery within my territory; and further to deliver on the Zambesi River a steamboat with guns suitable for defensive purposes upon the said river, or in lieu of the said steamboat, should I so elect, to pay to me the sum of five hundred pounds sterling British currency. On the execution of these presents, I, Lo Bengula, King of Matabeleland, Mashonaland and other adjoining territories, in the exercise of my sovereign powers, and in the presence and with the consent of my Council of Indunas, do hereby grant and assign unto the said grantees, their heirs, representatives and assigns, jointly and severally, the complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my kingdoms, principalities and dominions, together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same, and to hold, collect and enjoy the profits and revenues, if any, derivable from the said metals and minerals subject to the aforesaid payment; and whereas I have been much molested of late by divers persons seeking and desiring to obtain grants and concessions of land and mining rights in my territories, I do hereby authorize the said grantees, their heirs, representatives and assigns, to

take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude from my kingdom, principalities and dominions all persons seeking land, metals, minerals or mining rights therein, and I do hereby undertake to render them such needful assistance as they may from time to time require for the exclusion of such persons and to grant no concessions of land or mining rights from and after this date without their consent and concurrence; provided that if at any time the said monthly payment of one hundred pounds shall be in arrear for a period of three months then this grant shall cease and determine from the date of the last made payment; and further provided that nothing contained in these presents shall extend to or affect a grant made by me of certain mining rights in a portion of my territory south of the Ramakoban River, which grant is commonly known as the Tati Concession.

This given under my hand this thirtieth day of October in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eighty-eight at my Royal Kraal.

(Signed)	Lo BENGULA	his X mark.
"	C. D. RUDD.	
"	ROCHFORD MAGUIRE,	
"	F. R. THOMPSON.	

Witnesses—

(Signed)	CHAS. D. HELM.
"	J. D. DREYER.

THE LIPPERT CONCESSION

To all to whom these Presents shall come, I, LO BENGULA,
King of the Amandabele nation, and of the Makalaka,
Mashona and surrounding territories, send Greeting :

Whereas I have granted a concession in respect of mineral rights, and the rights incidental to mining only, and whereas my absolute power as paramount King to allow persons to occupy land in my kingdom, and to levy and collect taxes thereon, has been successfully established, and whereas, seeing that large numbers of white people are coming into my territories, and it is desirable I should assign land to them, and whereas it is desirable that I should once and for all appoint some person to act for me in these respects :

Now, therefore, and in consideration of the payment of one thousand pounds (£1,000) having been made to me to-day, I do hereby grant to Edward Amandus Lippert, and to his heirs, executors, assigns and substitutes absolutely, subject only to the annual sum of £500 being paid to me or to my successors in office, in quarterly instalments, in lieu of rates, rents and taxes, the following rights and privileges, namely :

The sole and exclusive right, power and privilege for the full term of one hundred (100) years to lay out, grant or lease, for such period or periods as he may think fit, farms, townships, building plots and grazing areas, to impose and levy rents, licences and taxes thereon, and to get in, collect and receive the same for his own benefit, to give and grant certificates in my name for the occupation of any farms, townships, building plots and grazing areas ; to commence and prosecute, and also to defend in any competent court, in Africa or elsewhere, either in my name or in his own name, all such actions, suits, and other proceedings as he may deem necessary for establishing, maintaining or defending the said rights, powers and privileges hereby conferred ; provided always that the said rights and privileges shall only extend and apply to all such territories as now are, or may hereafter

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be, occupied by, or be under the sphere of operations of, the British South Africa Company, their successors, or any person or persons holding from or under them, and provided that from the rights granted by these presents are excluded only the grazing of such cattle, the enclosing of such land, and the erection of such buildings and machinery as are strictly required for the exercise of the mineral rights now held by the British South Africa Company under the said concession.

The powers granted to E. Ramsay Renny-Tailyour, under date of 22nd April, 1891, are hereby withdrawn and cancelled in so far as they are in conflict with these presents.

Given under my seal at Umvutcha,
this 17th day of November,
1891.

Elephant
seal
LO BENGULA.

Witnesses—

(Signed)

E. R. RENNY-TAILYOUR.

"

JAMES REILLY.

"

JAMES FAIRBAIRN.

"

X (James Umkisa's cross).

(Signed)

ED. A. LIPPERT.

I hereby certify that the above document has been fully interpreted and explained to the King Lo Bengula and to his indunas, according to the established usages of the nation.

(Signed) W. J. TANTON,

Interpreter.

(Signed) G. M. ACUTT,

Interpreter.

There were present at the discussion of the above grant besides the King Lo Bengula, Umhlaha (the Regent), Umlagela, Gambo, Umjana, Lutuli, all indunas; and of Europeans, Mr. Moffat, Tainton (interpreter), Ed. Lippert, E. R. Renny-Tailyour, James Reilly, C. M. Acutt (interpreter), and James Umkisa (servant).

(Signed)

ED. LIPPERT.

I certify that this document is a full and exact expression of the wishes of the Chief Lo Bengula and his principal indunas, and that I sign this in accordance with the wish of the Chief.

(Signed)

J. S. MOFFAT,
Assistant Commissioner.

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

CHARTER OF INCORPORATION.

VICTORIA by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting :

WHEREAS a Humble Petition has been presented to Us in Our Council by The Most Noble JAMES, Duke of ABERCORN, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath ; The Most Noble ALEXANDER WILLIAM GEORGE Duke of FIFE, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Privy Councillor ; The Right Honourable EDRIC FREDERICK, Lord GIFFORD, V.C. ; CECIL JOHN RHODES, of Kimberley, in the Cape Colony, Member of the Executive Council and of the House of Assembly of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope ; ALFRED BEIT, of 29, Holborn Viaduct, London, Merchant ; ALBERT HENRY GEORGE GREY, of Howick, Northumberland, Esquire ; and GEORGE CAWSTON, of 18, Lennox Gardens, London, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law.

AND WHEREAS the said Petition states amongst other things :

That the Petitioners and others are associated for the purpose of forming a Company or Association, to be incorporated, if to Us should seem fit, for the objects in the said Petition set forth, under the corporate name of The British South Africa Company.

That the existence of a powerful British Company, controlled by those of Our subjects in whom We have confidence, and having its principal field of operations in that region of South Africa lying to the north of Bechuanaland and to the west of Portuguese East Africa, would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests of Our subjects in the United Kingdom and in Our Colonies.

That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect divers concessions and agreements which have been made by certain of the chiefs and tribes inhabiting the said region, and such other concessions, agreements, grants and treaties as the Petitioners may hereafter obtain within the said region or elsewhere in Africa, with the view of promoting trade, commerce, civilization and good government (including the regulation of liquor traffic with the natives) in the territories which are or may be comprised or referred to in such concessions, agreements, grants and treaties as aforesaid.

That the Petitioners believe that if the said concessions, agreements, grants and treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the natives inhabiting the said territories will be materially improved and their civilization advanced, and an organization established which will tend to the suppression of the slave trade in the said territories, and to the opening up of the said territories to the immigration of Europeans, and to the lawful trade and commerce of Our subjects and of other nations.

That the success of the enterprise in which the Petitioners are engaged would be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to Us to grant them Our Royal Charter of Incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, or such other name or title, and with such powers, as to Us may seem fit for the purpose of more effectually carrying into effect the objects aforesaid.

That large sums of money have been subscribed for the purposes of the intended Company by the Petitioners and others, who are prepared also to subscribe or to procure such further sums as may hereafter be found requisite for the development of the said enterprise, in the event of Our being pleased to grant to them Our Royal Charter of Incorporation as aforesaid.

Now, THEREFORE, We having taken the said Petition into Our Royal consideration in Our Council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the Petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the Petition described may be productive of the benefits set forth therein, by Our Prerogative Royal and of Our especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, have constituted, erected and incorporated, and by this Our Charter

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for Us and Our heirs and Royal successors do constitute, erect and incorporate into one body politic and corporate by the name of The British South Africa Company, and the said James, Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, Edric Frederick, Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Grey and George Cawston, and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time become and are members of the body politic and corporate by these presents constituted, erected and incorporated with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to break, alter or renew the same at discretion, and with the further authorities, powers and privileges conferred, and subject to the conditions imposed by this Our Charter; And We do hereby accordingly will, ordain, give, grant, constitute, appoint and declare as follows (that is to say):

1. The principal field of the operations of The British South Africa Company (in this Our Charter referred to as "the Company") shall be the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions.

2. The Company is hereby authorized and empowered to hold, use and retain for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of this Our Charter, the full benefit of the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid, so far as they are valid, or any of them, and all interests, authorities and powers comprised or referred to in the said concessions and agreements. Provided always that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect any other valid and subsisting concessions or agreements which may have been made by any of the chiefs or tribes aforesaid. And in particular nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect certain concessions granted in and subsequent to the year 1880, relating to the territory usually known as the District of the Tati, nor shall anything herein contained be construed as giving any jurisdiction, administrative or otherwise, within the said District of the Tati, the limits of which District are as follows, viz.: from the place where the Shasi River rises to its junction with the Tati and Ramaquaban Rivers, thence along the Ramaquaban River to where it rises, and thence along the watershed of those rivers.

3. The Company is hereby further authorized and em-

powered, subject to the approval of one of Our Principal Secretaries of State (herein referred to as "Our Secretary of State"), from time to time, to acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty, all or any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions and powers of any kind or nature whatever, including powers necessary for the purposes of government, and the preservation of public order in or for the protection of territories, lands or property, comprised or referred to in the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid or affecting other territories, lands or property in Africa, or the inhabitants thereof, and to hold, use and exercise such territories, lands, property, rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions and powers respectively for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of this Our Charter.

4. Provided that no powers of government or administration shall be exercised under or in relation to any such last-mentioned concession, agreement, grant or treaty, until a copy of such concession, agreement, grant or treaty in such form and with such maps or particulars as Our Secretary of State approves, verified as he requires, has been transmitted to him, and he has signified his approval thereof either absolutely or subject to any conditions or reservations. And provided also that no rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions or powers of any description shall be acquired by the Company within the said District of the Tati as hereinbefore described without the previous consent in writing of the owners for the time being of the concessions above referred to relating to the said District, and the approval of Our Secretary of State.

5. The Company shall be bound by and shall fulfil all and singular the stipulations on its part contained in any such concession, agreement, grant or treaty as aforesaid, subject to any subsequent agreement affecting those stipulations approved by Our Secretary of State.

6. The Company shall always be and remain British in character and domicile, and shall have its principal office in Great Britain, and the Company's principal representative in South Africa, and the Directors shall always be natural-born British subjects or persons who have been naturalized as British subjects by or under an Act of Parliament of Our United Kingdom; but this Article shall not disqualify any person nominated a Director by this Our Charter, or any person whose election as a Director shall have been approved by Our Secretary of State, from acting in that capacity.

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7. In case at any time any difference arises between any chief or tribe inhabiting any of the territories aforesaid and the Company, that difference shall, if Our Secretary of State so require, be submitted by the Company to him for his decision, and the Company shall act in accordance with such decision.

8. If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any of the dealings of the Company with any Foreign Power and to make known to the Company any suggestion founded on that dissent or objection, the Company shall act in accordance with such suggestion.

9. If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to object to the exercise by the Company of any authority, power or right within any part of the territories aforesaid, on the ground of there being an adverse claim to or in respect of that part, the Company shall defer to that objection until such time as any such claim has been withdrawn or finally dealt with or settled by Our Secretary of State.

10. The Company shall to the best of its ability preserve peace and order in such ways and manners as it shall consider necessary, and may with that object make ordinances (to be approved by Our Secretary of State) and may establish and maintain a force of police.

11. The Company shall to the best of its ability discourage and, so far as may be practicable, abolish by degrees, any system of slave trade or domestic servitude in the territories aforesaid.

12. The Company shall regulate the traffic in spirits and other intoxicating liquors within the territories aforesaid, so as, as far as practicable, to prevent the sale of any spirits or other intoxicating liquor to any natives.

13. The Company as such, or its officers as such, shall not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the peoples of the territories aforesaid or of any of the inhabitants thereof, except so far as may be necessary in the interest of humanity, and all forms of religious worship or religious ordinances may be exercised within the said territories and no hindrance shall be offered thereto except as aforesaid.

14. In the administration of justice to the said peoples or inhabitants, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands

and goods and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce and legitimacy and other rights of property and personal rights, but subject to any British laws which may be in force in any of the territories aforesaid, and applicable to the peoples or inhabitants thereof.

15. If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any part of the proceedings or system of the Company relative to the peoples of the territories aforesaid or to any of the inhabitants thereof, in respect of slavery or religion or the administration of justice, or any other matter, he shall make known to the Company his dissent or objection, and the Company shall act in accordance with his directions duly signified.

16. In the event of the Company acquiring any harbour or harbours, the Company shall freely afford all facilities for or to Our ships therein without payment, except reasonable charges for work done or services rendered or materials or things supplied.

17. The Company shall furnish annually to Our Secretary of State, as soon as conveniently may be after the close of the financial year, accounts of its expenditure for administrative purposes, and of all sums received by it by way of public revenue, as distinguished from its commercial profits, during the financial year, together with a report as to its public proceedings and the condition of the territories within the sphere of its operations. The Company shall also on or before the commencement of each financial year furnish to Our Secretary of State an estimate of its expenditure for administrative purposes, and of its public revenue (as above defined) for the ensuing year. The Company shall in addition from time to time furnish to Our Secretary of State any reports, accounts or information with which he may require to be furnished.

18. The several officers of the Company shall, subject to the rules of official subordination and to any regulations that may be agreed upon, communicate freely with Our High Commissioner in South Africa and any others Our officers who may be stationed within any of the territories aforesaid, and shall pay due regard to any requirements, suggestions or requests which the said High Commissioner or other officers shall make to them or any of them, and the Company shall be bound to enforce the observance of this Article.

19. The Company may hoist and use on its buildings and elsewhere in the territories aforesaid, and on its

vessels, such distinctive flag indicating the British character of the Company as Our Secretary of State and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall from time to time approve.

20. Nothing in this Our Charter shall be deemed to authorize the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of trade; provided that the establishment of or the grant of concessions for banks, railways, tramways, docks, telegraphs, waterworks or other similar undertakings or the establishment of any system of patent or copyright approved by Our Secretary of State, shall not be deemed monopolies for this purpose. The Company shall not, either directly or indirectly, hinder any Company or persons who now are or hereafter may be lawfully and peaceably carrying on any business concern or venture within the said District of the Tati hereinbefore described, but shall by permitting and facilitating transit by every lawful means to and from the District of the Tati across its own territories or where it has jurisdiction in that behalf and by all other reasonable and lawful means encourage, assist and protect all British subjects who now are or hereafter may be lawfully and peaceably engaged in the prosecution of a lawful enterprise within the said District of the Tati.

21. For the preservation of elephants and other game, the Company may make such other regulations and (notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained) may impose such licence duties on the killing or taking of elephants or other game as they may think fit; Provided that nothing in such regulations shall tend to diminish or interfere with any hunting rights which may have been or may hereafter be reserved to any native chiefs or tribes by treaty, save so far as any such regulations may relate to the establishment and enforcement of a close season.

22. The Company shall be subject to and shall perform and undertake all the obligations contained in or undertaken by Ourselves under any treaty, agreement or arrangement between Ourselves and any other State or Power whether already made or hereafter to be made. In all matters relating to the observance of this Article, or to the exercise within the Company's territories for the time being, of any jurisdiction exercisable by Us under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, the Company shall conform to and observe and carry out all such directions as may from time to time be given in that behalf by Our Secretary of State, and the Company shall appoint all necessary officers

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to perform such duties, and shall provide such Courts and other requisites as may from time to time be necessary for the administration of justice.

23. The original share capital of the Company shall be £1,000,000, divided into 1,000,000 shares of £1 each.

24. The Company is hereby further specially authorized and empowered for the purposes of this Our Charter from time to time—

- (I) To issue shares of different classes or descriptions, to increase the share capital of the Company, and to borrow moneys by debentures or other obligations.
- (II) To acquire and hold, and to charter or otherwise deal with, steam vessels and other vessels.
- (III) To establish or authorize banking companies and other companies, and undertakings or associations of every description, for purposes consistent with the provisions of this Our Charter.
- (IV) To make and maintain roads, railways, telegraphs, harbours and any other works which may tend to the development or improvement of the territories of the Company.
- (V) To carry on mining and other industries, and to make concessions of mining, forestal or other rights.
- (VI) To improve, develop, clear, plant, irrigate and cultivate any lands included within the territories of the Company.
- (VII) To settle any such territories and lands as aforesaid, and to aid and promote immigration.
- (VIII) To grant lands for terms of years or in perpetuity, and either absolutely, or by way of mortgage or otherwise.
- (IX) To make loans or contributions of money or money's worth, for promoting any of the objects of the Company.
- (X) To acquire and hold personal property.
- (XI) To acquire and hold (without licence in mortmain or other authority than this Our Charter) lands in the United Kingdom, not exceeding five acres in all, at any one time for the purpose of the offices and business of the Company and (subject to any local law) lands in any of Our Colonies or Possessions and elsewhere, convenient for carrying on the manage-

ment of the affairs of the Company, and to dispose from time to time of any such lands when not required for that purpose.

- (XII) To carry on any lawful commerce, trade, pursuit, business, operations or dealing whatsoever in connection with the objects of the Company.
- (XIII) To establish and maintain agencies in Our Colonies and Possessions, and elsewhere.
- (XIV) To sue and be sued by the Company's name of incorporation, as well in Our Courts in Our United Kingdom, or in Our Courts in Our Colonies or Possessions, or in Our Courts in Foreign countries or elsewhere.
- (XV) To do all lawful things incidental or conducive to the exercise or enjoyment of the rights, interests, authorities and powers of the Company in this Our Charter expressed or referred to, or any of them.

25. Within one year after the date of this Our Charter, or such extended period as may be certified by Our Secretary of State, there shall be executed by the Members of the Company for the time being a Deed of Settlement, provided so far as necessary for—

- (I) The further definition of the objects and purposes of the Company.
- (II) The classes or descriptions of shares into which the Capital of the Company is divided, and the calls to be made in respect thereof, and the terms and conditions of Membership of the Company.
- (III) The division and distribution of profits.
- (IV) General Meetings of the Company; the appointment by Our Secretary of State (if so required by him) of an Official Director, and the number, qualification, appointment, remuneration, rotation, removal and powers of Directors of the Company, and of other officers of the Company.
- (V) The registration of Members of the Company, and the transfer of shares in the capital of the Company.
- (VI) The preparation of annual accounts to be submitted to the Members at a General Meeting.
- (VII) The audit of those accounts by independent auditors.

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- (VIII) The making of bye-laws.
- (IX) The making and using of official seals of the Company.
- (X) The constitution and regulation of Committees or Local Boards of Management.
- (XI) The making and execution of supplementary deeds of settlement.
- (XII) The winding-up (in case of need) of the Company's affairs.
- (XIII) The government and regulation of the Company and of its affairs.
- (XIV) Any other matters usual or proper to be provided for in respect of a Chartered Company.

26. The Deed of Settlement shall, before the execution thereof, be submitted to and approved by the Lords of Our Council, and a certificate of their approval thereof, signed by the Clerk of Our Council, shall be endorsed on this Our Charter, and be conclusive evidence of such approval, and on the Deed of Settlement, and such Deed of Settlement shall take effect from the date of such approval, and shall be binding upon the Company, its Members, Officers and servants, and for all other purposes whatsoever.

27. The provisions of the Deed of Settlement, or of any supplementary Deed for the time being in force, may be from time to time repealed, varied or added to by a supplementary Deed, made and executed in such manner as the Deed of Settlement prescribes. Provided that the provisions of any such Deed relative to the Official Director shall not be repealed, varied or added to without the express approval of Our Secretary of State.

28. The Members of the Company shall be individually liable for the debts, contracts, engagement and liabilities of the Company to the extent only of the amount, if any, for the time being unpaid on the shares held by them respectively.

29. Until such Deed of Settlement as aforesaid takes effect the said James, Duke of Abercorn, shall be the President; the said Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, shall be Vice-President; and the said Edric Frederick Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Grey, and George Cawston shall be the Directors of the Company: and may on behalf of the Company do all things necessary or proper to be done under this Our Charter by or on behalf of the Company: Provided

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always that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Deed of Settlement of the Company, the said James, Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, and Albert Henry George Grey shall not be subject to retire from office in accordance with its provisions but shall be and remain Directors of the Company until death, incapacity to act or resignation, as the case may be.

30. And We do further will, ordain and declare that this Our Charter shall be acknowledged by Our governors and Our naval and military officers and Our consuls, and Our other officers in our Colonies and Possessions, and on the high seas and elsewhere, and they shall severally give full force and effect to this Our Charter, and shall recognize and be in all things aiding to the Company and its officers.

31. And We do further will, ordain and declare that this Our Charter shall be taken, construed and adjudged in the most favourable and beneficial sense for and to the best advantage of the Company as well in Our Courts in Our United Kingdom, and in Our Courts in Our Colonies or Possessions, and in Our Courts in Foreign countries or elsewhere, notwithstanding that there may appear to be in this Our Charter any non-recital, mis-recital, uncertainty or imperfection.

32. And We do further will, ordain and declare that this Our Charter shall subsist and continue valid, notwithstanding any lawful change in the name of the Company or in the Deed of Settlement thereof, such change being made with the previous approval of Our Secretary of State signified under his hand.

33. And We do further will, ordain and declare that it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, and We do hereby expressly reserve to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right and power by writing under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom at the end of twenty-five years from the date of this Our Charter, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add, to alter or repeal any of the provisions of this Our Charter or to enact other provisions in substitution for or in addition to any of its existing provisions. Provided that the right and power thus reserved shall be exercised only in relation to so much of this Our Charter as relates to administrative and public matters. And We do further expressly reserve to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right to take over any buildings or works belonging

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to the Company, and used exclusively or mainly for administrative or public purposes on payment to the Company of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed, or as failing agreement may be settled by the Commissioners of Our Treasury. And We do further appoint, direct and declare that any such writing under the said Great Seal shall have full effect, and be binding upon the Company, its Members, Officers and servants, and all other persons, and shall be of the same force, effect and validity as if its provisions had been part of and contained in these presents.

34. Provided always and We do further declare that nothing in this Our Charter shall be deemed or taken in any wise to limit or restrict the exercise of any of Our rights or powers with reference to the protection of any territories or with reference to the government thereof should We see fit to include the same within Our Dominions.

35. And We do lastly will, ordain and declare, without prejudice to any power to repeal this Our Charter by law belonging to Us, Our heirs and successors, or to any of Our courts, ministers, or officers independently of this present declaration and reservation, that in case at any time it is made to appear to Us in Our Council that the Company has substantially failed to observe and conform to the provisions of this Our Charter, or that the Company is not exercising its powers under the concessions, agreements, grants and treaties aforesaid, so as to advance the interests which the Petitioners have represented to Us to be likely to be advanced by the grant of this Our Charter, it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, and We do hereby expressly reserve and take to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right and power by writing under the Great Seal of Our United Kingdom to revoke this Our Charter, and to revoke and annul the privileges, powers and rights hereby granted to the Company.

In Witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

Witness Ourselves at Westminster, the twenty-ninth day of October, in the fifty-third year of Our reign.

By Warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual.

*The
Great Seal
of the
United Kingdom.*

MUIR MACKENZIE.

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

SUPPLEMENTAL CHARTER I

VICTORIA by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting :

WHEREAS by Our Charter or Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, bearing date at Westminster, the 29th day of October, 1889, We did grant, ordain and declare that The Most Noble JAMES, Duke of ABERCORN, now Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath ; The Most Noble ALEXANDER WILLIAM GEORGE, Duke of FIFE, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Privy Councillor ; the Right Honourable EDRIC FREDERICK LORD GIFFORD, V.C. ; CECIL JOHN RHODES, Esquire, Member of the Executive Council and of the House of Assembly of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, now The Right Honourable CECIL JOHN RHODES ; ALFRED BEIT, Esquire, Merchant ; ALBERT HENRY GEORGE GREY, Esquire, now The Right Honourable EARL GREY ; and GEORGE CAWSTON, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law, and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time should become and be members of the body politic and corporate thereby constituted, erected and incorporated should be constituted, erected and incorporated into one body politic and corporate by the name of the British South Africa Company, by which name they should have perpetual succession and a common seal with such powers as in the same Charter mentioned :

AND WHEREAS it is expedient that Our said Charter should be amended as hereinafter provided :

AND WHEREAS the said British South Africa Company has agreed to accept the said amendments :

Now know ye that We of Our especial grace and mere motion have willed, ordained, constituted and declared,

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and by these presents for Us, Our heirs and successors, do will, ordain, constitute and declare, and unto the said British South Africa Company do grant in manner following :

1. This Charter shall be read and construed as one with the Charter granted by Us on the 29th October, 1889, to the British South Africa Company, which said Charter is herein referred to as the Principal Charter.
2. So much of Article 10 of the Principal Charter as provides that the Company may make Ordinances to be approved by Our Secretary of State is hereby repealed, but without prejudice to anything lawfully done thereunder. Provided that the Company may continue to make Ordinances to be approved as aforesaid until the date on which a Legislative Council to be established for Southern Rhodesia shall assemble, and thereupon such powers shall altogether cease and determine.
3. Article 29 of the Principal Charter is hereby repealed, but without prejudice to anything lawfully done thereunder.
4. Nothing in the Principal Charter shall authorize the Company to establish or maintain any force of military police.
5. Any person or persons duly authorized in that behalf in writing by Our Secretary of State shall at all convenient times have access to all documents of the Company, and shall be furnished by the Company, or its officers and servants, with true copies of any such documents as aforesaid, as and when he may require.
6. The Directors of the Company shall, within eight days from the passing or recording thereof, cause to be transmitted to our Secretary of State true copies of all resolutions, minutes, orders or other proceedings of the Board of Directors or of any Committee thereof which relate to the administration by the Company of the territories within its field of operations, and Our Secretary of State may intimate to the Directors at any time his dissent from any such resolution, minute, order or other proceeding, or may require the same to be cancelled or amended, or the operation thereof to be suspended for such time or in such manner

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as he shall direct, and thereupon the operation of any such resolution, order, minute or proceeding shall, as and from a date named by Our Secretary of State, or, if no date is named, as and from the date of such direction, be cancelled, amended or the operation thereof suspended accordingly, but without prejudice to anything lawfully done thereunder.

7. Any Director, Officer or servant of the Company who in the opinion of Our Secretary of State shall refuse or neglect

(1) To comply with any of the requirements of our Secretary of State made under the provisions of the Principal Charter or of any Supplemental Charter, or

(2) To comply with the provisions of the last preceding Article of this Our Supplemental Charter,

shall, if Our Secretary of State shall so direct, cease to be a Director, Officer, or servant of the Company, and the Company shall not employ in any capacity whatsoever any such Director, Officer, or servant without the permission in writing of Our Secretary of State first had and obtained.

8. Nothing herein or in the Principal Charter contained shall be deemed to impose upon Our Secretary of State or upon the Lords Commissioners of Our Treasury any liability with respect to any matter relating to the financial concerns or commercial undertakings of the Company.

9. In this Charter and in the Principal Charter, unless the contrary intention appears, "document" shall include "minute," "resolution," "order," "book," "telegram," "letter," "map," "code," "cypher," or any other printed, typed or written matter of any nature whatsoever, or any copy thereof.

In Witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

Witness Ourselves at Westminster the eighth day of June, in the sixty-third year of Our reign.

By Warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual.

MUIR MACKENZIE.

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

SUPPLEMENTAL CHARTER II

GEORGE THE FIFTH by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith.

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting :

WHEREAS by Her Charter or Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, bearing date at Westminster, the 29th day of October, 1889, Her late Majesty Queen Victoria did grant, ordain and declare that James, Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, Edric Frederick, Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit (all of whom are now deceased), Albert Henry George Grey (now the Right Honourable Earl Grey), and George Cawston, and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time should become and be members of the body politic and corporate thereby constituted, erected and incorporated, should be constituted, erected and incorporated into one body politic and corporate by the name of the British South Africa Company, by which name they should have perpetual succession and a common seal, with the authorities, powers and privileges conferred and subject to the conditions imposed by the said Charter (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Charter) :

And whereas the said Charter was amended by a further Charter granted by Her said late Majesty Queen Victoria on the 8th day of June, 1900 (hereinafter referred to as the First Supplemental Charter) :

And whereas it is expedient that the Principal Charter should be amended as hereinafter provided :

And whereas the said British South Africa Company has agreed to accept the said amendments :

Now KNOW YE that We of Our especial grace and mere motion have willed, ordained, constituted and declared, and by these Presents for Us, Our heirs and successors, do will

ordain, constitute and declare, and unto the said British South Africa Company do grant, in manner following :

1. This Charter shall be read and construed as one with the Principal Charter and the First Supplemental Charter.
2. So much of Article 33 of the Principal Charter as provides that it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, at the end of twenty-five years from the date of the said Charter, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add to, alter or repeal any of the provisions of the said Charter relating to administrative and public matters, or to enact other provisions in substitution therefor or in addition thereto, shall be read and construed subject to the proviso that if at any time after the 29th day of October, 1914, the Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia shall, by an absolute majority of the whole number of the Members of the Council as then constituted, pass a Resolution praying the Crown to establish in Southern Rhodesia the form of Government known as Responsible Government, and shall support such Resolution with evidence showing that the condition of the territory financially and in other respects is such as to justify the establishment of the form of Government aforesaid, it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, if We or They at any time think fit, to accede to the prayer of such Resolution, to add to, alter or repeal any of the provisions of the said Charter relating to administrative and public matters, or to enact other provisions in substitution therefor or in addition thereto for the purpose of establishing Responsible Government.
3. So much of Article 33 of the Principal Charter as reserves to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right to take over any buildings or works belonging to the Company, and used exclusively or mainly for administrative or public purposes, on payment to the Company of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed, or as, failing agreement, may be settled by the Commissioners of Our Treasury, shall be read and construed subject to the proviso that the Company shall not be entitled to compensation in respect of any such buildings or works

as aforesaid which can be shown to have been wholly provided out of administrative revenue between the 29th day of October, 1914, and the date on which the said buildings and works shall have been so taken over, such period being taken as a whole, and where any such buildings and works can be shown to have been partly so provided during the said period taken as a whole the Company shall be entitled to claim compensation in respect only of such proportion of the value of the said buildings and works as that part of the original cost which has not, at the date of their being taken over as aforesaid, been provided out of administrative revenue may bear to the total cost of the said buildings and works.

4. Subject to the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of this Our Charter, Article 33 of the Principal Charter shall continue to have full force, effect and validity, and nothing in this Our Charter shall be deemed or taken in any wise to limit or restrict the exercise of any rights or powers reserved to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, by the said Article.

In Witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

Witness Ourself at Westminster, the thirteenth day of March, 1915, in the fifth year of Our reign.

By Warrant under the King's Sign Manual.

MUIR MACKENZIE.

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
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
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
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